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Abstract
This thesis explores some of the associations between income inequality, education 
and economic growth. In addition, the thesis also explores the effects of democracy 
and regime duration on growth. The analysis is conducted at three levels: for 
Malaysia as a nation using time series data, for a panel of Malaysian states and for a
panel of Southeast Asian countries. The main empirical tools applied are meta-
regression analysis and panel data econometrics. Specifically, the thesis explores the 
following associations: (i) the effect of education on inequality; (ii) the effect of 
economic development and economic growth on inequality; (iii) the effect of 
education on growth; (iv) the effect of inequality on growth; (v) the effect of 
democracy on growth; and (vi) the effect of regime duration on growth.
The results from the meta-regression analysis suggest that education is 
effective at reducing inequality at both ends of the income distribution (the share of 
the top 20 percent and the share of the bottom 40 percent). The panel data 
econometric evidence for Malaysia and Southeast Asia suggests that the relationship 
between education and inequality is non-linear, though in opposite directions. For 
Southeast Asia, education initially increases inequality but then subsequently it
reduces inequality. For Malaysia, education appears to initially reduce inequality but 
then subsequently it increases it.
There is no clear evidence of a link between economic development and 
inequality (Kuznets’ curve) in Southeast Asian countries. The one exception is 
Thailand. The evidence is very similar at the Malaysian regional level; the pattern of 
inequality for Malaysian states also contradicts Kuznets’ hypothesis. 
Inequality has, in general, a positive effect on growth in both Malaysia and 
Southeast Asia but this effect is not always robust. Education has a negative 
relationship with short-run growth. Democracy has a positive effect on growth in 
Malaysia but there is no evidence that democracy has any effect on growth in 
Southeast Asia.
The relationship between regime duration, party dominance and economic 
growth appears to be non-linear, just as Olson (1982) hypothesized. There is robust 
evidence of positive growth effects from party dominance in Malaysian states and 
throughout Southeast Asia. However, very strong party dominance and very long 
lived regimes are bad for economic growth. Regarding Malaysian government 
xv
policies, it appears that inequality increased during the period of the NEP. The NEP 
did however stimulate growth in Malaysia.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This thesis explores some of the associations between inequality, economic growth 
and education in Malaysia. Malaysia offers a fascinating case study, as it is a country
that has been rather successful at generating economic growth and economic 
development. Malaysia is also an example of a country that has actively used 
education as a vehicle for reducing inequality and promoting economic growth. In 
their highly influential study, The East Asian Miracle, the World Bank (1993)
categorized Malaysia as one of the High-Performing Asian Economies (HPAE), with 
several neighbouring Southeast Asian countries (most notably Singapore, Indonesia 
and Thailand) also members of this group. The HPAE group of countries has 
recorded relatively high rates of economic growth. As shown in Figure 1.1, the 
Southeast Asian region1 has recorded solid economic growth since the 1960s. While
many countries in Latin America recorded negative or below one percent economic 
growth (Georgio and Lee, 1999), Southeast Asian countries recorded an average 
annual growth of about 4.2 percent during the 1960-2010 period.2
Figure 1.1: Southeast Asia, economic growth, 5-year averages, 1960-2010
Source: WDI Online, 2012
                                                          
1 Figure 1.1 includes all countries except Brunei for which  most of the data are not available.
2The Asian financial crisis in 1997 was a rare exception to this growth record.  
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Sustained economic growth is not an easy achievement. Malaysia in 
particular has struggled very hard especially in the early development period.
Malaysia gained her independence from Great Britain 55 years ago. Since 
independence, Malaysia’s gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) has grown 
steadily; see Figure 1.2. Indeed, Malaysia has outperformed middle-income countries
as a group and the income differential has widened during the new century.
Figure 1.2: Malaysia and middle income countries GDPpc
(USD constant 2000), 1960-2010
Source: WDI Online, 2012
At the time of independence, inequality and mass Malay poverty were two of 
the main problems facing the newly formed country. A decade after independence, 
inequality and mass Malay poverty had turned into a crisis, culminating in the 13 
May 1969 riot. For many Malaysians, the riot counts as one of the greatest national 
tragedies in recent history. According to official reports, about 200 people were 
killed and 6,000 people made homeless as a direct result of the riot. The government 
declared a state of emergency and Parliament was suspended for 18 months.
The 1969 riot triggered a national debate in Malaysia about the underlying 
causes and possible solutions. The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and the 
Department of National Unity (DNU) were assigned to investigate the causes and to 
provide solutions. Economic inequality between ethnic groups in Malaysia was 
identified as a major underlying source of social unrest. The government identified 
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the backwardness of the indigenous Malays as the main factor behind inter-ethnic 
tensions that led to the May 13 upheaval. Affirmative action in the form of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) was implemented in order to transform the position and 
privileges of the Malays, in an attempt to reduce economic inequality between the 
main ethnic groups in Malaysia (Faaland et.al, 1990). In addition, the NEP was also 
assigned the task of promoting economic growth.
During the period of the NEP, Malaysia recorded an impressive reduction in 
poverty levels. Figure 1.3 illustrates the dramatic reduction in the poverty level in 
Malaysia from 1970 to 2009. In 1970, about half of the Malaysian population lived
in poverty. The poverty level has declined rapidly from 52.4 percent in 1970 to only 
3.8 percent in 2009. Income inequality has also declined, in general. As shown in 
Figure 1.4, although inequality has fluctuated over time, it has generally followed a
declining trend; the Gini coefficient was 0.51 in 1970 compared to 0.44 in 2009.    
Figure 1.3: Malaysian poverty level, 1970-2009
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia (2011)
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Figure 1.4: Malaysian inequality level, 1970-2009
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia (2011)
Education has played a central role in Malaysian economic policies. For 
example, a higher education policy that advantages the Bumiputera 3 was 
incorporated in numerous public policies and development plans, particularly the 
NEP. Education has received strong support from Malaysian government. School 
enrollment rates, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels, have increased 
dramatically. Malaysian efforts at increasing education can be seen from the 
remarkable increase in the average years of schooling illustrated in Figure 1.5 below. 
Similar increases in education can be seen throughout Southeast Asia. The 
stock of human capital is relatively high in Southeast Asia, with education receiving 
a relatively high proportion of government expenditure (Asian Development Bank, 
2008: 7-9; Lee and Francisco, 2010: 9-10). Enrollment rates for primary and 
secondary schools are more than 90 percent and 80 percent, respectively.
                                                          
3The Malay and other indigenous groups are known as Bumiputera, which means ‘son of soils’, while 
other ethnic groups such as Chinese and Indians, are known as ‘Non-Bumiputera’. This classification 
is used for administrative purposes, especially in the implementation of some affirmative action
economic policies. 
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Figure 1.5: Malaysia, average years of schooling, 1970-2010
Source: Barro and Lee (2010)
1.2 Key Objectives
Education is generally believed to be an effective tool for reducing inequality, 
but the empirical evidence for this at the macroeconomic level is very mixed.
Moreover, the relationship between education and growth and inequality and growth 
are also empirically uncertain. The main objective of this thesis is to study some of 
the relationships between inequality, education and growth. Malaysia is used as the 
main case study, with the empirical analysis conducted at both the national and the 
state levels. Additionally, data for Southeast Asia are analysed in order to provide a 
broader regional perspective and benchmark.
The thesis makes three main contributions to the literature:
First, this thesis assesses the strength and significance of the effect of 
education on inequality. Various studies have shown that education can increase, 
decrease or have no effect on inequality. Meta-regression analysis is applied to the 
extant empirical findings to investigate this issue in a comprehensive manner.
Second, this thesis studies the patterns in inequality and the determinants of 
inequality in Malaysia and Southeast Asia. In particular, this thesis tests Kuznets’
hypothesis for Malaysia and Southeast Asia. Kuznets’ hypothesis is one of the most 
influential hypotheses in the study of inequality. However, relatively few studies 
have been conducted for Southeast Asian countries. The thesis contributes to the 
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literature by also exploring Kuznets’ hypothesis within a single nation, by analysing
the path of inequality between and within Malaysian states.
Third, this thesis investigates the relationship between inequality and growth. 
This relationship is also the subject of substantial disagreement within the literature. 
Early studies suggest inequality may be harmful for growth while new evidence 
suggests inequality is either good for growth, or it has an insignificant effect on 
growth. This thesis tackles this issue in the context of models that also explore the 
effects of democracy and regime duration on inequality and growth. This is an 
important consideration as Southeast Asian countries have by and large been ruled 
by autocracies and partial democracies. Moreover, many governments in this region 
are relatively long lived and some are ruled by a single party. The relationship of the 
main variables examined in this thesis can be illustrated by the diagram below.
 
 
Figure 1.6: The relationship of the main variables
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1.3 Organization of the Thesis
Following this chapter, Chapter 2 provides a discussion on inequality and 
Malaysian economic policy issues. Chapter 2 commences with a review of 
Malaysian economic policies and the structure of the economy in the post-colonial 
period until the implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1970. The chapter 
also presents a brief discussion and assessment of the New Economic Policy (1970-
1990). The chapter then discusses Malaysian economic policies in the post-New 
Economic Policy environment.
Chapter 3 discusses the history and development of Malaysian education. 
This chapter highlights the importance of education for nation building. As a 
multiracial country, the issue of education, language and national unity is of 
fundamental importance, and was particularly so in the early period after 
Independence. Education became an important component of the New Economic 
Policy.  Chapter 3 also discusses the affirmative action policy in education under the 
New Economic Policy. Finally, Chapter 3 presents a brief overview on new 
directions in Malaysia, and future education challenges including the impact of 
globalization. Chapters 2 and 3 thus provide background on the role of education in
shaping inequality and growth within the Malaysian context. These serve as useful 
foundations for the ensuing empirical analysis.
Several methods of analysis and several types of data are employed in the 
empirical analysis presented in this thesis (Chapters 5 to 8). The discussion of the 
general methodology and data used is presented in Chapter 4. The data used in this 
thesis was obtained from various sources; national and international agencies such as 
the Economic Planning Unit, Malaysian Election Commission and the World Bank.
Hence, data quality is an essential issue. The discussion on data quality, data 
transformations and the construction of variables is also presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 presents a meta-regression analysis of the effect of education on 
inequality. This involves a comprehensive quantitative literature review of 66 
empirical studies. This chapter also discusses several issues that are important in 
meta-analysis, such as publication bias and the heterogeneity of reported results.
The focus of Chapter 6 is the relationship between inequality and growth in 
Malaysia and Southeast Asia based on Kuznets’ hypothesis. Kuznets’ hypothesis has 
been widely tested but very few studies have been carried out in Southeast Asia.
Rapid economic growth and low inequality are notable features of Southeast Asia, 
Chapter 1
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contrary to Kuznets’ hypothesis; this makes the region a particularly interesting case 
study. Several empirical models of Kuznets’ hypothesis are tested in Chapter 6. The 
chapter also provides an analysis of the role of education and government in 
influencing inequality. 
Chapter 7 extends the discussion on the patterns of inequality using 
Malaysian regional data. The pattern of regional inequality is an important issue for 
Malaysia. This chapter provides estimates of Kuznets’ and Williamson’s curves for 
regional Malaysia. The chapter also explores regional income convergence (beta-
and sigma-convergence). Finally, this chapter also highlights some of the important 
factors behind continued regional income disparities, such as historical background, 
government policies and the effects of globalization.
In Chapter 8, this thesis examines the relationship between inequality and 
growth. Is inequality harmful to growth? Do different measures of inequality make a 
difference? Is the experience of Malaysia different to that of Southeast Asia in 
general? The analysis incorporates the effects of democracy and regime duration as 
determinants of growth in Malaysia and Southeast Asia. Has democracy contributed 
to growth in the region? What has been the impact of regime duration on growth?
Chapter 9 concludes and summarizes the thesis. This final chapter provides a 
summary of the major findings and policy implications. The chapter also discusses 
some of the limitations of the thesis and offers some suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
INEQUALITY AND MALAYSIAN ECONOMIC POLICY
2.1 Introduction
Malaysia is an independent nation state comprising 13 states and 3 Federal 
Territories. Malaysia consists of two major regions separated by the South China 
Sea. Peninsular Malaysia (also known as West Malaysia) is connected to mainland 
Asia. East Malaysia, comprising Sabah and Sarawak, is located at Borneo, 
approximately 650 km across the South China Sea.1
Malaysia is a multiracial society with more than 26 ethnic groups. Peninsular 
Malaysia is predominantly populated by Malays, followed by Chinese and Indians,
as well as small communities of other ethnic groups such as Siamese and indigenous 
ethnic groups. In Sabah and Sarawak, indigenous ethnic groups such as Iban, 
Melanau, Kadazan and Dusun make up about 60 percent of the population.
This chapter provides a background on Malaysian economic development 
policies, particularly relating to inequality. The chapter proceeds as follows.
Inequality, both pre- and during British Occupation, is discussed in Section 2.2. 
Section 2.3 presents a review of economic policies in the post-colonial period until 
the implementation of the New Economic Policy. Section 2.4 discusses the New 
Economic Policy and Section 2.5 discusses the post-New Economic Policy period. A
summary is provided in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Inequality During Pre-Colonialism to British Occupation, 1400-19562
Inequality in Malaysia can be traced back to the era of pre-colonialism. 
Before the colonial era, Malays dominated the population in Malaya. They had 
traditional political systems and structures. The states were the largest units, headed 
by a King (or Sultan). The Kings were assisted by local chiefs, and local village 
headmen ruled at the district level. Melaka (Malacca) was the most developed state 
due to its strategic location in the middle of a trade route. Traders from the East and 
West met at Melaka, resulting in Melaka becoming one of the famous trading centres 
in Southeast Asia. Spices, tin and textiles were among the main commodities traded. 
                                                          
1 Prior to independence Peninsular Malaysia was known as Malaya. After Independence this region is
also referred to as West Malaysia. Sabah was called North Borneo before joining the Malaysian
Federation. Sabah and Sarawak together are widely known as East Malaysia. These terms are used 
interchangeably.   
2 See Ali (2008) for details of Malay history during British Occupation.
Inequality and Malaysian Economic Policy 
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The popularity of Melaka as a trade zone was due to good management practiced by 
the Melaka ruler; this included good facilities and special areas for the traders to 
organise their business.
The prominence of Melaka as a trade centre during the 16th century shows 
that Malays do have business traditions and have a history of involvement with
commerce. However, these trade activities were dominated by the rulers (the Sultans)
and chiefs (government officers) of Melaka. While most of the common people 
carried out agricultural activities, they were forced to pay taxes or send tributes to the 
rulers and chiefs. Therefore, the economic position of the chief and the rulers was
strong. Unfortunately, the wealth accumulated by the rulers and chiefs was not 
channeled into productive investment or the development of the states but, as noted 
by Ali (2008:101), was:
often used to beautify their palaces and glorify their way of life, in keeping with 
their rank and position. Part of their riches was kept in the form of gold, silver, 
jewellery and other valuables; and among other things these riches could be used for 
‘financing’ war, but never as a source of capital investment for any major 
economic undertaking.
As a result, when the British colonialised Malaya and introduced new 
economic activities, the ruling class lost much of its economic strength, weakening
its power in the community (Ali, 2008:103). This enabled the British to monopolise 
modern economic sectors such as mining and rubber plantations, which previously
had been the main sources of income for the ruling class.
In 1511, the Portuguese captured Melaka; this was the beginning of western 
colonialism in Malaya. The Dutch then defeated the Portuguese in 1641. The Dutch 
ruled Melaka for more than 200 years until the end of the 19 century. British 
colonialisation started in the late 19 century after a series of agreements with the 
Dutch and Malay’s Sultans. When Francis Light founded Penang in 1786, the British 
objective was only for trade through the British East India Company. Until 1874, the 
British did not become involved in politics, and left all administration to the Malay 
rulers and local headmen. However, the Chinese community created disorder and 
clan wars especially in the mining fields, which encouraged the British to intervene 
in order to maintain peace for traders in Penang and Singapore (Ness, 1967:25). At 
the same time, the British also had to prevent the advancement of Germany and 
France in Southeast Asia, inducing the British government to sign the Treaty of 
Pangkor with the Perak ruler in 1874.  Purcell (1946:21) noted:
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The Straits Settlements Chinese frequently petitioned the British Government to 
intervene to restore order to the Peninsula, but this for over fifty years after the 
foundation of Singapore the British refused to do. Eventually, however, an 
accumulation of abuses persuaded them to change their policy. Clashes between the 
Malay and Chinese miners of Larut and bloody faction fights among the latter, and 
a recrudescence of piracy along the coast were among the reasons for this change 
of policy.
In 1874 the British government signed the Treaty of Pangkor with the Sultan of 
Perak; this treaty forced the Sultan to accept a British resident adviser except in areas 
of religion and Malay customs. Similar agreements were also made in Selangor and 
other Malay states including Negeri Sembilan and Pahang in 1895. By the early 20th
century, four northern states were ruled from Singapore by the British government. 
The Plural Society
The population of Malaya during the British Occupation comprised three 
main ethnic groups. Malays, the largest ethnic group, made up 60 percent of the 
population. The Chinese were the second largest ethnic group making up about 30 
percent of the population, and the other 10 percent was made up of the Indian ethnic 
group. In 1911, a census recorded that the population of Malaya was about 2.4 
million; by 1947, less than 40 years later, the population had doubled to 4.9 million. 
By the time of Malaya’s independence from British Colonialisation in 1957, the 
population of Malaya was over 6 million (Lim, 1973: 68; Lau, 1989: 217).
The rapid growth of the Malaya population during the colonial era can be 
attributed substantially to mass immigration from China and India. As discussed 
above, Melaka was located on the trade route between India, the West and China,
resulting in a strong relationship between the Chinese, Indian and Malaya 
communities. In the early 19th century, the Sultan of Johor brought Chinese 
immigrants in to work his pepper plantation. The Chinese then moved to tin mining 
fields in central Malaya (Selangor and Perak) in the middle of the 19th century. 
During the period of British Colonialisation period, the Chinese and Indians were 
brought in by the British government to work in the tin mining or rubber estates.
Large scale migration of Chinese and Indians into the country resulted in 
problems of ethnic segmentation, both economically and geographically. There was
very little integration and only limited interaction among the ethnic communities. 
The general perception of many Chinese and Indians was that their stay in Malaya 
was temporary. Interaction with ethnic communities was not important to them since 
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after accumulating enough savings, they were to return ‘home’ to China or India. 
There was no ‘sense of belonging’ to Malaya as they perceived it as a transition land 
rather than as their new homeland (Gomez and Jomo, 1997:11).
Economic Growth and Main Economic Activities3
The Malayan economy was very much dependent on rubber and tin exports.
Table 2.1 shows that the primary sector, comprising agriculture, forestry and mining,
was the main source of income. It generated $2,867 million or 54.3% of gross 
national income (GNI) in 1951, $2,125 or 48.2% in 1952 and $1,810 or 45.3% in 
1953.
Table 2.1: Industrial origin of gross national income, West Malaysia, in current 
prices, 1951-1953
Year 1951 1952 1953
Sectors RM 
Million
% of 
Total
RM 
Million
% of 
Total
RM 
Million
% of 
Total
Primary Sector 2867 54.3 2125 48.2 1810 45.3
Rubber 1495 28.3 799 18.1 528 13.2
Mining 354 6.7 325 7.4 225 5.6
Other 1018 19.3 1001 22.7 1057 26.5
Secondary and 
Tertiary Sectors
2406 45.7 2291 51.8 2162 54.7
Gross National 
Income
5273 100.0 4416 100.0 3987 100.0
Source: Lim (1973:106)
Rubber and tin mining were the main economic activities in Malaya. In 1947-
1950, exports of rubber and tin contributed 83 percent of total exports. The 
contribution of rubber and tin to the total export reached a peak in 1951 to 1955
period but dropped slightly in 1956-1960 (Table 2.2). Rubber and tin exports had
high price volatility, thus the GDP growth of the Malayan economy was also 
unstable.
                                                          
3 The currency used in this thesis is the Malaysian Ringgit (RM) or the local currency Malayan Dollar
($) unless stated otherwise. RM and $ are used interchangeably depending on the context and period.
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Income Per Capita
In the 1950s, the Malayan economy was one of the more developed 
economies in the Asian region. The World Bank (1955) estimated per capita income 
of Malaya in 1953 to be about USD250, the highest in the Far East. Malaya was also 
considerably advanced in terms of infrastructure development such as transportation
and telecommunications, as well as financial services, compared to its neighbouring
countries. 
Table 2.2: Composition of gross exports by major items, 1947-1960 (%)
Items Years
1947-1950 1951-1955 1956-1960
Rubber 64 64 63
Tin 19 21 17
Iron-ore - 1 4
Timber 1 1 2
Palm Oil 2 2 2
Others 14 11 12
TOTAL 100 100 100
Source: Lim (1973:122)
Control of Wealth and Ownership4
Post-colonialisation, the Malaya economy was separated into three layers.
The first layer was dominated by British companies with control over most of the 
modern economic sectors. They were involved in the modern and commercial sectors
that used large scale production methods. Rubber and palm oil were grown in high 
scale estate plantations, while tin mining used modern technology. Their products 
were also produced for the international market via ports in Penang and Singapore. 
Large scale production enabled British companies to obtain financial support from 
international banking institutions such as the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the 
Chartered Bank. The profits and wages earned from their business activities were 
relatively higher than their traditional counterparts.
The second layer was the Chinese and Indians that were involved in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors as mediators for British companies. They worked as 
                                                          
4 The following discussion is based on Faaland et. al. (1990).
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entrepreneurs and managers as well as employees in the British firms. They earned 
higher incomes compared to Malays. In the 1950s, before Independence, European 
companies had control of 65 to 75 percent of the export trade and 60 to 70 percent of 
the import trade, while Chinese firms owned around 10 percent of import agencies.
Indian owned companies amounted to around 2 percent of import trade, while Malay 
ownership was close to non-existent (Gomez and Jomo 1997:14).
The Malays made up the third layer, mostly in the rural areas working as 
farmers and fishermen. They worked in traditional sectors, which normally involved 
a small scale of production. Due to diseconomies of scale, their products were for 
local consumption only with no intention to produce for the international market. 
Most of the time, goods were produced for self-subsistence and did not aim for 
commercialisation. The traditional method was a common type of production in 
Malay communities, especially in the Malay Belt states, while in the West Coast 
some peasant agriculture was more developed. Tin mining carried out by Malays also 
used traditional methods and was mostly carried out by hand. The participation of 
Malays in the modern sector was very small and limited to the British civil service,
particularly the police and military, which earned relatively low wages (Faaland, 
1990:7). 
Employment Pattern and Division of Labour
The change in the population composition which resulted from an influx of 
immigrants to Malaya also influenced the labour force composition. The British 
government employed Chinese and Indians immigrants to work in the plantation and 
mining sectors in order to secure a cheap labour supply and reduce costs. The British 
refused to employ Malays due to the perception that Malays were not productive. 
According to Ali (2008:104):
The British had encouraged Indians to migrate from southern India to become 
workers on their estates, and Chinese from southern China to work in the mines. 
They did not employ the Malays, in line with the policy that Malays should 
continue doing traditional agriculture especially for producing the rice. They also 
believed that the Malays made neither hardworking nor stable labourers since 
their family links to their village were strong, allowing them to quit or return 
home whenever they wished. It was difficult for the Chinese and Indians to do so 
because their homes were far across the sea. 
Unfortunately, the British policy resulted in a close identification between race and 
economic function, which can be seen by examining the distribution of employment 
by ethnic group. 
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Table 2.3 shows that the majority of Malays were involved in agriculture 
particularly as farmers (e.g. rubber tappers) and labourers. Although more than half 
of government sector jobs were filled by Malays, these jobs were mainly lower 
positions such as office assistants, the army and policemen. They were needed by the 
British Government to communicate with the local people. Meanwhile the Chinese
ethnic group dominated mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities as well as 
the services sector.   
Table 2.3: Distribution of employment by ethnic group 1947(%)
Sector Malays Chinese Indians and Others
Agriculture 57 30 13
Peasant/Rice 70 27 3
Rubber 39 33 28
Mining 14 71 15
Manufacturing, Construction and Utilities 19 70 11
Services 27 48 25
Government 54 11 35
Total Employment 44 40 16
Source: Lim (1973:53)
The modern economic sector was controlled by the British and the non-
Malays with several types of discrimination. Thus it was almost impossible for the 
Malays to move forward or compete in the economy or job market. Faaland et.al.
(1990:7) explain the situation in Malaya as follows:
Social and economic discrimination against the Malays by commercial and 
industrial circles controlled by the non-Malays took many forms. In business, the 
British and Chinese banks refused to have anything to do with them, for they 
were regarded as having no suitable experiences. In wholesale, retail, and export 
and import business, they were kept out by associations and guilds. Even if the 
Malays, sought jobs in the private sector, they were kept out by clan, language 
and cultural preferences and barriers. The many Chinese and Indian shops 
refused to employ Malays. Until recently, Indian shops imported labour from 
India when there were short-handed. As for urban jobs outside the government, 
only the lowest types of manual labour were open to Malays: such jobs as 
trishaw pedalers, drivers and watchmen.
Income Distribution
As discussed above, Malaya had relatively high income per capita and 
economic growth in the 1950s, however the wealth was not enjoyed by all citizens
but was instead concentrated amongst certain groups. There were no official statistics 
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or surveys available during the British Occupation period to measure inequality and 
poverty. The earliest data available comes from the study by Benham (1951) on the 
national income of West Malaysia and Singapore in 1947 (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Aggregate income and per capita income levels by ethnic group for West 
Malaysia and Singapore
Malays Chinese Indians Total
Aggregate Individual Income        
(RM Million) 656 1714 337 3023
Percent of Total Income 22 57 11 100
Population (million) 2.54 2.61 0.6 5.82
Percent of Total Population 44 45 10 100
Income Per capita      (RM 
Million) 258 657 562 519
Source: Lim (1973:54)
Benham (1951) reported that Malays received only 22 percent of aggregate 
income even though their share of the population was 44 percent. Meanwhile, 
Chinese and Indians, which comprised 45 percent and 10 percent of the population, 
enjoyed a higher share of income of around 57 percent and 11 per cent, respectively. 
The Chinese earned the highest aggregate income of about $1714 million, while 
Malays and Indians earned $656 million and $337 million respectively. Income per 
capita of the Malays was the lowest compared to the Chinese and Indians. Malays’
income per capita was only $258, about 154 percent and 118 percent lower than the 
Chinese and Indians per capita income, respectively. Chinese's income per capita 
was $657 and Indians was $562. In short, the data in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that 
there was significant inequality in income distribution in West Malaysia and 
Singapore in 1947 during the British Occupation.
Policies to Overcome Inequality
There was no systematic and proper development planning in the early stage 
of British Occupation, particularly in relation to poverty and inequality (Jomo, 
1990:102-106). Infrastructure was mostly developed on a private basis by tin mining 
and rubber plantation owners, with some minimal investment from the British 
Government. After World War II, the British faced serious balance of payment 
imbalances due to shortages in foreign exchange. This problem restricted the British 
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government’s ability to develop Malaya even though Malaya was one of the major 
sources of British factor income from abroad (see Corley, 1994:81). The first 
development plan was the Draft Development Plan (DPP) and was implemented after 
World War II in 1950. The budget allocations in the DPP favoured the economic 
sector (e.g. mining and plantation), which received 92 percent of the overall budget,
with only 8 percent of the total allotted to the social sector, such as the education.
The First Five Year Plan (1956-1960), introduced in 1956, succeeded the 
DPP. The budget allocation in this plan also heavily favoured the economic sector,
particularly in the development of infrastructure (Jomo, 1990:104). In addition,
infrastructure development was biased towards rubber plantation and mining areas,
which were located mainly on the western coast. Hence, uneven development 
persisted between the urban and rural areas.
2.3 Post-Colonialisation: The Independence and Market Led Development,
1957-1969
In the decade prior to independence, the three main ethnic groups had formed 
political parties which were mainly ethnic based to protect their own interests. As 
discussed above, the influx of immigrants during the British Occupation resulted in 
ethnic plurality and economic polarisation in Malaya. The main concern of Malays 
was sovereignty over their own country. Many Malays were afraid of losing the 
country to the immigrants as noted by Purcell (1946: 25):
The Malays, though their numbers increased (from 1,438,000 in 1911 to 1,651,000
in 1921, to 1,962,000 in 1931 and to 2,279,000 in 1941) and though they shared 
directly and indirectly in the country's newly acquired wealth, were feeling the 
economic encroachment of the more enterprising immigrants, especially the 
Chinese. The interests of the Malay peasant were safeguarded by the setting 
aside of Malay land reservations which could not be alienated to non-Malays, but in 
spite of this and the preference given to Malays in the government service of the 
Malay States, the economic status of the native people of the country was relatively 
declining. The immigrants, at the same time, though appreciative of the 
opportunity to thrive, were not altogether satisfied with their indeterminate status 
and with their exclusion from the higher ranks of public employment.
These concerns increased when the British proposed the Malayan Union in 
1946. The Malayan Union proposal diminished the power of all Malay Sultans to 
that of advisors of Malay customs and religion only. Administration of the country 
was in the hands of the British Resident, who was directly accountable to the British 
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government in London.5 The Malayan Union proposal also recommended equal 
rights for all Malayan residents, triggering huge protests from the Malays. The 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the largest Malay political party,
was established in 1946 in response to the Malayan Union proposal. UMNO leaders 
organised mass demonstrations and protests over the Malayan Union. The Malayan 
Union was abandoned and replaced with the Federation of Malaya in 1948 (Lau, 
1989: 242). 
At the same time, the Chinese and Indians also formed their own political 
parties. The Indian community formed the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) in 1946 
and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was formed in 1948 by the Chinese 
community to protect their interests. The three parties eventually proposed the 
independence of Malaya to the British.       
Malaya gained independence from Britain on the 31st August 1957. Malaysia 
was formed 6 years later on 16 September 1963. All former British territories except 
Brunei joined Malaya to form The Federation of Malaysia. However, Singapore 
separated from the Malaysia Federation in 1965 due to political differences between 
the Federal Government and the State of Singapore (see Lau, 1969 for detail).
Given the complexities inherited from British Colonialisation, the major 
challenge for the first period after independence was to respond to political and 
social conditions.
The Malaysian Constitution
The Malaysian Constitution is also described as a ‘social contract’ among 
Malaysian citizens. The Malaysia Constitution Article 153 granted Malays special 
privileges, especially in the economic sector. The Malays are given priority in 
licences and permits, education and positions in public services (Lee, 2005: 212).
Meanwhile, the immigrants were given citizenship status that allowed them to 
conduct their business and preserve their culture and religions. 
The ‘social contract’ had significant implications, particularly on Malay 
politics, as it eroded the Malays’ power. As Malaysian citizens, the immigrants had 
                                                          
5 The following statement was made in the Britain Parliament made on October 10, 1945 by The
Secretary of State for the Colonies in: "His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to 
the future of Malaya and the need to promote the sense of unity and common citizenship which will 
develop the country's strength and capacity in due course for self-government within the British 
Commonwealth. Our policy will call for a constitutional Union of Malaya and for the institution of a
Malayan citizenship which will give equal citizenship rights to those who can claim Malaya to be their 
homeland. (c.f. Purcell, 1946: 27). 
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new rights and privileges, including the right to be actively involved in politics,
which had previously belonged exclusively to Malays. Milne and Mauzy (1980) 
noted that about 800,000 immigrants were granted citizenship in 1958. Thus the 
composition of the Malaysian population changed from Malay dominance to a more 
multi-racial composition. In 1958 for example, the non-Malays made up half of the 
Malaysian population.
Main Economic Activities 
Similar to the period prior to independence, agriculture, forestry and fishing 
were the main economic activities in Malaysia after independence. These activities 
contributed up to 40 percent of gross domestic income in the early period after 
independence in 1960 but declined slightly to 36.3 percent in 1962, 31.5 percent in 
1965, 30 and 30.6 percent in 1968 and 1970 respectively. Meanwhile, the 
contribution of mining and quarrying fluctuated around 6 to 9 percent of Gross 
Domestic Income (GDI) in the same period. The primary sector was gradually 
replaced by the secondary sector in its contribution to gross domestic income, 
particularly by the manufacturing sector. In 1960 and 1962, the manufacturing sector 
contribution was only 8.5 percent; this jumped to 13 percent in 1970.
Mass Malay Poverty and Economic Imbalances
The main issue for the new Malaysian government after independence was
mass Malay poverty and economic imbalance. Malays constituted the largest ethnic 
group but shared the smallest portion of economic wealth. The majority of Malays 
lived in poverty. Most of them held small farms, the ownership of which was 
sometimes shared among many families. Tan (1982a), revealed that around 40 
percent of paddy farmers in Perak for instance, held less than 2 acres and up to 75 
percent farmers in Kelantan and Terengganu had no more than 3.5 acres. 
The differences in income between Malays and non-Malays emerged in all 
sectors. Non-Malays earned higher incomes even in the industries that Malays 
dominated. This is shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. The differences in income received 
were up to 150 percent in an agricultural sector (Farmer) in which Malays were 
predominant, and 119 percent in Sales. The Professional and Technical occupation 
group recorded a 53 percent difference. Differences in income for other occupations 
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such as Managers and Administrators, Clerks, Farm Labour, Services and Production 
workers varied from 6 to 41 percent. 
Table 2.5: Income per worker by industry and race 1967 (RM)
Industry Total Malays Non-Malays
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1457 1312 1574
Agricultural Products requiring Substantial 
Processing 1327 1195 1434
Mining, Manufacturing and Construction 3977 3580 4296
Electricity, Water and Sanitary Services 9765 8789 10547
Commerce 3254 2929 3515
Transport, Storage and Communications 2396 2157 2588
Services 3428 3086 3703
TOTAL 2461 2215 2658
Malay Dominated Industries 1659 2141 2329
Non- Malay Dominated Industries 3513 3162 3794
Source: Faaland, et.al, 1990
Table 2.6: Occupation group and race in 1965(RM)
Occupation Malays Non-Malays Differences in %
Professional, technical 319 488 53
Managers, 
administrators 574 632 10
Clerks 238 291 22
Sales 118 259 119
Services 172 162 6
Farmers 84 210 150
Farm labour 74 104 41
Production workers 132 172 30
Source: Snodgrass (1980)
The issue of economic representation, including imbalances in employment 
composition, raised ethnic tensions between Malays and Chinese. The ethnic 
tensions worsened after the Democratic Action Party (DAP) opposition party won 
the 1969 general election. The DAP and Gerakan (one of the Chinese dominated 
political parties) questioned the social contract, especially Malays’ rights in the 
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constitution. The DAP for instance fought for equal rights for citizens regardless of 
race6. The riot that erupted in 13 May 1969 came about as a climax of ethnic tension.    
The 13 May 1969 Riot
The 13 May 1969 riot was the worst ethnic conflict in Malaysia. The 
government declared a state of emergency and Parliament was suspended as an 
immediate response to the crisis. The country was ruled by the National Operation 
Council (NOC), which was headed by the armed forces, civil services and major 
political parties, becoming a de facto government with control over all decision 
making for 18 months until the Parliament reconvened in February 1971.
There are still differences in opinion over what caused the 13 May 1969 riot7.
The NOC’s official report listed differences over the interpretation of the 
Constitution, especially on the Malay’s constitutional rights, as the main factor.
Different races had their own interpretation of the constitution regarding their rights
as a citizen and the extent of Malays privileges. For the Malays the main issue was 
their relative backwardness and economic deprivation. There was a strong feeling 
among the Malays that their rights were gradually being eroded, while the non-
Malays felt neglected by the government. Jomo (1990:144) stated that:  
Many Malays believed Chinese economic power to be responsible for Malay 
economic backwardness, though in the late 1960s, the Malaysian economy was 
still actually largely dominated by foreign investors and a handful of local 
Chinese businessmen. On the other hand, many poor non Malays believed the 
UMNO-led and Malay-dominated Alliance government to be responsible for 
official government discrimination against them. Most businessmen were 
Chinese and most government officials were Malays, and the relatively few 
Chinese capitalists, together with the Malay administrative political elite, 
enjoyed most of the fruits of rapid economic growth in the 1960s. 
The situation became worse during the 1969 general election campaign due to 
provocative statements made by the political parties and their supporters. As 
Malaysian political parties were strongly ethnic based, it was difficult to control the 
racist issues during the general election’s campaigns. The result of the general 
                                                          
6 The Barisan Nasional (National Front or Alliance, prior to 1973) is a coalition of 13 parties. The 
largest parties are United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA), Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and Gerakan. Currently Barisan Nasional is the ruling 
party in Malaysia since the Independence 1957. Pakatan Rakyat (People Alliance) is the opposition 
party consists of three political parties namely Parti Islam Semalaysia or Malaysian Islamic Party 
(PAS), Parti Keadilan Rakyat or People Justice (PKR) and Democratic Action Party (DAP).  
7 See Kua (2007) for details on the 13th May Riot.
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election was unexpected, as the opposition parties received stronger than expected 
support. The opposition retained the state of Kelantan and defeated the ruling party 
in Penang. The opposition party also managed to deny a two third majority of the 
ruling government in two states, Selangor and Perak. At the Federal level, the 
opposition increased their number of seats in Parliament, which reduced the power of 
the ruling Alliance Party (Barisan Nasional). Just after the riot, the Parliament passed 
a Sedition Ordinance. The ordinance restricted people’s free speech and exercised 
control over the mass media, particularly on Constitutional issues, as a security 
measure (Faaland et.al, 1990).
The government had identified that the backwardness of the Malays 
community was the main factor of interethnic tension, which lead to the May 13
incident. They argued that the ethnic riots would emerge again unless the position of 
the Malays was secured. The political parties had no choice except to return to the 
essence of the Constitution. Therefore, to maintain peace, affirmative action had to 
be carried out. Affirmative action in the form of the New Economic Policy was 
implemented to transform the position and privileges of the Malays. 
2.4 State-Led Development Policy, 1971-1990
New Economic Policy (NEP)       
The NEP was established in 1971 as an immediate response to the May 13
riots. The implementation of NEP was part of the Second to Fifth Malaysia Plans,
between 1971 and 1990 period.
The Objectives of NEP 
The NEP consists of two main objectives. As stated in the Second Malaysia 
Plan (1971-1975), the objectives were the ‘eradication of poverty irrespective of 
race, and restructuring Malaysian society to reduce and eventually eliminate the 
identification of race with economic functions’.
NEP and Inequality: The Implementation 
The framework and blueprint of NEP’s implementation were officially 
published in the Outline Perspective Plan I (OPP I) which covers the 20 year period
(1971-1990). More specifically the NEP consisted of two elements. Firstly, the NEP 
aimed to achieve full employment by generating employment opportunities at a
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sufficient rate to reduce unemployment. The labour force was projected to grow at 
2.9 percent annually. As a result, the unemployment rate would be reduced to 4 
percent in 1990 from an initial rate of 7.5 percent in 1970. The aim was also that the 
reduction in unemployment should be accompanied by equal distribution of 
employment. Although there was no fixed target, this objective was clearly 
mentioned in the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1970):
increase the share of the Malays and other indigenous people in employment in 
mining, manufacturing and construction and the share of other Malaysians in 
agriculture and services so that by 1990 employment in the various sectors of the 
economy will reflect the racial composition of the country. 
The second element of the NEP was restructuring the ownership and control 
of wealth. As discussed above, ownership and the control of capital was 
predominantly in the hand of non-Malays and foreigners. Unequal wealth 
distribution was the main issue that led to ethnic tension. Therefore, to maintain 
national unity the government believed that ownership of capital should be equally 
distributed. As the Malays were starting from far behind, the NEP set a target to:
raise the share of the Malays and other indigenous people in the ownership of 
productive wealth including land, fixed assets and equity capital. The target is 
that by 1990, they will own at least 30 percent of equity capital with 40 percent 
being owned by other Malaysians (Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980).
Achievement of NEP
Malaysian economic growth was quite high, about 6 percent annually prior to 
the NEP period. However fundamental issues such as the high incidence of poverty, 
unemployment (7.5 percent in 1970) and economic imbalances had not been properly 
addressed. The achievements of the NEP can be assessed in terms of two main 
aspects. 
a. Poverty reduction
During the NEP period, the poverty level (measured using poverty line index)
declined significantly in both urban and rural areas.8
                                                          
8 In Malaysia, absolute poverty means the gross monthly income of a household is inadequate to 
purchase the minimum necessities of life. A poverty line income (PLI) has been established based on 
the basic costs of the necessity items such as accommodation, cloth and food. Absolute hard core 
poverty is a condition in which the gross monthly income of a household is less than half of PLI. The 
PLI for Peninsular Malaysia is RM661, Sabah (RM888) and Sarawak, RM765 (see Ragayah, 2007; 
Mohd. Arif,1997 for detail) 
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In 1970 when the NEP was introduced, about 52.4 percent of the Malaysian 
population was living in poverty. 
Table 2.7: Patterns and trends of poverty 1970 – 1990
Poverty Rate (%) 1970 1976 1984 1990
Total 52.4 42.4 20.7 17.1
Rural n.a 50.9 27.3 21.8
Urban n.a 18.7 8.5 7.5
Source: Economic Planning Unit (2004). Notes: n.a denotes not available.
Poverty levels had dropped to only 17.1 percent after 20 years, at the end of 
the NEP. The poverty level in rural areas declined by 29 percentage points, from 51 
percent in 1970 to 22 percent in 1990, while the poverty level in urban areas also 
declined more than two fold to only 7.5 percent at the end of the NEP in 1990.
b. Inequality remains
As mentioned above, the NEP achieved poverty alleviation for both rural and 
urban areas. However, inequality remained at reasonably high levels for the first ten 
year period of NEP implementation. It dropped slightly in the 1980s towards the end 
of the NEP period. Table 2.8 shows that there were similar trends for the rural and 
urban areas.
Table 2.8: Malaysia: Gini coefficient in urban and rural area 1970-1990
1970 1976 1979 1984 1987 1990
Overall 0.513 0.529 0.505 0.483 0.458 0.446
Rural 0.469 0.5 0.482 0.444 0.427 0.409
Urban 0.503 0.512 0.501 0.466 0.449 0.445
Source: Economic Planning Unit (2004)
Despite the fact that NEP had been successful in poverty eradication and 
maintaining high economic growth, some people perceived that the NEP failed in 
terms of ownership restructuring. The criticisms of the NEP were around the failure 
to achieve the target of 30 percent Bumiputera ownership. Until the end of the NEP 
in 1990, asset ownership of Bumiputera was only 18 percent, far behind the 30 
percent equity target. Ownership concentration was still in the hands of largest 
companies, and even increased significantly between 1975 to 1983 (Mehmet, 1986).
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The details of income distribution in Malaysia are shown in Table 2.9. The 
table shows that there was not much change in the pattern of income distribution 
even after 17 years of NEP implementation. Income shares for middle 40 percent and 
lowest 40 percent increased but by an almost insignificant amount. On the other 
hand, while there was a small decrease in the share of income for the highest 20 
percent, this group still controlled around 40 to 50 percent of income in all regions
and ethnic groups. The pattern was quite similar across the regions and races,  
implying that the NEP had only a small impact on Malaysian income distribution 
structure.
Table 2.9: Distribution of income 1970-1987(%)
Source: MAPEN II (2000).
Region and 
Ethnic Group
1970 1987
Highest 
20% 
Middle 
40% 
Lowest 
40% 
Highest 
20% 
Middle 
40%
Lowest 
40%
Peninsular 55.7 32.8 11.5 51.3 34.9 13.8
Bumiputra 51.6 35.2 13.2 50.3 35.6 14.1
Chinese 52.6 33.5 13.8 49.2 35.7 15.1
Indians 54.0 31.2 14.8 47.2 35.9 16.9
Others 68.2 29.6 2.2 74.2 21.8 4.0
City 55.8 31.4 12.8 50.8 35.0 14.2
Outside City 50.9 35.6 13.5 48.6 36.5 14.9
Sabah 59.5 31.2 9.3 52.6 34.1 13.3
Bumiputra 55.0 39.0 6.0 48.2 36.2 15.6
Chinese 53.9 33.4 12.7 45.3 38.6 16.1
Others 50.0 31.2 18.8 43.4 40.2 16.4
City 58.1 32.1 9.8 49.4 36.0 14.6
Outside City 53.9 35.4 10.7 59.3 34.0 13.7
Sarawak 55.7 33.0 11.3 52.5 34.1 13.4
Bumiputra 53.2 34.8 12.0 50.3 34.8 14.9
Chinese 51.2 34.4 14.4 47.1 37.1 15.8
Others 71.8 18.2 10.0 44.0 46.2 9.8
City 53.9 32.7 13.4 49.2 35.9 14.9
Outside City 53.1 35.7 11.2 51.4 34.3 14.3
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2.5 The Current Economic Situation
This section reviews the current economic situation in Malaysia after the New 
Economic Policy. 
New Orientation of Malaysian Development Plans
To prepare Malaysia for the era of the globalization, in 1991 the government 
introduced The National Development Plan (1991-2000) and the National Vision 
Plan (2001-2010). Both development plans followed on from the NEP. Under the 
National Development Plan (1991-2000) and the National Vision Plan (2001-2010), 
poverty eradication and income inequality were still the focus of the government,
especially the emphasis on minimizing the income gap between regional and ethnic 
groups. The plans laid out, among others, the following targets to achieve these
objectives: 
a. reorienting poverty eradication programs to reduce the incidence of poverty to 
0.5 per cent by 2005.
b. intensifying efforts to improve the quality of life, especially in rural areas, by 
upgrading the quality of basic amenities, housing, health, recreation and 
educational facilities.
c. improving the distribution of income and narrowing income imbalances between 
and within ethnic groups, income groups, economic sectors, regions and states.
d. restructuring employment to reflect the ethnic composition of the population.
Malaysian Economic Growth 
Prior to the Asian economic crisis 1997, Malaysia was one of the East Asia 
economies that recorded high economic growth, between 6 to 7 percent annually 
(Figure 2.1). Nevertheless, during the Asian economic crisis, 1997/1998, Malaysian 
economic growth declined sharply. Economic growth was negative (-9.6 per cent) in 
1998 compared to 4.6 percent in 1997, the worst economic growth for three decades. 
Although the Malaysian economy had recovered several years later, the economic 
achievements in the post-economic crisis were lower than before the crisis. 
Malaysian economic growth was only 6 percent on average after the crisis with 
negative economic growth (-1.7) in 2009.   
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Figure 2.1: Malaysian per capita economic growth: 1990-2010
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Various years
Malaysian Economic Transformation
Malaysian economic growth is driven mainly by the manufacturing and 
services sectors. From the 1990s onward, the contribution of the primary sector was
overtaken by the secondary and tertiary sectors (see Table 2.10).
Table 2.10 Malaysian economic structure (%)
GDP Share Year
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 18.7
(28.3)
10.3
(18.7)
8.6
(15.2)
8.2
(12.7)
7.5
(11.8)
Mining and Quarrying 9.8
(0.4)
8.2
(0.5)
7.3
(0.4)
6.7
(0.4)
7.5
(0.4)
Manufacturing 26.9
(19.9)
27.1
(25.3)
32.0
(27.6)
31.6
(28.8)
26.7
(27.8)
Construction 3.6
(6.3)
4.4
(9.0)
3.3
(8.1)
2.7
(7.0)
3.3
(6.5)
Services 42.4
(47.1)
51.2
(46.6)
54.0
(48.7)
58.2
(51.0)
57.9
(53.6)
Total (RM Million) 4426 5815 8899 10033 55211
Sources: Ragayah (2008) and Economic Planning Unit (2010)
Notes: 1. Employment share in brackets. 2.  1990-2000 (1987=100), 2005-2010 (2005=100).
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The manufacturing sector contributed about 26.9 percent to GDP in 1990 and the 
contribution rate increased to 27.1 in the next five years (by 1995). In the 2000s the 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP reached 30 percent. In 2000 and 
2005, the contributions were percent 32.0 percent and 31.6 percent respectively. 
Currently, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP is around 27 percent; 
the same as it was 20 years ago. 
The manufacturing sector also contributes to employment generation. In the 
early years of Malaysian independence, less than 10 percent of total employment was 
in manufacturing, but by 1990, around 20.0 percent of overall employment was in 
the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector increasingly plays an important a
role in employment creation. In 1995, the manufacturing sector contributed 
approximately 25.3 percent to employment. In 2000 and 2005, the contributions were 
27.6 and 28.8 percent respectively while in 2010 the rate was decreased by one 
percent to 27.8 (Ragayah, 2008; Economic Planning Unit, 2010). The discussion 
above shows that the manufacturing sector played a central function in Malaysian 
economic development especially from1990 onward. The increasing shares of 
manufacturing output and employment was due to Malaysia’s aggressive 
industrialisation policy driven by trade and foreign direct investment.
The services sector also recorded an increasing trend in GDP share. The 
contribution of the services sector was 42.4 percent in 1990 but this increased rapidly 
to 51.2 percent in 1995. The GDP share of services sector continues to rise in the 
2000s. In 2000, the rate had risen to 54.0 percent and in 2005 and 2010 the rate 
reached 58.2 and 57.9 percent respectively. The services sector also became the main 
source of employment. Since 1990, this sector provided around half of employment 
opportunities in Malaysia. In 1990, the services sector provided 47.1 percent 
employment while in 1995 this sector contributed to more than 50 percent of total 
employment share.
On the other hand, the primary sector has seen decreasing trends. Agriculture, 
forestry and fishing sectors fell from 18.7 percent of GDP in 1990 to 7.5 percent in 
2010. The contribution of these sectors to employment also registered a similar trend, 
declining from 28.3 percent in 1990 to 11.8 percent in 2010. Meanwhile, the mining 
and quarrying sector did not record any substantial changes in the same period. In 
1990, the contribution to GDP share was 9.8 percent before dropping continuously to
6.7 percent in 2005, but rose to 7.5 percent in 2010. However, the employment share 
was stagnant at 0.4 to 0.5 percent only.
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Poverty and Inequality
There are various policies and programs implemented by the government to improve 
life in the rural sector, to eradicate poverty and reduce income inequality. The rural 
areas are being developed as new centers of economic activity. Intensive rural 
development efforts, i.e. land development activities by Federal Land Development 
Authority (FELDA), irrigation for double cropping, re-planting of rubber, and 
diversification of agriculture (oil palm) have been under way, along with substantial 
allocations for rural schools, health, electricity, roads, credit supply and so on. The 
development program for the hardcore poor or ‘Pogram Pembangunan Rakyat 
Termiskin (PPRT)’ was launched during 1989: this program involves registration of 
hard core poor in every district for income generation, basic amenities, human 
development and welfare assistance (Ragayah, 2008:180-181). The National Vision 
Policy (2001-2010) aims at establishing a progressive and prosperous society, to 
balance development and build a competitive and resilient nation. Under this policy 
the target for poverty is set at 0.05% by 2005 with targets specific to pockets of 
poverty (Bumiputera minorities in Sabah and Sarawak, orang asli, urban poor) and 
set eligibility criteria of RM1200 per person. The focus is on the bottom 30% of the 
population, and various measures have been pronounced under The Third Outline 
Perspective Plan (OPP3).
The incidence of poverty (Table 2.11) declined steadily from 1992 to 2009 
from 12.4 percent in 1992 to only 3.8 in 2009. However, Bumiputera and other 
indigenous ethnic groups still have the highest poverty rate, while the Chinese ethnic 
group has the lowest poverty rate. The poverty incidence of the Chinese was less 
than one percent in the middle of 2000s.   
Table 2.11: Incidence of poverty (%), 1990-2009
Year 1992 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 2007 2008 2009
Malaysia 12.4 8.7 6.1 8.5 6.0 5.7 3.6 3.8 3.8
Bumiputera 17.5 12.2 9 12.3 9.0 8.3 5.1 n.a 5.3
Chinese 3.2 2.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.6 n.a 0.6
Indians 4.5 2.6 1.3 3.4 1.3 2.9 2.5 n.a 2.5
Others 21.7 22.5 13.0 25.5 13.0 6.9 9.8 n.a 6.7
Source: Economic Planning Unit, various years
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Although Malaysia has successfully reduced poverty levels to single digit, 
inequality in the distribution of incomes remains. As shown in Figure 2.3, inequality 
increased slightly in the earlier period of 1990s. The Gini coefficient rose by six 
points from 0.44 in 1990 to 0.50 in 1992 and remained constant at 0.50 until 1997. 
The lowest level of inequality was in 2004 at 0.40 but it rose again to 0.44 in 2007
and 2009; see Table 2.12.
Figure 2.2: Malaysia: incidence of poverty 1990-2009
Source: Table 2.11 (Economic Planning Unit, various years)
Table 2.12: Inequality in Malaysia: 1990-2009
Year Gini 
Coefficient
1990 0.44
1992 0.50
1995 0.50
1997 0.50
1999 0.44
2004 0.40
2007 0.44
2009 0.44
Source: Economic Planning Unit, various years
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Figure 2.3: Inequality in Malaysia (Gini), 1990-2009
Source: Table 2.12 (Economic Planning Unit, various years)
As can be seen in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.13 below, income distribution did 
not record any significant changes. For nearly 20 years, from 1990 to 2009 the top 20 
percent of households dominated around 50 percent of income. The middle 40 
percent received 35 percent while the bottom 40 percent received only about 14 to 15 
percent. 
Table 2.13 Malaysia: Income distribution 1990-2009
Year Share of 
Top 20%
Share of Middle 
40%
Share of Bottom 
40%
1990 50.4 35.3 14.3
1992 51.5 34.8 13.7
1995 51.3 35.0 13.7
1997 52.4 34.4 13.2
1999 50.5 35.5 14.0
2002 51.3 35.2 13.5
2004 51.8 35.0 13.2
2007 49.8 35.6 14.6
2009 49.6 36.1 14.3
Source: Economic Planning Unit, 2010
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Figure 2.4: Malaysia: Income distribution 1990-2009
Source: Table 2.13 (Economic Planning Unit, 2010)
The income gap continued to exist in 2004 where the per capita income of 
urban household was RM3956 but the rural household income was RM1875. This 
trend continued in 2007 whereby urban household per capita income was RM4325 
but rural household per capita income was only RM2171. The per capita income of 
rural households is only half of that in urban areas (Economic Planning Unit 2008).
Overall, the mean monthly income of Malaysian’s increased from 1990 until 
2009. The Chinese had the highest mean monthly income; since 1990 their income 
surpassed the monthly income at the national (overall) level. The Indian’s mean 
monthly income has also been higher than the national average since 1990 but was 
less than the Chinese ethnic group. On the other hand, the Bumiputera, (making up
the majority of the population) had the lowest income level except for 1995. In 
general, the Bumiputera’s mean monthly income was less than the national average. 
The data in Table 2.14 shows that the income gap in term of income disparity ratio
between the ethnic groups continues.
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Table 2.14: Mean monthly income by ethnic groups in Malaysia
Mean Monthly Income (RM)
Year Overall Bumiputera Chinese Indian Others
1990 1167 940 1631 1289 955
1995 2020 1604 2890 2140 1284
1997 2606 2038 3738 2896 2244
1999 2472 1984 3456 2702 1371
2002 3011 2376 4279 3044 2165
2004 3249 2711 4437 3456 2312
2007 3686 3156 4853 3799 3651
2009 4025 3624 5011 3999 3640
Source: Department of Statistics, various years
Table 2.15 Malaysia: Income disparity ratio 1990-2009
Income Disparity Ratio
Year Bumiputera: Chinese Bumiputera:
Indian
Rural: Urban
1990 1.70 1.29 1.70
1993 1.78 1.29 1.75
1995 1.80 1.33 1.95
1997 2.04 1.42 2.04
1999 1.81 1.36 1.81
2002 2.11 1.28 2.11
2004 1.16 1.27 2.11
2007 1.15 1.12 1.91
2009 1.38 1.10 1.85
Source: Ragayah (2008) and Malaysia Plans, various years.
However, the income gap has narrowed (Table 2.15), especially the income 
gap between Bumiputera and Chinese. Although the ratio had risen in the 1990s, it 
reduced sharply from 2002 onward. The income disparity ratio between Bumiputera 
and Chinese fluctuated in between 1.70 to 2.04 in the 1990s period before jumping to 
the highest level in 2002. The ratio declined to 1.16 and 1.15 in 2004 and 2007 
respectively. In 2009, the ratio was increased to 1.38. Meanwhile, the ratio between 
Bumiputera and Indian ethnic groups increased considerably in the middle of the 
1990s and declined afterward. The ratio for rural and urban areas was somewhat 
higher in 2000s compared to the 1990s period. In the 1990s, the ratio grew from 1.70 
in 1990 to 2.04 in 1997 before dropping to 1.81 two years later (1999). The ratio rose 
subsequently after 1999 to 2004 and declined in 2007 and 2009.
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Figure 2.5: Malaysia: income disparity ratio 1990-2009
Source: Table 2.15
  
2.6 Summary
Malaysian economic and development policies have been largely influenced 
by historical factors. The British government’s policies in Malaya brought in a large 
number of immigrant labourers from China and India, and changed Malaysian’s
(Malaya) socioeconomic and political landscape from a Malay dominated state into a
multiracial society.
Income inequality and mass Malay poverty are crucial issues in Malaysia as 
these have created ethnic tensions in the past. There was no particular policy 
addressing inequality and poverty issues during the British occupation; these issues 
did not receive much attention until the early independence period. Specific policies
on inequality were incorporated into Malaysian development plans for the two 
decades from 1970, largely in response to the 13 May 1969 riot. 
The New Economic Policy was established to specifically address inequality. 
Although its achievement in reducing income inequality is debatable, the policy has
been successful in alleviating poverty. The New Economic Policy was replaced by 
the National Development Plan (1991-2000) and National Vision Plan (2001-2010). 
Both development plans maintained the NEP objectives with more emphasis on
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reducing the income gap between regional and ethnic groups. Although the level of 
poverty has been successfully reduced, income inequality remains an issue.
Education has been proposed as an effective way of reducing inequality in 
Malaysia. The next chapter provides a background on the history and development of 
education in Malaysia, and the background on Malaysian education policies.
36
 
CHAPTER 3
EDUCATION POLICY IN MALAYSIA: NATIONAL UNITY AND HUMAN 
CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Introduction
The effect of enhanced educational inputs upon economic outputs must be seen 
within abroader historical and sociological perspective which attempts to examine 
the problematic relationship between education and development in the widest sense.
(Foster, 1985:1529).
As discussed in Chapter 2, different migrant groups in Malaysia did not 
integrate well after the substantial migration from China and India during the British 
Occupation. Although the different ethnic groups interacted with each other during 
the course of their daily life, for example in market places, each ethnic group 
continued to retain their own culture, religion, language and ideas. Thus, they were 
living separately in society while living in the same area (Furnivall, 1948:304). 
Within this environment, education has emerged as an important issue in Malaysia. It 
is regarded not only as an investment in human capital, but also as a means for 
preserving national unity, and the languages and cultural identity of different ethnic 
groups. 
This chapter discusses the Malaysian education system in a historical and 
political context, to better understand the effect of education on economic 
development. The chapter will provide the background for subsequent chapters on
the effect of education on inequality and growth. Section 3.2 discusses the history of 
education in Malaysia, as well as the importance of education for nation building. 
The issue of education, language and national unity is discussed in Section 3.3. 
Section 3.4 discusses the relationship between educational inequality and inequality 
of income. Section 3.5 reviews the Malaysian government’s affirmative action 
policy. Section 3.6 provides a brief overview of Malaysian education data, followed 
by a discussion on the impact of globalization in Section 3.7. New directions in 
higher education are presented in Section 3.8 and Section 3.9 presents the current
Malaysian education challenges. Section 3.10 summarizes the chapter.
3.2 Education Development and Policy during British Occupation1
The British government in Malaya did not place much emphasis on 
educational development, perhaps because of limited resources, and the British 
1 See Francis and Gwee (1972), Lee (1972), Fong (1989) and Rashid (2002) for extensive literature in 
Malaysian education system and history.
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policy in the Straits Settlements: ‘to interfere as little as possible with the manners, 
customs, methods and prejudices of the different nationalities’ (Bee, 1978:466). 
Education was conducted by the community on a private basis. Different ethnic 
groups had their own educational system without universal standards or systematic 
curriculum. In fact, until the 1950s the Malay, Chinese, Tamil and English schools 
were allowed to determine their own curriculum and textbooks, mostly based on their 
home country (Francis and Gwee, 1972:8). In Malay communities, education was 
conducted by the Imam in the mosque, particularly emphasizing religious education 
and Quranic readings.
However in the 1870s, as part of a British policy to assist development by 
building infrastructure, the British government established free Malay primary 
schools. The objective was not so much to develop human capital but to provide 
basic knowledge of reading, writing and simple arithmetic at the elementary level. 
This education was intended to ensure that Malay children were ‘better than their 
father’ and not ‘cheated’ by Chinese and Indians at daily transactions (Selvaratnam, 
1988:175; Fong, 1989; Ali, 2008).
On the other hand, Chinese education received no support from the British 
government. Schools were fully funded by the communities using their own 
resources, with some funds collected from their home country. The syllabus and 
textbooks were brought from China, and different clans used their own dialect as a 
medium of instruction (Francis and Gwee, 1972: 27). As the main objective of 
education was to preserve their own culture, language and ideology, the type of 
education was largely influenced by their home country. In 1920, the British 
government introduced controls on the syllabus, teachers and medium of instruction,
in order to obstruct the spread of communist ideology in schools. Mandarin was used 
as a medium of instruction, replacing various local dialects (Fong, 1989: 17).
Similar to the Chinese community, Indian education was also conducted 
privately with relatively little assistance from the British government. Tamil schools 
were initiated by the plantation owners, especially after the British government 
introduced the Labor Code in 1912. The Labor Code 1912 made school 
establishment a legal responsibility of plantation owners. Nevertheless, with limited 
resources, the quality of education, particularly the facilities and teachers, was not at 
a satisfactory level. Teachers were untrained and classes were sometimes conducted 
by the plantation staff (Fong, 1989).
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English schools however were fully funded and established by the British 
government. Better quality schools were mainly located in urban areas. The English 
schools, often conducted by Christian missionaries, consisted of six years of primary 
school and five years of secondary school (Francis and Gwee, 1972:14). Although 
the schools charged high fees, they attracted high demand due to their relatively high 
quality. Furthermore, English education was a necessary qualification for entry into
the British government services and its affiliations as a clerk or teacher. The 
establishment of English schools largely benefited the Chinese as they mostly stayed 
in urban areas and were more prosperous compared to Malays and Indians. In 1938, 
the Chinese made up 80 percent of the 62,000 students enrolled in English schools.
Malays had less access to English education since the majority stayed in rural areas.
Many Malays were hesitant to send their children to English schools due to concerns
about whether Christian missionaries would attempt religious conversion. At the 
same time, the British policy of not interfering with Malay customs and religion 
discouraged Christian missionaries from setting up the schools in predominantly 
Malay areas. As a result, there were only 5200 Malay students enrolled in English 
schools in 1948 (Fong, 1989: 18).
3.3 Education, Language and National Unity
A dual education system existed from the early 1900s during the British 
Occupation, creating a complex education system with English and vernacular 
education running simultaneously. Although the British government realized that this
education system was a major part of ethnic segregation, no action was taken until 
1949, when the British government established the Central Advisory Committee on 
Education. The Committee was established to rectify the problem of the education 
system contributing to ethnic segregation, and in particular to deal with the problems 
of Malay education. 
The Committee, chaired by L.J Barnes of Oxford University, suggested that 
vernacular schools should be abolished and replaced with one type of school using 
English and Malay as the medium of instruction. The Barnes Report was criticised
by the Chinese community because it would abolish Chinese schools. After
substantial pressure, the British government set up another committee to look into 
Chinese education. The committee, headed by Dr. William P. Fenn and Dr. Wu The-
Yao, proposed to the government that the Chinese culture and language should be 
preserved in Chinese education. However, the syllabus and textbooks must be based 
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on the local context without any influence from China (Francis and Gwee, 1972: 24; 
Fong, 1989:14).
Following independence from the British government in 1957, national unity 
was the main objective of Malaysian (Malayan) government policy. The differences 
in educational streams inherited from British Occupation era had resulted in complex 
problems for the new Malaysian government in promoting national unity. Since each 
ethnic group held their own school system, usually seen as a measure to protect their 
interests, early independence educational policy had be sensitive to different ethnic 
needs.
Education, language and culture were controversial issues, particularly in a
multiracial society like Malaysia. The issue of unity became a main concern as each 
ethnic group had their own culture, religion and ideologies that needed government 
consideration (Rashid, 2002: 22-23). Education was seen as an effective tool to 
inculcate national unity and redress ethnic economic imbalances. With specific 
reference to Malaysia, Watson (1980:144) noted that:
In culturally plural societies education is seen as a neutral means of redressing ethnic 
imbalances and of creating a sense of national unity where none existed before. It is 
often linked with economic policies designed to redress economic imbalances which 
might or might not coincide with race.
The development of a standardized education system was an initial effort to 
achieve national unity. In 1955, a committee called the Razak Committee had been 
formed with the main objective:
to establish a national system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation
as a whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural development as a 
nation, having regard to the intention to make Malay the National Language of the 
country, whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the language and culture of 
others communities living in the country (The Razak Report Committee, 1956 c.f. 
Watson, 1980: 145).  
A common syllabus and examination system was adopted in all schools, 
regardless of the medium of instruction, to create a sense of belonging to the country.
The Razak Report 1956 had clearly asserted that national unity was the most 
important objective to achieve. According to the report:
… the introduction of a syllabus common to all schools in the Federation is the 
crucial requirement of educational policy in Malaya. It is an essential element in the 
development of a united Malayan nation. It is the key which will unlock the gates 
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hitherto standing locked and barred against the establishment of an educational 
system acceptable to the people of Malaya as a whole (The Razak Report 1956 c.f. 
Watson, 1980: 145)
The Razak Report became the foundation for the Malaysian national 
education system. The report was legalized as the Educational Ordinance in 1956.
The main content of the Razak Report was the recognition of vernacular education in 
which the Malay, Chinese, Tamil (Indian) and English languages were to be used as
the mediums of instruction, while Malay, as the national language, became a
compulsory subject in primary and secondary schools. The report also recommended 
that all levels of schools should have a common syllabus and timetable. 
However, the report did not satisfy many Malaysian ethnic groups as they 
claimed that the Razak Report ‘failed to specify definite steps for achieving 
educational unification based on the Malay medium by giving too much ground to 
multilingualism’ (Fong, 1989:82-83). As a result, in 1960 the government set up a
new committee, the Rahman Talib Committee, to review the Malaysian education 
system. The Rahman Talib Report 1960 proposed that multilingual medium of 
instruction had to be implemented only in primary schools. The medium of 
instruction in secondary schools would be in either Malay or English. English was 
retained as the medium of instruction at the tertiary level. This report formed the 
basis of the Education Act of 1961.
Since language and culture reflects individual personality and group identity 
(Wong, 1973), it became:
…a thorny question in multi-racial societies because it can become a barrier to 
integration if different ethnic or racial groups insist on maintaining their own 
languages as a means of transmitting cultural and social values, and if they resist the 
concept of a national language (Watson, 1980:147).
Therefore, the second initiative for nation building was developing a national 
language policy. The role of the Malay language as the national language was 
asserted in the Constitution of 1957, Article 152. However, the government realized 
that the implementation of a national language policy was not an easy task. The 
implementation was made gradually until 1967, for a period of ten years after 
Merdeka (Independence) Day to give enough room for adjustment. Meanwhile, the 
English language could be used in both Houses of Parliament, in the Legislative 
Assembly of every State and for all other official purposes. This policy was accepted 
by non-Malay groups. Currently, the Malay language is the official language, but 
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vernacular schooling that allows classes to be taught in Chinese and Tamil languages 
are maintained in primary school. The Malay language is the main medium of 
instruction in secondary and tertiary education.
Despite the efforts discussed above to develop the education system after 
independence, lower levels of education remained a problem in Malaysia,
particularly among the Malay ethnic groups. Selvaratnam (1988:175) noted that:
The pyramidal colonial educational system in the period 1786-1957 had created a 
grave imbalance in the distribution of opportunities for education. With the 
exception of the Malay feudal class, the majority of Malays were provided 
with only an elementary vernacular education, from about 4 to 6 years, which was 
terminal...the exclusive Western-biased English-medium education that was 
provided by the colonial government and the Christian missions was restrictive, as it 
was predominantly an urban phenomenon. Therefore, only a small section of the 
feudal class of the Malays and the middle-class Indians, Chinese, and Eurasians who 
lived in the urban areas and near them benefited from this educational 
provision… The policy, therefore, obviously benefited the upper and middle classes 
of the numerically preponderant urban Chinese, the middle and professional classes 
of the Indians, and elements of the ruling Malay feudal class disproportionately.
3.4 Educational Inequality and Income Inequality 
The differences in educational opportunity along with differences in the 
socioeconomic background among ethnic groups resulted in problems of educational
inequality. The Population Census 1957 Report on literacy rates in West Malaysia
(Table 3.1) shows that the Malays had relatively low educational attainment. The 
Malay literacy rates in any language were the lowest among ethnic groups in West 
Malaysia. The literacy rate was only 47 percent compared to 53 and 57 percent for 
the Chinese and Indian ethnic groups respectively.
Table 3.1: Literacy rates in West Malaysia: 1957 and 1967(%)
Source:  Lee (1972:8) Note: n.a = not available
Language
English Malay Chinese Tamil In any language
Race 1957 1967 1957 1967 1957 1967 1957 1967 1957 1967
Malay 5 8.6 46 89.2 n.a 0.1 n.a 0.1 47 n.a
Chinese 11 14.3 3 0.7 n.a 85 n.a 0.01 53 n.a
Indian 16 28.4 5 1.6 n.a 0.3 n.a 66.8 57 n.a
All 
Races
10 14.2 25 42.3 n.a 33.1 n.a 9 51 n.a
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In addition, educational attainment variation occurred not only among ethnic 
groups but also among different regions. Hirschman (1979) found that Malays born 
in the eastern (Kelantan, Terengganu and Pahang) and northern states (Kedah and 
Perlis) had fewer years of schooling. The eastern and northern states, which are also 
known as the Malay Belt, are the Malays predominant states. According to 
Hirschman (1979:76): 
The most obvious explanation for the lower educational achievement of Malays born 
in the east and the north is simply one of access. Relatively more Chinese and 
Indians were likely to live in towns and in close proximity to schools. Only as 
educational opportunities were made equal through the construction of schools in
rural areas and all-weather roads from villages to towns was it possible for Malay 
youth to have the same access to schooling. 
Educational attainment was highly related to income levels. The Socio-
Economic Sample Survey of Households Malaysia 1967/68, in West Malaysia in 
1967-1968 revealed that education levels influenced gross cash income received by 
the population (Hirschman, 1972: 488). Table 3.2 below shows those with university 
education earned the highest annual gross income. 
Table 3.2: Median income estimates (RM), West Malaysia, 1967-1968
Schooling Attainment Gross Cash Income
Unschooled 516
Primary 1969
Form I-II 3663
Form III-IV 5828
Sixth Form 8434
University 15211
Teacher Training 7354
Source: Hoerr (1973:256)
University graduates were able to earn more than RM15,000 per annum, 
while unschooled and primary school holders earned about RM516 and RM1969 
respectively. Since the Malays had the lowest percentage of educational attainment, 
they tended to do less well-paid jobs and to be less competitive in the labour market. 
Selvaratnam (1988: 176) explained the problems of Malays as follows:
Although the Malays formed the majority of the population, their low educational 
credentials did not allow them to participate in adequate numbers in the expanding 
job market that was being rapidly opened to English-educated non-Europeans in 
both the public service and commercial organizations. The vernacular education that 
the colonial government provided for the Malays equipped them only with the 
elementary skills of numeracy and literacy. This education locked the majority of 
them into the low income-generating rural economy, except for a section of them 
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who were recruited into the police and security forces and in the very bottom levels 
of the government services.
3.5 Affirmative Action in Education
Apart from being used to achieve economic objectives of increased productivity and 
income, education was also seen as an important tool to promote the government’s 
objective of national unity. The role of education in achieving these objectives was 
clearly stated in the Second Malaysia Plan document. According to the Second 
Malaysia Plan 1970 (p.222):
… education and training programs will contributes significantly towards promoting 
national unity. They will play a vital role in increasing the productivity and income 
of all Malaysians, as well as in the greater urbanization of the Malays and other 
indigenous people…A major objective in the Second Malaysia Plan period will be 
the consolidation of the education system so as to make it an efficient vehicle for the 
achievement of these important objectives of national development. Curricula, 
teaching method, staffing, classroom facilities and other aspects will be subject to 
close review for this purpose.    
In line with the New Economic Policy (NEP) as explained in Chapter 2, the 
government imposed an affirmative action in education that advantaged Bumiputera 
or Malays. The Bumiputera or Malays were seen by the government to be the 
disadvantaged ethnic group. Most were living in rural areas with minimum access to 
education. The Chinese and Indians were living in or near the urban areas that 
enabled them easier access to education, as well as involvement in modern economic 
sectors. As Chai (1971:25) explains:
By and large the Chinese had the major advantage over the Malays in educational 
opportunities and achievement, with the Indians occupying a middle position. Thus, 
through education the more ag[g]ressive Chinese and Indians were able to achieve 
rapid social mobility...Since the urban centres displayed the highest rates of 
change, those immigrant groups who began as petty traders and shopkeepers were 
able to expand their activities and diversify their economic enterprise’2.
Changes in the Medium of Instruction 
A drastic change had been made in July 1969 regarding the medium of 
instruction in education, when the Education Minister announced that English 
schools would have to teach using the Malay language. The policy was then
extended to local universities. From 1983, public universities have been using Malay
language as a medium of instruction. Furthermore, examinations have to be
2 c.f. Rashid (2002:27). 
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conducted in Malay, and a credit (good) grade in Bahasa Malaysia (Malay Language)
became a compulsory entry requirement to higher education, including for teacher 
training colleges. The Malay language was officially declared as the national 
language and the official language of government in 1969. The declaration was 
strengthened in 1971 with the amendment to the Constitutional Act (Verma, 
2004:67).
This change in the medium of instruction from English to Malay was an
effort to redress economic imbalances between Malay and non-Malay citizens. 
Following the ethnic riot in May 1969, the government realized that there was a large 
ethnic imbalance in the composition of university enrolment. When the University of 
Malaya, the oldest Malaysian university, started in 1959, Malays made up only 20 
percent of the student population. The percentage of Malays was even lower in 
science and engineering based faculties. For example in 1970, among the 71 students 
who graduated from the Faculty of Engineering there was only one Malay. The 
situation was similar in the Faculty of Medicine in which only four Malay graduated 
out of a total of 67 students. The University of Malaya used English as a medium of 
instruction, and relied on textbooks from the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Thus, it benefited the students from English schools, of whom the majority were 
Chinese (Fong, 1989:86; Selvaratnam, 1988:180). The new Malay language policy 
had a significant impact on the composition of student enrolment; in particular, it
increased the number of Malay students in the public universities. According to 
Selvaratnam (1988:183):
…the Bahasa Malaysia policy gave the rapidly growing number of increasingly 
aspiring Malay students, particularly from the fast-expanding Malay-medium 
schools, access to the various postsecondary schools and tertiary education 
institution within the country, which were the main channels of upward mobility. In 
contrast, in the past, English as a medium of instruction conferred on the privileged 
non-bumiputras a cultural capital that helped to reinforce their dominant education 
position to the disadvantage of the bumiputras.         
A negative side effect of the policy however has been the reduction in 
competence in the English Language. For example, in 2006 about 29 percent of 
university students only achieved the lowest ‘extremely limited or limited’ bands in 
the Malaysian University English Test (MUET) (Nelson, 2008:206). Competency in 
the English Language is important, as it has become one of the criteria to be 
successful in the labour market. A recent survey of graduate competency by the 
World Bank (2005) revealed that graduates lacking English language competency 
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and communication skills have difficulties in entering the private sector job market. 
The affirmative policy preference to Bumiputera has resulted in non-Bumiputera 
employers, who dominate the private sector job market, imposing a ‘sense of 
discrimination’ to Bumiputera graduates. Some employers have also made Chinese 
Language competency a requirement (Nelson, 2008:211).
In 2003, the government announced that the Science and Mathematics
subjects at primary and secondary schools must be taught in English. However, due 
to several protests from the public, the policy has been abolished recently. At the 
tertiary level, MUET has been a compulsory admission requirement to local 
universities from 1999. The amendment of the Education Act 1996 allows private 
higher institutions to use English as the medium of instruction with the permission of 
the Ministry of Higher Education. 
The Quota System3
Education has been seen as the easiest and most effective tool to fulfill the 
NEP’s objective of eliminating ethnic identity as a major determinant of economic 
advantage and employment opportunity. The enforcement of a quota system in 
university enrolments has increased the number of Malays or Bumiputera students. 
The quota policy was based on the Report of the Committee Appointed by the 
National Operations Council to Study Campus life of Students of the University of 
Malaya (1971). The report revealed that the student composition in the University of 
Malaya, (the only university at that time) did not reflect the ethnic composition in 
Malaysia. Malay students were highly under represented, only 20 percent, far less 
than 60 percent quota for the Malay population. The report recommended that 
student enrolment in the university should not be based on academic merit only. A 
quota system that reflected ethnic representation must be established to allow more 
Bumiputera or Malays students, especially from rural areas, to be admitted in to 
public higher institutions. The quota system granted Bumiputera at least 55 percent 
of the university enrolment. The quota system was made legal with the introduction 
of the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (Selvaratnam, 1988:179-181).
The report also suggested that the university should set clear guidelines or 
policies to implement the quota system, and as far as possible to ensure the student 
population reflects ethnic groups in Malaysia. The University of Malaya was pushed 
3 See Selvaratnam (1988), Rashid (2002) and Verma (2004) for detail.
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to increase the enrolment of the Bumiputera, particularly in the fields of science and 
technology. More universities have been established to cater for increasing student 
enrolment. The Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (Malaysia National University), a 
fully Malay language university was established in 1970. The public universities also 
established their own matriculation centre to provide a sufficient amount of
Bumiputera students.4 At the secondary school level, Majlis Amanah Rakyat (Public 
Trust Council) (MARA) set up Maktab Rendah Sains Mara (MRSM) (MARA Science 
Junior College) specifically for the Bumiputera’s excellent students. These colleges 
become a feeder to provide qualified Bumiputera’s student to be enrolled in 
matriculation centres as well as overseas institutions.
At the national level, the Central Unit for University Students Selection was 
established under the purview of the Ministry of Education to ensure the 
implementation of the quota policy in line with NEP objectives. The report also 
recommended that the Bumiputera students should be given priority in getting 
scholarships and tuition fees exemption (Selvaratnam, 1988: 181; Fong, 1989: 58). 
Employment Structure
In terms of employment outcomes, the affirmative action in education has 
shown progress. The number of Bumiputra in professional occupations has increased 
steadily in almost all fields. In 1970, less than 10 percent of Bumiputera were 
involved in professional sectors (except for veterinary science) but in 1990 the 
percentage increased significantly. For example, Bumiputera’s doctors were only 3.7 
percent of the total number of doctors in 1970 but by 1990 the percentage had 
increased to 27.8 percent. By 2007, Bumiputera doctors made up 43.8 percent of all 
doctors. The number of engineers also increased drastically from 7.3 percent in 1970 
to 34.8 percent in 1990; and rose again to 46.2 percent in 2007. The percentage detail 
of Bumiputera and non Bumiputera professionals is available in Table 3.3 below.
4 With the exception of a few universities such as Universiti Malaya (UM) and International Islamic 
University (IIUM), the matriculation program has been taken over by the Ministry of Education 
recently. Students from matriculation program could be enrolled in any public universities.
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3.6 Education Enrolment and Education Spending
Generally, the government is the main provider of education in Malaysia, 
particularly for primary and secondary schooling. Primary schooling lasts for six years 
and secondary school for five years. Since 1991 Malaysia has adopted eleven years of 
universal education that allows students to study up to Form 5 in secondary school. At 
the end of Form 5 (Year 11), the students will sit the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) 
(Malaysian Certificate of Education). This examination is a basic requirement for 
entering higher education and Malaysian public services. 
Education Enrolment Rate
The education enrolment rate, especially for primary education, was already 
high in the 1960s. In 1965 primary school enrolment was above 80 percent while 
secondary enrolment was 31.5 percent. Malaysia’s education enrolment rates in the 
similar period were higher than her neighborhoods, Indonesia and Thailand. 
Primary school enrolment in 1970 was 84.0 percent and 79.5 percent
respectively in Indonesia and Thailand while in Malaysia it was above 90 percent. 
Malaysia’s secondary education rate was 41.7 percent, much higher than Indonesia 
(17.5 percent) and Thailand (17.4 percent). The tertiary education enrolment rate was 
small, just about three percent in 1975, but comparable to Indonesia and Thailand. In 
Indonesia, tertiary enrolment rate was 2.7 percent in 1975 while in Thailand it was 3.6 
percent (WDI Online, 2011).   
As the rate of primary school enrolment was already high in 1960s, not much 
change has been seen. Currently the rate is around 94.0 percent. The secondary school 
enrolment rate has increased, notably from 31.5 percent in 1965 to 84.0 percent in 2007.
Meanwhile the enrolment rates for tertiary education have increased significantly, from 
just 2.6 percent in 1973 to 36.0 percent in 2007. Many factors, such as government 
policies and global economic pressures, have contributed to these changes. These will 
be discussed later in Section 3.7. The detail of education enrolment rates is available in 
Figure 3.1 below.
Government Spending
The government in Malaysia has emphasized the importance of developing the 
education sector. This is reflected by the large allocation provided by the government 
for this sector, which has increased annually. In the past 40 years, between 1970-2008,
government spending on the education sector experienced an increase of almost tenfold.  
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Figure 3.1:Malaysia: education enrolment (%)
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Source: Malaysia Educational Statistics. Tertiary education data is available since 1973 only.
Table 3.4: Malaysia: Education expenditure (RM) 1970-2008
(1970 as the base year)
Year Operating 
Expenditure
Development 
Expenditure Total GDP % of GDP
1970 477 44 521 11829 4.40
1975 814 149 963 15705 6.13
1980 1257 315 1571 30067 5.23
1983 1499 508 2007 36218 5.54
1990 2153 709 2862 51662 5.54
1995 3097 740 3836 80490 4.77
2000 3896 2140 6036 107447 5.62
2005 6830 1107 7937 154753 5.13
2008 8451 1876 10327 176069 5.87
Source: Nelson (2008: 193)
In 1970 the total amount of government spending in this sector was only RM521
million (4.40 percent of GDP) but by the year 2008, it had reached RM43,445 million 
or 5.87 percent of GDP. As shown in Table 3.4 above, the amount of educational 
spending increases every year. Malaysian government expenditure on education is one 
of the highest in the Southeast Asian region (Nelson, 2008: 25)
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3.7 The Pressures of Globalization
Malaysia recorded rapid economic growth through the 1990s. Until 1997, before 
the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia had successfully maintained 8.0 percent economic 
growth on average. The growth was relatively lower after the crisis but above the world 
economic growth average (recall Chapter 2). Rapid economic growth resulted in serious 
labour shortages, particularly in the engineering and technical fields. The Seventh 
Malaysia Plan reported that the labour force grew at 2.9 percent during 1990-1995 while 
employment expansion was 6.3 percent. Due to high economic growth, especially rapid 
expansion in the manufacturing sector (9.0 percent per annum) and construction (9.2 
percent per annum), nearly 1.2 million new jobs were created throughout that period. 
This exceeded the target of 1.1 million jobs creation in the Seventh Malaysia Plan. Both 
manufacturing and construction sectors were severely affected, with labour force 
shortages in engineering fields of over 20,000 to 30,000 in this particular period (1996-
2000). The shortage in labour supply increased costs and delayed production. 
Unfortunately, local universities failed to respond quickly to supply sufficient labour.
As local universities have limited places, Malaysia has depended on overseas 
higher education institutions to fulfill tertiary education demand. In 1985 for instance, 
the number of Malaysian students studying overseas was nearly 70,000 or around 40.0 
percent of the overall Malaysian student population. This percentage was down to 20
percent in 1990 but the absolute number was higher; up to 73,000. According to the 
Ministry of Education in 1993, it was estimated that every Malaysian student overseas 
had spent around RM35,000 to RM45,000 (USD10,000 to USD12,000) for tuition fees 
or RM2 to RM3 billion (USD1billion) annually. Malaysian spent about US$800 million 
for education abroad or close to 12 per cent of Malaysia’s current account deficit in 
1995 (Ziguras, 2003: 103). Currently there are more than 50,000 Malaysia’s students
studying overseas, or 6-10 percent of Malaysia’s student population (Ministry of Higher 
Education, 2007). As the Malaysian currency declined after the Asian financial crisis in 
the middle of 1997, the cost of sending students overseas increased rapidly.
The Evolution of Higher Education5
In Malaysia, private higher education providers have operated since the 1970s. 
In the 1970s, most operated as tuition centres offering tuition for professional degrees in 
the United Kingdom. Among the popular courses was a preparation program for the 
5 See Tan (2002) and Nelson (2008).
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London Engineering Council and Chartered Association of Certified Accountant
examinations. Due to high demand, these colleges expanded their business by offering 
matriculation courses from Australian universities such as the South Australian 
Matriculation and the Victoria Certificate of Education. These colleges also offered pre 
university courses from Canadian universities as well as British A-Levels. These 
courses gained popularity amongst non-Malays particularly after the government 
changed the medium of instruction from English to Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysian 
language). This policy had resulted in increasing number of non-Malay parents sending 
their children overseas for tertiary education.
In the 1980s, private higher institutions expanded their business by developing 
partnerships with overseas higher institutions especially from the United Kingdom and 
United States. They offered twinning programs that allow the courses to be conducted 
partially in Malaysia in order to reduce the costs of study. The Kolej Damansara Utama 
and PJ Community College were among the pioneers of these programs. 
Until the late 1990s, there were no official statistics available on the number of 
students in private higher institutions. Tan (2002) however, estimated that in 1985 there 
were around 15,000 students enrolled in private institutions. At the same time there 
were about 25 private colleges offering various levels of study including twinning 
degree programs. The number of students and private higher institutions increased 
rapidly in 1990s, attracted government attention. In 1996, the government passed the 
Private Higher Institution Act 1996 to regulate as well as stimulate the development of 
private higher institutions.
3.8 New Directions for Higher Education
The Private Higher Institution Act 1996 and Education Act 1996 (Amendment) 
have changed the higher education landscape in Malaysia. Higher education is now 
viewed from a new perspective. According to Nelson (2008: 193): 
In the late 1990s the education system’s contributions to economic development took a 
further turn. The higher education sector began to be viewed as a potential export 
sector. Whereas for decades Malaysian students had been sent abroad to study at foreign 
universities, Malaysian institutes and universities…were beginning to attract 
substantial numbers of students from abroad, particularly within the Southeast and East 
Asian regions. 
The commercialization of the education sector is not a novel issue for some 
countries, such as Australia and Canada, which started this process as early as the 
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1970s.  In the United States and the United Kingdom this sector has grown rapidly since 
the 1980s. It has continued to increase with the United States being the main exporter of 
education services, recording the highest value in the world of more than USD10 billion 
in the year 2000. The higher education sector thus contributes tremendously to national 
revenue for these countries. Among the OECD countries alone, the market value for this 
service is estimated to be about USD30 billion, which is roughly around 3 percent of the 
total service sector (Kurt Larsen et. al, 2002).
Malaysia has been actively promoting its education sector at the international 
level in the hope of becoming a hypermarket that is able to offer various courses to 
foreign students, especially those from developing countries. Malaysia has planned to 
be the region’s centre of excellence for education, expecting to attract some 50,000 
foreign students by the year 2010 onward, thus contributing some RM3.0 billion to the 
nation’s annual revenue. The number of foreign students in Malaysia increased 
drastically in less than 10 years. In 1996 the number of foreign students was 5565. This 
figure increased nearly fivefold by 2002 with 26,466 students. Malaysia was able to 
generate income of roughly RM500 million per year (UNESCO, 2003). Currently, it is 
estimated that there are around 87000 foreign students in Malaysia surpassed the target 
for 2010 (Ministry of Higher Education, 2010). A large number of the students are from 
China and Indonesia. Malaysia has an edge as the cost of education is estimated to be 
30% lower compared to Singapore, with better facilities than other countries in the 
region (UNESCO, 2003:27). In short, education has now become a profitable trade 
commodity.
New Educational Providers
Lucrative business opportunities in the education sector have attracted other parties to 
enter the market. Since 1990s, the key players in the education sector could be divided 
into six categories (Mahdzan and Noran, 1999; Tan, 2002).
a. Private higher institutions owned or funded by government linked companies 
(GLCs). The GLCs such as Petrolium Nasional Berhad (Petronas) Malaysia oil 
company established their own university called University Petronas. The 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), the main electricity provider, has their own 
university, Uniten and Telekom Malaysia Berhad, and the largest 
telecommunication company is the owner of Multimedia University.
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b. Private higher institutions owned by public listed companies such as Sunway 
College (Sungei Way Group), Kolej Aman of Talam Corporation and Sepang 
Institute of Technology established by Hong Leong Group.
c. Private higher institutions established by political parties. In order to protect 
their interests and achieve the parties’ objectives, as well as for making profit, 
political parties also set up their own higher institutions. The government ruling 
party UMNO, has established Universiti Tun Abdul Razak (UNITAR), a virtual 
university. The MCA, Chinese political party, is the key stakeholder of 
Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR) and the Indian based party, Malaysian 
Indian Congress (MIC) owns Kolej TAFE Seremban. On the opposition side, 
PAS, the largest Islamic party also established their own college recently called 
Kolej Universiti Islam Zulkifli Mohamad (KUIZM) that offers courses based on 
Islamic study. Although admission to private higher institutions is open to all 
Malaysians regardless of ethnicity or religion, as well as to foreigners, the 
student population is still dominated by the particular ethnic group only. For 
example, UTAR is predominantly Chinese (Mahdzan and Noran, 1999).   
d. Private higher institutions owned by the State government. The state 
governments are also involved in the establishment of private higher institutions. 
The Selangor government for instance runs the Universiti Selangor (formerly 
known as Universiti Industri Selangor).   
e. Independent private colleges. This category involves the private colleges that 
have been established a long time ago with excellent performance and 
international linkages. Most of them were the pioneers in the industry such as 
Goon Institute (established in 1936) and Stamford College (established in 1940).
f. Foreign universities branch such as Monash University, Nottingham University, 
Curtin University of Technology and Swinburne University. 
The changes in education policies, such as the introduction of the Private Higher 
Education Act and the Education Act 1996, the increase in the number of years
of universal education to 11 years in 1991, as well as globalization and 
economic pressures have increased the number of student enrolments and the 
number of universities established.
The number of private higher education institutions increased drastically from 1990. In 
1990, there were only 25 private higher education institutions but within 5 years, the 
number increased more than tenfold to 280 (see Figure 4.2 and Table 3.5).
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Table 3.5: Number of public and private higher institutions
Year Public 
university
Polytechnic Community 
College
Government 
HE
Private 
HE
Total
1970 3 1 n.a 4 n.a 4
1975 5 1 n.a 6 n.a 6
1980 5 2 n.a 7 n.a 7
1990 7 6 n.a 13 25 38
1995 9 6 n.a 15 280 295
2000 13 12 n.a 25 611 636
2005 16 20 34 70 559 629
2007 16 24 37 77 525 602
2010 20 24 45 89 476 565
Source: Ministry of Higher Education, various years. Note: n.a = not available
Figure 3.2: Number of public and private higher institutions
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Source: Ministry of Higher Education, various years.
In 2000, the number increased again to about 611. However, the number of private 
higher education institutions started declining in the 2000s. By 2007, almost 100 of the 
private colleges were closing or merging with other institutions. The establishment of 
new public universities including the polytechnics and community colleges that offer 
similar courses had affected their business. Therefore, some of them were unable to 
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survive due to serious financial problems and stiff competition in attracting new 
students, especially for those institutions that depends solely on the domestic market.
Figure 3.3: Student enrolment in public and private higher institution (in thousands)
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Source: Ministry of Higher Education, various years.
The number of student enrolments also increased sharply from the 1990s, 
especially the enrolment in private higher education institutions. In 1990, the number of 
students was around 36,000 but by 2010 had increased to more than 540,000. Public 
higher education institutions also showed significant changes in the number of student 
enrolments, increasing almost threefold within two decades. In 1985, about 144,000 
students enrolled in public higher education institutions but in 2010 the numbers of 
students reached nearly 600,000 (Figure 4.3).
Education Policy and Political Pressure
Malays make up the largest ethnic group, comprising 60 percent of the 
population, and are hence predominant in Malaysian politics. However, Malay voters
are split into three main political parties; UMNO, PAS and Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
(PKR). As a result, to hold political power Malays have to cooperate with other ethnic
groups. The Chinese group, which is dominant economically, also has considerable
political power. In many cases, the Chinese (who made up 30 percent of the population)
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are key to the determination of election results. The MCA is the government ruling 
party but: 
...the MCA has had to engage in serious competitive bidding for Chinese votes to stay 
in business. This was done by appearing to be the party that best champions Chinese 
rights and interests, in most cases beyond the bounds of the NEP. Sometimes the MCA 
has overplayed this role by taking on a stance more extreme than that of the DAP or that 
of the Gerakan. In its capacity as an opposition, the MCA has on occasion turned 
around and attacked some of the major decisions of the Alliance government and the 
cabinet, even though it has remained an important member of that government (Faaland
et.al, 1990:168).
Chinese perceptions and actions toward education policies are strongly 
influenced by their NGO’s6. In 2000 there were more than 8000 registered Chinese 
NGO’s in Malaysia. Their objectives are heterogeneous and diverse but they generally
play a very significant role as a ‘guardian of the sociopolitical interests of the Chinese 
community’ by championing the issues of citizenships, education and language. 
Chinese NGO’s increased significantly after the ethnic riot in 1969. They felt that 
urgent action should be taken to unite the Chinese community to balance Malays’
power. 
Although the Chinese are citizens of Malaysia and have been in Malaysia for 
more than 50 years, the perception of the Chinese community, particularly the non-
governmental organizations (NGO), towards government policy has not changed.
Government policy, particularly the classification of Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera,
is perceived as discriminatory. Influential Chinese NGO’s, Dong Zong (the United 
Chinese School Committees Associations of Malaysia) and Jiaozong (the United 
Chinese School Teachers Associations of Malaysia) - together commonly known as 
Dongjiaozong - become the most active NGOs to challenge government policies on 
language, education and culture. In the view of the Chinese community, instead of 
playing a role for developing human capital and uplifting socioeconomic status, 
education is perceived as the survival of culture and ethnic identity. Thock 2008:604
noted:
…our age-old culture, language and mother tongue…we consider it to be our sacred 
right…We therefore strongly urge that Chinese Education should be accorded a proper 
place in the educational system of this country7.
6 Chinese NGOs are also known as Chinese Guild Associations. In the Chinese dialect, they also called as 
Shetuan (social organizations) and Huatuan (Chinese organizations). See Thock (2005 and 2008) for 
literature on the role of Malaysian Chinese movement.
7 Statement of the National Conference of Chinese Education, c.f. Thock, 2008:590. 
Education Policy in Malaysia: National Unity and Human Capital Development
 
57
 
They urged the government to recognize the rights of the Chinese to be equal to those of 
Malays, including the freedom for minority groups to perpetuate their education, 
language and culture (Thock, 2008:584).
Barisan Nasional is the ruling party, with a two-thirds majority in the Parliament 
since Independence. However, they have to be very careful in any policy formulation 
because education and language are very sensitive; any changes in policies have to 
consider political pressure from various ethnic groups. Major changes in education 
policy are only possible when the government is in a very strong position. For example 
in 2003, the government had to compromise with language policy by enforcing teaching 
and learning of science and mathematics subjects in English. According to Lee 
(1997:3):
The re-emphasis on the importance of English came about only after the National Front 
coalition won sweeping victories in the last two general elections, and after Mahathir, 
the current prime minister, consolidated his power within UMNO after the UMNO split 
in the mid-1980s.
3.9 The Malaysian Education: Emerging Issues and Challenges
The substantial changes in education policies since the 1970s have several 
implications.
Dualism in Higher Education
Mahdzan and Noran (1999) define dualism as two different types of education. 
The first type refers to private higher education institutions that use English as the 
medium of instruction and were mainly dominated by non-Malay students. The second 
type is the Malay medium public higher education institutions with largely Malay 
students. The enrolment of Malays students in Malaysian public universities has 
increased drastically, with particularly large increases between 1960 and 1970. Refer to 
Table 3.6 below. Table 3.6 also shows a decline in enrolment of non-Malays in public 
higher education institutions; this has been balanced by increasing enrolments in private 
higher education institutions. There was no time series data available on the private 
university enrolment according to ethnic group, but the data published by Majlis 
Perundingan Ekonomi Negara II (MAPEN II) (Economic Consultative Council) (refer 
to Table 3.7 below) shows that non-Bumiputera comprise more than 80.0 percent of the 
student’s population. This table also shows that the degree programs in large private 
universities consist of 92.1 percent of non-Bumiputera, with 80.7 percent in diploma 
programs and 76.7 percent at certificate level.    
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Tables 3.6 and 3.7 together show that the composition of Bumiputera and non-
Bumiputera in public and private higher institutions is not balanced. In a country with 
fragile ethnic relations, this imbalance in student enrolments may become a sensitive 
issue in the future. Lee (2004: 32-33) noted:
The ethnic divide between public and private higher education is problematic to say the 
least. The government has tried to bridge this ethnic divide by decreeing that all courses 
offered in be conducted in the Malay language so as to promote social cohesion. 
However, this policy could not be fully implemented because all the transnational 
education programmes have to be conducted in in English since they have originated 
from Western countries…the Minister of Education also suggested that ethnic quota 
policy should be extended to all the PHEIs…this was objected vehemently by MAPCO 
and NAPIEI8.
Table 3.6: Student population in public universities by ethnic group (%)
Year Malays Non Malays
1960 22.0 78.0
1970 54.2 46.8
1980 63.1 36.9
1985 67.0 33.0
1990 74.6 25.4
2002 68.7 31.3
2003 62.6 37.4
Source: MAPEN II (2001)
Table 3.7: Students enrolment by race and education level in large private 
universities as of 31 December 1999
Education Level Students Enrolment
Bumiputra % Non-Bumiputra % Total 
Degree 1322 7.9 15344 92.1 16666
Diploma 6722 19.3 28207 80.7 34933
Certificate 3420 23.3 11284 76.7 14704
Total 11468 17.3 54835 82.7 66303
Source: MAPEN II (2000)
8 PHEIs is acronym of Private Higher Education Institution. MAPCO is Malaysian Association of Private 
Colleges and NAPEI is National Association of Private Educational Institutions.
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Distributional Issues
Generally, the establishment of private higher education institutions provides
alternatives to those who do not or cannot enroll in public higher education institutions.
However, it seems that the mushrooming of private higher education institutions
restrains the social restructuring objectives of the NEP. Private higher institution 
education fees are very expensive; therefore, students from rich families have more 
choices. Education loans are available from the government through Perbadanan 
Tabung Pengajian Tinggi Nasional (PTPTN) (National Higher Education Fund) or 
banking institutions, which may benefit the poor, but either the student or their parents 
have to accumulate high levels of debt and pay high rates of interest. The rich may in 
fact benefit more from these loans. According to Tham (2011:15):
The lack of a maximum income criteria for loans approved has resulted in some 
students from wealthy families accessing this loans…
Previous studies have shown that students from higher income families gain the 
most from government policies in education. The study by Mazumdar (1981) for 
example, highlights that the students who were studying at higher learning institutions
come from high income households9.The scenario of higher education as explained in 
the above section suggests that those in the higher income bracket have received 
comparatively more benefits. Educational attainment has a strong relationship with 
income, thus children from higher income families end up with more opportunities for 
better jobs, entrenching current disadvantage. Therefore, the new higher education 
policy advantages the wealthy, with likely negative effects on equality. 
3.10 Summary
The Malaysian education system was conducted by different ethnic groups 
without any proper syllabus and system during the British Occupation. Since 
Independence, the education system has been viewed by the government as playing an 
important role in achieving national unity. Various plans have restructured the 
education system with this in mind. Education is also seen as an effective tool to redress 
socioeconomic imbalance, increase productivity and hence promote economic growth. 
Globalization, economic liberalization and political pressures have resulted in dramatic
9Bowman et.al (1986) however, found the poorest received the largest portion of subsidy per student but 
the rate of subsidy per household increased with the high income group showing the highest rate, up to 
RM176 per student.
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changes to Malaysia’s education systems. The amendment to the Education Act (1996) 
and the establishment of the Higher Education Act (1996) become landmarks in the new 
orientation of Malaysian education towards more internationalization. Private providers 
of higher education have dramatically increased in number. Unequal access to these 
(more expensive) higher education institutions has implications for inequality and the 
government’s goal of national unity.
The remaining chapters of this thesis provide empirical analysis of various 
aspects of education and inequality. The next chapter discusses the general methodology 
used in this thesis. The chapter also discusses the sources and quality of data used in the 
empirical analyses presented in Chapters 6 to 8.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
4.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters discussed the history and development of 
education policy in Malaysia and some of the patterns in poverty and inequality. This 
chapter discusses the data and methodology used to test the relationship between 
education, inequality and growth in this thesis. Since the data is derived from 
secondary sources, the discussion of data quality is important. The data 
transformations are also discussed in this chapter.
This thesis uses two types of data. First, the data used for the meta-analysis in 
chapter 5 is derived from 66 studies of the effects of education on inequality. Second,
the empirical analyses in Chapters 6 to 8 use annual data compiled from various 
sources, as summarized in Table 4.1. 
Several methods have been adopted in order to achieve study objectives. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.1, Chapter 5 uses a meta-analysis to estimate the effect of 
education on inequality. Chapter 7 is a regional study that relies mostly on Malaysian 
States’ time series and panel data. Chapters 6 and 8 also use Malaysian and Southeast 
Asian time series and panel data
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a general overview 
of the scope and level of data. The sources and quality of education and inequality
data are discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively, while Section 4.5 discusses 
the other data used in the analysis. Section 4.6 discusses data related to democracy
and regime duration. Panel data and data treatment issues are discussed in Sections
4.7 and 4.8. Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section 4.9.
4.2 The Scope and Level of Aggregation of Data
The main focus of this thesis is Malaysia. However, much of the data for 
Malaysia have small numbers of observations which might affect the empirical 
results. The empirical analysis is therefore extended to include Southeast Asia. 
Analysis of the Southeast Asia data plays a role as a ‘benchmark’ or comparison. 
Therefore, this thesis will use three levels of data: 
a. Panel data at the Malaysian State level data (Negeri). 
b. Time series data at the Malaysian National level.
c. Panel data for Southeast Asia.
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Figure 4.1: General methodology summary
Table 4.1: Sources of data
LEVEL VARIABLE SOURCES
Malaysian State Economic Growth
GDP per capita
FDI (share of GDP)
Government Expenditure  
(share of GDP)
Capital  (share of GDP)
Inequality
Economic Planning Unit, 
Malaysia
Population Department of Statistics 
Malaysia
Education Enrolment Ministry of Education 
Malaysia
Party Dominance
Voter Turnout
The Election Commission 
of Malaysia 
Malaysia National Economic Growth
GDP Per capita
FDI
Government Expenditure
Capital
Economic Planning Unit, 
Malaysia
Inequality The World Income 
Inequality Database 
Meta-Regression 
Analysis
Time series and Panel Data Econometric 
Analysis
Chapter 
5
Chapter 
7
Chapters
6 and 8
Time 
Series 
Data 
Time 
Series 
and 
Panel 
Data
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(WIID2)
Economic Planning Unit, 
Malaysia
Average Years of 
Schooling
Barro and Lee (2010)
Economic Freedom Economic Freedom of the 
World (2010),Fraser 
Institute
Democracy and Regime 
Duration 
Polity IV
Trade Openness Penn Table 2010
Southeast Asia Economic growth
GDP per capita 
FDI  (share of GDP)
Government Expenditure  
(share of GDP)
Capital  (share of GDP)
Population growth
WDI Online
Inequality The World Income 
Inequality Database 
(WIID2)
Average Years of 
Schooling
Barro and Lee (2010)
Democracy and Regime 
Duration
Polity IV
Trade Openness Penn Table 2010
Malaysian State Level Data
The state level data refers to data from Malaysian states. As noted in Chapter 
3, Malaysia has 13 states and three Federal Territories. If all Federal Territories are 
included, then Malaysia has 16 regions. However, this thesis has excluded two 
Federal Territories, Labuan and Putrajaya, from the empirical analysis. Labuan and 
Putrajaya are small states with most of their administration carried out under their 
original states.1 Since most of the data in both states are pooled together with their 
original states data, it is almost impossible to trace out and separate the data. The 
data has been reported separately in recent official reports, but this is not enough to 
create a suitable time series (nor panel data series).
National and International Level Data
National level data is for Malaysia as a whole, while the international level 
data includes data for Southeast Asia, consisting of ten countries: Brunei, Cambodia, 
                                                          
1 Sabah was the original state for Labuan and Putrajaya was originally from Selangor.
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Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. Data is patchy for the less developed countries in the region (Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). Brunei and Myanmar are particularly deficient in 
observations and are thus removed from the empirical analysis.
For each of the three levels, the data is divided into four components. These 
are education data, inequality data, economic data and democracy and regime 
duration data data. The actual empirical analysis presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
also makes use of other data. These are listed in Table 4.1 and are discussed in the 
associated chapters.
4.3 Definition, Sources, and the Quality of Education Data
Human capital or education has become one of the central issues in the study
of economic development. The existing literature suggests that human capital,
especially education, is an important component of economic growth.2 However, this
hypothesis is often supported by little empirical evidence. One of key issues in 
researching the relationship between education and economic growth is differences
in the definition and measurement of human capital, particularly in the measurement 
of educational variables. Some studies use school enrolment rates or enrolment 
ratios, the literacy rate or the average years of schooling as a proxy of human capital.
Other studies use human skills, physical abilities and life expectancy as a measure of 
human capital such as Cipolla (1969) and Houston (1983) (see Leeuwen, 2007:20).
Measures of Human Capital
In this thesis, human capital is proxied by years of schooling and the school 
enrolment rate. Barro and Lee (1993, 2000, 2010) used the years of schooling as a 
measure of human capital. However, they admitted that as a measure of human 
capital the average years of schooling has limitations as it neglects the quality of the 
education. According to Barro and Lee (1993:364):
Our data measure years of school attainment, but do not adjust for quality of 
education, length of school day or year, and so on. The necessary information to 
make these kinds of adjustments do[es] not seem to be available for the broad cross-
section of countries that we are considering, although it would be possible to take 
account of elements such as public expenditures on education and pupil-teacher 
ratios.      
          
                                                          
2 Human capital also includes physical and mental health status.
Chapter 4
 
65
 
The use of enrolment rates as a proxy for human capital has statistical validity
or it can be quantified but it fails to capture education quality. Another criticism 
regarding this measurement arises because students are outside the labour force 
(Permani, 2009:6). Therefore, their contribution to economic growth is difficult to 
justify, and if any, it can be considered to be very small. In fact, Pritchett (1996) 
found that both primary and secondary school enrolments are negatively related to 
human capital growth rate. A better measure of human capital available for economic 
growth is some measure of human capital embodied in the existing labour force.3
The enrolment rate at each school level is usually calculated as:
ܧ݊ݎ݋݈݉݁݊ݐ ܴܽݐ݁ = ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܧ݊ݎ݋݈݁݀ ܵݐݑ݀݁݊ݐݏ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈ െ ܽݐݐ݁݊݀݅݊݃ ܽ݃݁ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊
The schooling-attending age population differs among countries depending on the 
education system. In Malaysia, the school-attending age population is 6 to 11 years 
for primary school, 12 to 14 for secondary school, 15 to 16 for upper secondary 
school, 17 to 18 for post secondary school and 19 to 24 for university level (Malaysia 
Educational Statistics, various years).
The Issues of Education Data at the National and State Level
The Sources of Data  
Education data can be obtained from at least six sources. 
a. Malaysia Educational Statistics by Ministry of Education 
b. Perangkaan Pengajian Tinggi (Higher Education Statistics) by Ministry of 
Higher Education 
c. Economic Reports by Treasury 
d. Population and Housing Census of Malaysia from Statistics Department 
e. Malaysia Development Plans published by Economic Planning Unit
f. World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank, and
g. Barro and Lee (2010)
Some of the data on higher education in the 1980s are also available in Tan (2002).
                                                          
3 The use of school attainment rates can often be justified on the basis of high correlation from year to 
year, suggesting that enrolment rates are a useful proxy for skill in the labour market.
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The Quality of Education Data
The main challenge in using secondary sourced data is the problem of data 
quality, particularly in a study that involves many datasets. This thesis has identified 
some problems that may affect data quality. As discussed above, education data is 
available in various government official reports and previous studies. But, the data 
varies between sources, and in some cases, especially the data for higher education, 
the differences in the data reported are quite significant.4
Table 4.2 below shows Malaysian education data from various official 
government reports. The table clearly shows that each agency reported different 
figures. In 2005 for example, Malaysia Educational Statistics reported 3.045 million 
students, or a 94.31 percent enrolment in primary school, which was similar to the 
enrolment rate given by the Economic Report 2006. Meanwhile in the Eighth
Malaysia Plan the number of students enrolled was reported to be 3.035 million, 10 
thousand lower than reported in Malaysia Educational Statistics.
Table 4.2 also compares the enrolment rate for three government official 
reports. The data on the primary and secondary school enrolment seems to be 
reliable. With the exception of the secondary school enrolment rate in 2005, the 
differences in the enrolment data of three reports were around one to two percent, 
which is acceptable. The difference in the education data reported by government 
agencies is due to several factors:
a. Differences in definitions
There is no agreement on the definition of higher education. Every report 
defines higher education differently. Therefore, the type of higher education 
institutions included in the report also differs. The Ministry of Education only reports 
the number of students enrolled in the public higher institutions under the purview of 
the ministry such as public universities, polytechnics and teacher training colleges. 
The Economic Reports on the other hand cover student enrolment in public 
universities only. Meanwhile the Malaysia Economic Plans (post 2000) and the 
                                                          
4 The best way to check data reliability and accuracy is to recalculate the data provided by different 
agencies with the school age population. Nevertheless, it is not an easy task to test the accuracy of the 
data with incomplete information. The school age population for each category is not available every 
year. Although the data on population is available annually in the Yearbook of Statistics, the 
population data reported in Malaysia Census is divided into three age groups only. These are 0-15 
year, 16-65 and above 65 years old groupings, which do not suit the schooling age population. 
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Perangkaan Pengajian Tinggi, Ministry of Higher Education reports the number of 
student enrolments for both public and private higher institutions. 
Table 4.2: Malaysia’s education data from various sources: a comparison
Student Enrolment 1995 2000 2005 2007
Primary School Enrolment (‘000)
Malaysia 
Educational 
Statistics
2828
(96.73)
2907
(93.13)
3045
(94.31)
3035
(94.24)
Economic Reports (96.7) (96.8) (94.3) (94.2)
Malaysia Plans 2799 2945 3035
(91.38)
n.a
Secondary School Enrolment (‘000)
Malaysia 
Educational 
Statistics
1590
(72.24)
1951
(79.34)
2074
(81.97)
2140
(81.54)
Economic Reports n.a n.a (82.4) (78.8)
Malaysia Plans 1628 1943 2285
(87.39)
n.a
Tertiary School Enrolment (‘000)
Malaysia 
Educational 
Statistics
272
(8.72)
364
(10.51)
360
(36.41)
355
(36.04)
Economic Reports 125 212 383
(13.49)
0.331
Malaysia Plans
Public Institutions 148 313 390 n.a
Private Institutions n.a 261 341 n.a
Total 148 574 732
(25.77)
n.a
Higher Education 
Statistics
Public Institutions n.a 270 307 383
Private Institutions n.a 261 259 366
Polytechnics n.a 434 738 843
TAR College n.a n.a 248 257
Community Colleges n.a n.a 987 144
Total 575 674
(23.36)
873
(25.00)
Malaysian Student
at Overseas
n.a 566 549
Total 731 928
Notes: 1. figure in brackets refer to the reported enrolment rate 2. n.a not available 3. Italic figure in brackets is 
author’s calculation using school population age in Malaysia Educational Statistics. 
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The inconsistent definition of higher education appears not only in different 
government agencies, but also in reports by the same agencies. Instead of publishing 
annual higher education data, in 2007 the Ministry of Higher Education also 
published the Strategic Plans for Higher Education. Although the reports were 
prepared by the same ministry, this report has a different enrolment rate for higher 
education. The Perangkaan Pengajian Tinggi stated that the enrolment rate of higher 
education was 25 percent and Strategic Plans for Higher Education reported 36 
percent enrolment rate. The difference was due to different definitions of higher or 
tertiary education. In order to achieve higher enrolment rates for tertiary education as 
one of the criteria to become a developed nation state, the Strategic Plans for Higher 
Education included high school (Form 6 and A Level) as a part of tertiary education. 
Previously, Form 6 and A Level were either reported separately or classified as 
secondary level schooling. In fact, the number of students in Form 6 and A Level has 
never been reported in Perangkaan Pengajian Tinggi because they are commonly 
recognized as ‘secondary school’.     
b. Data reporting format
The main problem while retrieving education data was that every report is published 
in a different format. In some cases, the difference is quite substantial even for the 
same report. As an example, the Economics Reports did not report secondary school 
enrolment prior to 2000. The Perangkaan Pengajian Tinggi only includes Kolej 
Tunku Abdul Rahman students’ enrolment since 2003. Differences in reporting
formats and school breakdown also appear in the Malaysia Educational Statistics for 
primary and secondary school. These differences result in problems of reconciling 
the enrolment rate according to school-age population in latter reports.
c. School age population
There is also no consensus on the schooling age population particularly for tertiary 
education. The Malaysia Educational Statistics uses ‘19 to 24 years’ while the 
Perangkaan Pengajian Tinggi uses ‘17 to 23 years’ as the schooling age population
for tertiary education. The difference in the schooling population age range of course 
affects the percentage of enrolment rate. 
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d. Data collection period and the time of publication
The differences in data reported are also due to different times of publication. The 
Malaysia Educational Statistics usually use data taken at the middle of the calendar 
year, while the Malaysia Plans and Economic Reports use data at the end of the 
calendar year. Student enrolments and graduations, particularly in higher education, 
occur twice a year. Therefore, some difference in the data is to be expected if the 
agencies choose different data periods.
Data Selection and Adjustment
As explained above, the quality of data is questionable. Although the 
differences in the period of data and time of publication might contribute to small 
differences in the data reported by different publications, it is difficult to know which 
data is the most accurate. A correlation test has been conducted to ensure the 
reliability of the data published by Malaysia Educational Statistics with the data 
published by the UNESCO and the World Bank. 
Table 4.3: Correlation of the UNESCO/World Bank and Malaysia Educational 
Statistics Data
The result in Table 4.3 shows that there is reasonably high correlation 
between the two datasets. The correlation coefficient for primary school is 0.65 and 
0.98 for secondary school, indicating that the data in the Malaysia Educational 
Statistics is still acceptable.
However, the data for tertiary education is questionable and seems to be 
unreliable as each report has different figures. For example, the 2005 Malaysia 
Educational Statistics reported that tertiary enrolment was 360,000 students or  36.41
percent of the tertiary aged population. In contrast, the Eight Malaysia Plan, 
Economic Report 2006 and Perangkaan Pengajian Tinggi reported that the number 
of students enrolled were 732 thousand, 0.383 million and 0.674 million respectively, 
very much higher than the Malaysia Educational Statistics. The author’s calculation 
based on schooling age population in Malaysia Educational Statistics 2006 reveals 
Reports Correlation Coefficient
Primary Secondary
UNESCO/World Bank 1.00 1.00
Malaysia Educational 
Statistics
0.65 0.98
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that the enrolment rates of tertiary education in the Economic Report and the Eight 
Malaysia Plan were only 13.49 percent, 25.77 percent and 23.76 percent
respectively, less than the enrolment rate reported in Malaysia Educational Statistics
(see Table 4.2, figures in bracket). Therefore, the quality of the data is debatable.
These reported figures seem to be unrealistic considering the number of 
public and private higher education institutions. Although the number of public 
institutions increased with the establishment of new universities, polytechnics and 
community colleges under the Ministry of Education, the number of private higher 
institution decreased rapidly. 
In the period from 2000 to 2005 the government built five new universities, 
seven polytechnics and 22 community colleges, but at the same time the number of 
private higher institution dropped from 611 to 559 (Refer to Chapter 3, Table 3.5 for 
details).  Therefore, an increase in the enrolment rate to 36 percent in that particular 
period is highly questionable. The author’s calculation based on the number of 
students and schooling age provided in the Malaysia Educational Statistics reveals 
that the rate should be between 10 to 12 percent only.
Moreover, Malaysia Educational Statistics also reported that the enrolment 
rate of tertiary education was 36.04 percent with 354,869 students enrolled. 
Unfortunately, the enrolment rate was inconsistent with the number of students and 
school going age population. In 2007, the estimated schooling age population was 
around 2.9 million (Malaysia Educational Statistics, 2007). Therefore the rate should 
be around 12 percent. The enrolment rate was similar to the rate reported in the 
Strategic Plan for Higher Education 2007.5
The data for higher education in Malaysia Educational Statistics tends to be 
underestimated as the report covers only higher education institutions that are under 
the purview of the Ministry of Education. The data for private higher education and 
Malaysia’s students studying overseas are mostly unavailable in their annual 
publication even though the role of private higher education institutions in providing 
tertiary and post secondary education is not a new phenomenon in Malaysia (recall
Chapter 3). As a result, relying on Malaysia Educational Statistics for tertiary 
education data leads to an underestimate of both the absolute number and the 
enrolment rate.
                                                          
5 It is possible that the Malaysia Educational Statistics had just ‘copy and pasted’ the rate in the 
Strategic Plan for Higher Education 2007 without considering the different in definition and age 
coverage.
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Therefore, to minimize errors and to ensure consistency with Southeast Asia 
data, this thesis uses the data from Barro and Lee (2010) for regression estimates.
Barro and Lee (2010) is a widely recognized education dataset. The main objective 
of this thesis is to capture the relationship between education, economic growth and 
inequality. Among these publications, only Barro and Lee (2010) provides a reliable 
and sufficiently long period of data coverage since 1960s, and hence, enables us to 
create the longest possible time series data. 
Education Data at the State Level
The education data for the state level is derived from the Malaysia 
Educational Statistics as that is the only report which publishes state level data. This 
report has enrolment data for primary and secondary school. Unfortunately, there is 
no data available on tertiary education at the state level. 
The Malaysia Educational Statistics reports the number of students enrolled 
only, without the enrolment rate. The school enrolment rate is usually calculated by 
dividing the number of enrolled students with the school attending age population. 
However, there is no data available on the school attending age population. The 
available population data in the Census reports are not divided into relevant school 
attending age; as a result, it is impossible to obtain enrolment rates at every school 
level. Therefore, the school enrolment rate at the state level in this thesis is calculated 
as follows:
ܧ݊ݎ݋݈݉݁݊ݐ ܴܽݐ݁ = ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܧ݊ݎ݋݈݁݀ ܵݐݑ݀݁݊ݐܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊  x 100
International Level Education Data
At the international level (Southeast Asia), the data is easier as it drawn from 
one dataset. This thesis use education data from Barro and Lee (2010). Their dataset 
uses the average year of schooling as a measure of human capital. Table 4.4 below 
summarizes the measurement and sources of education data used in this thesis.
General Methodology and Data
 
72
 
Table 4.4 Sources and measurement of education data
Level Measurement Sources
Malaysian State School Enrolment Malaysia Educational 
Statistics
Malaysian National Average Year of Schooling Barro and Lee (2010)
Southeast Asia Average Year of Schooling Barro and Lee (2010)
4.4 The Inequality Data: Definition, Sources and the Issues of Comparability 
This section will discuss in depth the definition, sources and the issues of the 
inequality data quality at the state, national and international or cross country levels. 
In general, four measures of inequality are used in this thesis: Gini, Top20,
Mid40 and Bot20. Top20 is the income share of the top 20% of the population, the 
middle 40% is a proxy for the middle class and the bottom 40% is the income share 
of the poorer people in a society. The inequality data are not always available 
annually. For Southeast Asia and Malaysian national data, the approach to dealing 
with the missing data was twofold. First, the growth models (see Chapter 8) were 
estimated using only the available reported data. Second, following the advice of 
Honaker and King (2010), multiple imputation techniques were used to derive an 
annual series for inequality. For each inequality measure (Gini, Top20, Mid40 and 
Bot40) this method derives 50 imputed series. This increases the number of 
observations for the empirical analysis, as well as introducing variation in the 
imputed data to enable standard errors to be corrected for the fact that the data are 
imputed.6
For the Malaysian states, both the inequality and GDP data are not available 
every year.7 Inequality data are actually available more frequently than GDP. Up 
until 2005, the regional GDP (and GDP per capita) data are available only at five
year intervals. Given the gaps in both the dependent variable and one of the key 
independent variables, for this thesis I chose not to interpolate the data to derive an 
annual series. Instead, five-year growth averages were constructed.
For Malaysian states inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, as 
income shares for the top and bottom earners at the state level are not available for 
sufficient years to enable us to explore the effects of alternative inequality measures.
                                                          
6 Linear interpolation can also used, but multiple imputation techniques have now become more 
popular.
7 GDP data are available annually only since 2005.
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The State and National Level Data
The original sources of inequality data for the Malaysian states and national were 
compiled from various official surveys undertaken by the Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia (Snodgrass,1980; Anand 1983; Shireen,1998; and Ragayah, 2008). The 
Surveys are:
a. The Household Budget Survey of the Federation Malaya 1957-58 (HBS)
b. The Federation Saving Survey 1959 (FSS)
c. The Socioeconomic Sample Survey of Households 1967-1968 (SES) 
d. The SRM/Ford Social and Economic Survey 1967/68 (SRM)
e. The Post Enumeration Survey of the 1970 population census (PES)
f. Household Income Surveys
A complete set of inequality data is available in Malaysian Economic 
Planning Unit website recently. The discussion below gives some idea on the quality 
of the original sources of inequality data.
a. The Household Budget Survey of the Federation Malaya 1957-58 (HBS)
The HBS was the earliest survey conducted in Malaysia since her 
independence in 1957. The survey was conducted to measure consumption patterns 
of the population in Peninsular Malaysia. HBS covered 2,760 households at urban 
and rural areas in Peninsular Malaysia. However, the inequality data drawn from 
HBS could be underestimated and did not reflect the real situation in Peninsular 
Malaysia as the survey excluded high-income households with more than RM1000 
monthly income.8
b. The Federation Saving Survey 1959 (FSS)
In 1960, another survey was conducted by the Department of Statistics, 
namely The Federation Saving Survey 1959. The FSS used a larger sample size than 
the HBS, involving 5691 households. Nevertheless, the survey has been criticized 
due to some problems in sampling and data collection processes. The survey process 
was questionable as it was run by students who received inadequate training, and 
there were issues with language barriers which degraded the accuracy of data (Lee, 
1971). 
                                                          
8 The HBS only covered three main ethnic groups Malay, Chinese and Indian but neglected other 
population who made up 2 percent of the population
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c. The Socioeconomic Sample Survey of Households 1967-1968(SES)
Since the FSS in 1959 there was no survey carried out by the Department of
Statistics until the late 1960s. In June 1967, Department of Statistics undertook the
Socioeconomic Sample Survey of Households 1967-1968. The SES comprised a 
large sample of up to one percent of the population. The survey was more systematic 
and comprehensive, covering data on employment, housing, demography and cash 
income. Although the SES has the advantage of a relatively larger sample size, it has 
been criticized because of a narrow income concept (Snodgrass, 1980:73; Anand, 
1983:43). In this survey, the income definition was limited to cash income only as 
the Department of Statistics assumed that other types of income such as rental 
income and transfer payments were equally distributed.     
d. The SRM /Ford Social and Economic Survey 1967/68
In 1967 there was a second survey undertaken by a private firm, Survey 
Research Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. This survey is known as the SRM/Ford Social and 
Economic Survey 1967/68. The survey involved 6,696 respondents in urban and 
rural areas. Although the survey had been administered by professionals, Snodgrass 
(1980) contended that the sample selection was skewed to urban population in order 
to minimize cost. 
e. The Post Enumeration Survey of the 1970 population census(PES)
The PES was carried out in conjunction with the population and housing 
census of 1970. The reasons for conducting the survey were: first to ensure the 
accuracy and reliability of the census data; second, to collect data for family planning 
programs; and finally, to collect information as a preparation for formulating new 
measures on income inequality. One of the advantages of the PES was that it had a 
clear income definition. Household income covered all types of income, comparable 
to the income concept used in national accounts. The PES had been designed to 
verify the precision of 1970s census data, hence, it might not be appropriate for 
income inequality studies. Nevertheless, with limited sources of data, the PES has 
been widely used by researchers (Ragayah, 2008:163).    
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f. Household Income Surveys(HIS)
Since 1979, the Department of Statistics established and conducted a new 
income survey, the Household Income Survey. This survey is carried out every 2-3
years and is the main source of data for income inequality studies. The HIS is 
conducted specifically to collect income distribution data at various socioeconomic 
levels. It covers about one percent of the total population in both rural and urban 
areas. The data from HIS are claimed to be reliable as the data are carefully checked 
to maintain consistency. Shireen (1998:23) explained the process of the HIS data 
collection as follows:
For each survey, data is collected by personal interviews. To check on the quality of 
the fieldwork, field edit at various regional centres and re-interviews were carried 
out. The comparability is further supported as the Department of Statistics issues 
guideline manuals to ensure a consistent approach when conducting the surveys. The 
Department of Statistics  has evaluated the income data to checks its reliability…A 
ten percent random check on completed interviews were carried out by supervisors 
to ensure that response errors were kept to a minimum. Consistency checks with 
household income estimates from the National Accounts were done to evaluate the 
extent of bias.
Due to careful checks performed by the Department of Statistics, Bhalla and Kharas 
(1992:44) concluded that: 
…these surveys have been extremely well conducted, and it is likely that they are 
amongst the most reliable of the surveys conducted in the developing world.
The survey offers more comprehensive analysis compared to the previous surveys.
The definition of income was extended to include non-cash income such as earnings 
from paid employment, self employment income, rental and property income, 
transfer receipts and transfer payments (Shireen, 1998:22).
Inequality Data: The Issue of Comparability
To highlight the issue of comparability, Table 4.5 below shows the trend in 
inequality in Malaysia from 1957 to 1970. Although it might be hard to believe that 
the inequality coefficient almost doubled over the period 1958 to 1959, the data 
suggest a very high level of inequality in this particular period.
However, as Kuznets (1955) postulated, high inequality seems to be a 
common situation for a country at an early stage of development. Table 4.6 shows 
household income inequality in selected economies which were at similar level of 
development to Malaysia. Based on Table 4.6 the inequality coefficients diverged 
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widely from 0.38 to 0.61. Malaysia, even though it recorded high inequality, was 
lower than Brazil and Mexico, which recorded the highest inequality. Nevertheless, 
several points must be considered before reaching any conclusion about inequality
levels and trends in Malaysia (Anand, 1983). Several differences, particularly in 
technical issues such as definitions and methodology as discussed previously, must 
be considered. Below is the discussion about the differences in income definitions in 
the inequality surveys.
Table 4.5: Malaysia inequality data (Gini Coefficient), 1957-1970
Areas Household Income Inequality in Malaysia
HBS,1957/58 FSS,1959 MSSH,1967/68 SRM/Ford,1967/68 PES,1970
Peninsular 
Malaysia
0.3705 0.549 0.5624 0.444 0.5129
Rural 0.3549 n.a 0.4794 n.a 0.4689
Urban 0.3514 n.a 0.5224 n.a 0.5037
Sample 
Size
2,760 5,691 30,000 6696 25023
Note: n.a not available
Source: Snodgrass (1980), Anand (1983)
Table 4.6: Cross country inequality coefficients
Economy Year Gini Coefficient
Republic of Korea 1970 0.3836
Thailand 1962 0.5103
Brazil 1970 0.6093
Mexico 1968 0.6106
Turkey 1968 0.5679
Zambia 1959 0.5226
Source: Anand (1983:40)
Income definition
The different income concepts adopted in the above surveys may affect the 
overall inequalities coefficient. Anand (1983:51-52) outlined six different definitions 
of income, as well as ambiguity between PES and HBS especially in terms of the 
income concept used. It is also argued by some authors that although some of the 
surveys, such as SES, PES and HIS, used a comprehensive definition of income, they 
still appear to underestimate the inequality level (Snodgrass, 1980; Anand, 1983; 
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Ragayah, 2008). The surveys did not take into account income that is not received
directly by households, such as retained earnings (Ragayah, 2008:164). 
The HBS had some weaknesses in term of definition and sampling method 
that may affect the results. The definition of income was not clearly defined. The 
income data collected in that survey was particularly for the purpose of cross 
checking the expenditure data. Anand (1983: 47) argued:    
In any discussion of HBS, it is important to bear in mind that HBS was an 
expenditure survey. The collection of income data was incidental to the survey, 
intended solely as a rough check on expenditure. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
no definition of income is given in the published report on the survey.
Since the objective of HBS was to study consumption patterns, Anand (1983) 
argued that HBS was an expenditure survey. Empirical evidence in previous studies 
shows that the inequality coefficient derived from expenditure surveys is lower than 
the coefficient based on income surveys (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; Deininger 
and Squire 1996). Thus, Anand (1983: 51) argued:
Those authors who concluded that inequality worsened between 1957 and 1970 after 
comparing PES with HBS have not probed sufficiently into problems leading to 
noncomparability. Their conclusion cannot be established because of technical 
differences between the surveys…
Household and Individual Income
The income concept used in the surveys is household income not individual 
income. It is argued that the household income data is not a good indicator for 
inequality and may be misleading if the income data do not taking into account the 
differences in household size. The surveys also focused on private households only 
and excluded those who were living in ‘institutional households’ such as hotels, 
military and police barracks (Ragayah, 2008).
It is clear that the inequality data from 1957 to 1970 had several problems 
due to differences in definitions and methodology employed. Nevertheless, 
inequality data from 1970s onward are derived from one source, the Household 
Income Survey that adopted similar definitions and methodology. The Household 
Income Survey is published every two or three years.
The Quality of Cross Country (International) Inequality Data
The quality of inequality data is an important issue, particularly in a cross-
country comparative study. This issue has been discussed extensively by Atkinson 
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and Brandolini (2001), Barro (2000), and Fields (2001), whose econometric results 
vary depending on the methods and data choices. Most authors use secondary 
datasets from various sources compiled by international agencies, such as The World 
Bank and The United Nations, as well as national statistics agencies. However, 
relying on readily available data has some limitations. As Atkinson and Brandolini 
(2001: 772) argue: 
Within countries, consistent income distribution series over time do not necessarily 
exist, or there may be several different series based on different sources or different 
definitions. Gini coefficients of income inequality may be published for a range of 
countries, but there is no agreed basis of definition.
There is no consensus on the definition of inequality. The most acceptable 
definition is based on income; this definition was recommended by the Canberra 
Group on Household Income Statistics (Asian Development Bank, 2007). A 
definition based on consumption aggregates has been recommended by Deaton and 
Zaidi (2002). Both definitions have several drawbacks in terms of concepts and 
methodology, as well as data collection processes (Asian Development Bank, 
2007:22-29).
The initiative for compiling inequality data was started by the United Nations 
in the 1950s. Since then there has been a continuous effort to assemble datasets by 
international agencies such as The World Bank, as well as individual researchers.
One of the most influential datasets was developed by Deininger and Squire (1996) 
who assembled about 2,600 Gini index observations from different sources. 
Deininger and Squire’s dataset has been recognized as a ‘high quality’ dataset as they 
used strict procedures to ‘accept’ (include) an observation in their dataset. To be 
accepted in their dataset, observations must be based on household surveys which 
include different types of income and cover most of the population (Deininger and 
Squire, 1996:568).  
Choice of Data
The main source of data for many recent inequality studies is UNU-WIDER. 
Their data - The World Income Inequality Database (WIID2) - is the most 
comprehensive to date (Asian Development Bank, 2007:21). The WIID2 dataset 
covers 149 countries with over 4,600 observations. WIID2 is a compilation of 
inequality data from various datasets including the previous dataset from Deininger 
and Squire (1996). Although WIID2 has a larger coverage than previous data sets 
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and ranks data according to quality, there are still inadequacies in its coverage, and 
sometimes there are several observations for the same year. For example, there are 
12 observations for Malaysia in 1970. The WIID2 advises users to check carefully 
differences in definitions and statistical concepts. They note that some data: ‘are not 
automatically comparable since differences in survey methodology might impair the 
comparability’ (UNU-WIDER, 2008a:15).
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001:779) argued that the choice of data might 
influence conclusions, especially when the study involves a time dimension. For 
example, they found that different types of data lead to contradictory conclusions and 
policy recommendations. Problems associated with data choice might also apply to 
studies on inequality and growth in Southeast Asia.
In order to choose the best observations from the WIID2 dataset, this thesis
adopted the following procedure:
i. Choose the best ranking: WIID2 data are ranked into 4 categories, from 1 to 
4, with 1 being the most reliable and considered as the best quality. In the case of 
overlapping observations the highest ranking had been chosen.
ii. High quality dataset: Some observations in a particular year also have a 
similar ranking. For example, data for Malaysia in 1984 has 2 similar rankings. One 
observation is from Bruton (1992) and another one from Deininger and Squire 
(1996). The observation from Deininger and Squire (1996) was selected because 
their dataset has been recognized as a high quality dataset.
iii. Data coverage: The data should cover all regions including rural and urban 
area. Data for Indonesia in 1976 for instance has 6 observations ranked 3. The data 
from Statistical Yearbook Indonesia was chosen because it covers all regions.
iv. Consistent source of data: Although household income and/or expenditure 
surveys are the most common source of data on income distributions, inequality data 
also can be derived from labor force surveys and income tax records (Asian 
Development Bank, 2007:21-22). Hence, to ensure comparability and consistency, 
the data must be derived from similar sources. For example, most of the inequality 
data for Singapore were derived from Labor Force Surveys. Hence, in cases of 
overlapping data, observations from the Labor Force Survey were chosen instead of 
those from the Household Survey.
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Although the data were carefully selected by the selection procedure outlined 
above, this does not mean that the data is free from error and bias. Errors and biases 
might emerge from conceptual and definitional problems. Deininger and Squire 
(1998) suggested that the data on inequality: ‘should be based on household surveys 
rather than estimates drawn from national account statistics’ (p.263). However, data 
from household surveys also have limitations since the respondents tend to 
underestimate income in order to avoid high taxes. They also suggested that the data:
… should have comprehensive coverage of all sources of income or uses of 
expenditure, rather than covering say wages only” (p.263). 
Most of the data for Singapore are based on wages collected from the Labour 
Force Survey. Inequality measures based on wages tend to be higher if the coverage 
of data is mixed and includes those without income. For instance, the Luxembourg 
Income Study found that inequality coefficients based on wage earnings are 10 to 15 
points higher than coefficients based on gross income (Deininger and Squire, 
1996:570, Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995). Therefore, this might be one 
of the reasons why income inequality in Singapore is among the highest in Southeast 
Asia.   
Meanwhile, inequality in Indonesia is measured using expenditure because of 
a perception that people tend to underestimate their income. However, according to 
Barro (2000:21), the Gini value is lower by around five percentage points if the data 
used are derived from expenditure rather than gross income. This might be one
reason why inequality in Indonesia is among the lowest in Southeast Asia, with a 
Gini coefficient of 0.35 on average, compared to an average of 0.48 in Malaysia, the 
highest average inequality coefficient in Southeast Asia (refer to Table 4.10 below). 
The availability of a new dataset from UNU-WIDER, with a larger number of 
observations, enables us to revisit these earlier studies using longer time series, as 
well as to exploit the advantages of panel data. Moreover, panel data allows us to 
pool the data and exploit the similarity of individual or country specific patterns, 
producing more accurate predictions (Hsiao, 2007:5). However, if countries included 
in the panel differ widely, it may not be wise to pool data.
Due to differences in definitions and data collection problems, inequality data 
are also subject to measurement errors. Most of the countries in Southeast Asia 
(except Indonesia) derive inequality coefficients based on income data, but the 
coverage of and definition of income differs. Inequality data in Singapore is mainly 
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based on salary income but in other countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, 
inequality data is based on household income. The differences in definition and 
coverage of income may affect the value of the Gini coefficients.9
4.5 The Economy and Development Data
Malaysia’s Economic Data at the State and National Level
Malaysian economic and development data is available from various sources 
either published by national or international agencies. The National agency, The 
Economic Planning Unit Malaysia (EPU), publishes Malaysia Plans every five years 
and Mid-Term Review of Malaysia Plans in the middle of every Malaysia Plan. 
These reports are the main source of Malaysian economic data. Currently, the EPU 
also published time series data for the Malaysian economy from various official 
publications such as Department of Statistics, Malaysia and others ministries or 
government agencies. The data is accessible through the Economic Planning Unit 
website, but only dates back to 1970.
Data on the Malaysian economy is also available from international agencies 
such as The World Bank's World Development Indicators Online (WDI Online) and
The Penn World Table (PWT) (Heston et.al, 2011). These sources sometimes offer a
longer series data, in some cases back to the 1960s. The WDI online provides 
comprehensive data on selected economic, social and environmental indicators, 
drawn from the World Bank and more than 30 partner agencies. Currently, the 
database contains almost one thousand indicators for more than 200 economies. 
The Penn World Table (PWT) consists of a set of national accounts economic 
time series for about 188 countries. The dataset also provides information about 
relative prices within and between countries, including demographic data and capital 
stock estimates. Since the economic data are denominated in a similar set of prices 
and currency, cross country comparisons can be made over time. The PWT also 
provides a longer dataset as WDI Online, but the data on GDP Per capita is measured 
in current price and it was calculated in relative terms to the United States. 
Moreover, the PWT does not provide economic growth data.
It must be noted that these agencies may publish different figures. As an 
example there is a large difference in the economic growth data published by EPU 
and WDI Online. Table 4.7 compares GDP per capita growth published by the EPU 
                                                          
9 See for example Anand and Kanbur (1993b), Fields (1994), Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998) and 
Asian Development Bank (2007) for detailed discussions on the problems of inequality measurement.  
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and WDI. In some cases, the differences are very significant. For example in 1976, 
1982 and 1986 the differences were up to 10-12 percentage points. 
It is difficult to determine which dataset is the most accurate. Indeed this is 
not the objective of this thesis. However to increase the degrees of freedom a large 
number of observations is needed, so a longer series of data is important. To 
maintain consistency with Southeast Asian data, this thesis uses WDI Online dataset 
as the main source of data especially the data on GDP per capita, economic growth, 
and investment as summarized in Table 4.1. Other sources of data such as EPU and
PWT play a role as alternatives datasets if the data is unavailable in the WDI Online.
Table 4.7: GDP per capita growth (annual %): A comparison
Year
GDP per capita growth 
(annual %)
Difference
EPU Data WDI Data
1961 n.a 4.26 n.a
1962 n.a 3.10 n.a
1963 n.a 4.02 n.a
1964 n.a 2.18 n.a
1965 n.a 4.56 n.a
1966 n.a 4.81 n.a
1967 n.a 1.07 n.a
1968 n.a 5.17 n.a
1969 n.a 2.22 n.a
1970 n.a 3.33 n.a
1971 5.15 3.13 2.01
1972 3.74 6.70 -2.97
1973 16.30 9.02 7.28
1974 1.56 5.74 -4.18
1975 -8.81 -1.54 -7.27
1976 19.77 9.02 10.75
1977 7.22 5.33 1.89
1978 9.13 4.24 4.88
1979 15.46 6.84 8.62
1980 4.86 4.90 -0.04
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1981 -4.04 4.34 -8.38
1982 15.89 3.30 12.59
1983 -0.12 3.53 -3.65
1984 4.01 4.91 -0.90
1985 -8.66 -3.82 -4.84
1986 -13.21 -1.69 -11.52
1987 9.81 2.36 7.45
1988 10.36 6.76 3.60
1989 10.19 5.96 4.24
1990 7.69 6.00 1.69
1991 7.68 6.64 1.05
1992 5.38 6.09 -0.71
1993 6.59 7.14 -0.55
1994 5.43 6.49 -1.06
1995 6.88 7.08 -0.20
1996 7.46 7.23 0.23
1997 4.95 4.63 0.32
1998 -5.11 -9.64 4.53
1999 0.94 3.63 -2.69
2000 4.78 6.43 -1.65
2001 -4.99 -1.59 -3.40
2002 4.55 3.31 1.24
2003 5.78 3.80 1.98
2004 9.27 4.84 4.44
2005 4.74 3.44 1.29
2006 3.93 3.90 0.03
2007 7.53 4.50 3.03
2008 7.28 2.86 4.41
Note: n.a Not available or not applicable
Sources: WDI Online and EPU
4.6 Democracy and Polity Data
Democracy Data
Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that the link between inequality and 
redistribution should be stronger in democracies; the effect of inequality on growth is 
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moderated by political participation. In their analyses, Persson and Tabellini use a 
measure of the degree to which franchise is restricted, and a dummy variable for 
whether a regime is democratic. For Southeast Asia this thesis uses the Polity2 series 
from the Polity dataset. Values in this series range from -10 to +10, with a score of 
+10 representing the most democratic regime.
There is no readily available series on democracy at the regional level for 
Malaysia. Three alternate measures of democracy are used in this thesis. First, voter 
turnout is used as a proxy for democracy. Voter turnout is an important dimension of 
political participation. Voting in Malaysia is not compulsory. Hence, this thesis
regards voter turnout as a measure of the electorates’ willingness to engage with the 
political process. A priori, it is difficult to predict the effect of voter turnout on 
growth. Greater political participation might force regional governments to shape 
their policies and promote growth. There might also be yardstick competition in play 
(Besley and Case, 1995). However, if politicians give in to lobbying then inefficient 
policies might be adopted.
The second measure used in this thesis is Vanhanen’s (2000) measure of 
democracy constructed as the product of voter turnout (participation) and the share of 
the votes that did not flow to the ruling party/coalition (competition). For the third 
measure, this thesis follows Gates et al. (2006) and modifies the Vanhanen measure 
in those instances where the ruling party/coalition received more than 70% of the 
vote. This modification effectively assigns a much lower democracy score for such 
cases. Voter turnout and the share of votes data at the regional level are available 
from 1986 onwards. This means that when the democracy variables are included in 
the empirical analysis, the sample size and sample period reduces from 1970 to 
1986.10
Regime Duration
The literature uses two approaches to measuring political stability (Alesina 
and Perroti, 1996): (a) the propensity to observe government change in any form 
including lawful and unlawful changes; and (b) social unrest, violence and political 
disorder. This thesis measure is more consistent with the former measure.
Nevertheless, the available political stability datasets do not provide enough 
information on Malaysia. Polity IV is a well established dataset on political stability. 
                                                          
10 The data is available at the electoral district level. I aggregated this data up to the regional level.
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It has a collection of time series data on political stability dating back to 1900. This
dataset classifies political stability into two categories, namely changes in the 
government and coup d’etat. In the coup d’etat section, there is only one observation 
for Malaysia. Therefore, it is not possible to a create time series data on political
stability using that data. As an alternative, this thesis uses the ‘Durable’ data from the 
Polity IV Dataset for Southeast Asia. According to  the dataset manual, the Durable 
data ‘provides a running measure of the durability of the regime’s authority pattern 
for a given year, that is, the number of years since the last substantive change in 
authority characteristics’ (p.14).
For Malaysia, regime duration is proxied by constructing a variable that 
measures ruling party dominance. This is calculated as the share of parliamentary 
seats held by the ruling party in each state multiplied by 100. The number of 
parliamentary seats is obtained from the Election Commission, Malaysia. 
Malaysia is a Federation, consisting of three levels of government, namely
the Federal government, state government and local government. Elections are held 
at the federal and state government levels only. Political dominance could be 
measured using the state assembly at the state level, but in Malaysia, the Federal 
government has the strongest administrative power. All the decisions on the main 
policies including economic development and education are made and controlled by 
the Federal government. Thus, the use of parliamentary seats as a proxy for political 
stability seems to be more accurate and more reliable measure.
An increase (decrease) in this proportion means an increase (decrease) in the 
ruling party’s hold on power. Note that Vanhannen (2001) uses the share of votes of 
the non-ruling parties/coalition as a measure of electoral competition (which is one 
dimension of his measure of democracy). This thesis does not use the share of voters;
rather, it focuses on the share of parliamentary seats. In one sense, the ruling party 
dominance measure is a dimension of democracy rather than regime duration. Party 
dominance can be taken to reflect reduced electoral competition. However, the same 
can be said for regime duration. An alternative way of viewing these variables is that 
by separating voter turnout and party dominance, it is possible to tease out and 
isolate the effects of different dimensions of democracy on growth in regional 
Malaysia. Similarly, by including both Polity2 and ‘Durable’, it is possible to tease 
out and isolate the effects of these different dimensions of democracy on growth in 
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Southeast Asia. Data on the number of parliamentary seats was obtained from the 
Malaysian Election Commission.
The choice of political stability (regime duration) measure above in fact has 
theoretical support from a political behaviour perspective. Ake (1975:271) defines
political behaviour as any activity by people or society that affects political power. 
According to Ake, any changes or unusual pattern in political behaviour will affect 
political stability, therefore, suggested that:
To determine the extent of political stability of a polity we must be able 
systematically to identify both regularities and irregularities in the flow of political 
exchanges…Political behavior or act or exchange is regular if it does not violate the 
system (or pattern) of political exchanges; it is irregular if it violates that pattern 
(p.273).
The ‘unusual pattern’ in political behaviour particularly in terms of the election 
results is discussed below.
Malaysian Political Stability
Although there have been several political crisis in Malaysia since 1957, the 
ruling government had successfully retained two third majority until 2008. The 
leadership crisis in one of the ruling party component the United Malay National 
Organization (UMNO) in 1987 was followed by the dismissal of former Deputy 
Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim ten years later in 1997. Such events have reduced 
support for the Barisan Nasional. Nevertheless, the party still maintained a two third 
majority in the Parliament. In fact, the Barisan Nasional recorded its most successful 
victory, controlled over 80 percent of Parliamentary seats, in the 11th general election 
in 2004.
The government was relatively stable prior to the 2008 general election. 
However, the Malaysian political landscape changed drastically in the general 
election 2008. The ruling party lost many of its parliamentary seats as well as losing
five states to the opposition party. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 below compare the Barisan 
Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat performance in the 2004 and 2008 general elections. 
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Table 4.8: The Barisan Nasional’s votes percentage 2004 and 2008
in Peninsular Malaysia
Constituencies Votes Percentage Increase/Decrease
2004 2008
Padang Besar 65.96 59.33 -6.63
Kangar 69.12 69.78 0.66
Arau 55.08 50.32 -4.76
Langkawi 74.09 60.89 -13.20
Jerlun 52.97 53.01 0.04
Kubang Pasu 67.17 58.55 -8.62
Alor Setar 66.89 50.04 -16.85
Kepala Batas 77.72 65.68 -12.04
Tasek Gelugor 64.87 55.70 -9.17
Jeli 63.84 57.07 -6.77
Gua Musang 66.06 59.10 -6.96
Besut 59.73 60.40 0.67
Setiu 58.14 57.86 -0.28
Kuala Nerus 54.32 51.01 -3.31
Kuala Terengganu 51.53 49.87 -1.66
Hulu Terengganu 59.65 61.38 1.73
Dungun 53.33 54.66 1.33
Kemaman 63.59 60.20 -3.39
Gerik 74.46 63.12 -11.34
Lenggong 67.28 64.19 -3.09
Larut 62.61 53.10 -9.51
Bukit Gantang 62.29 54.65 -7.64
Tambun 68.75 54.88 -13.87
Kuala Kangsar 65.81 52.62 -13.19
Parit 60.85 56.44 -4.41
Kampar 62.88 53.10 -9.78
Tapah 68.53 56.00 -12.53
Pasir Salak 64.11 54.31 -9.8
Lumut 56.29 47.55 -8.74
Bagan Datok 79.08 55.57 -23.51
Tanjong Malim 71.44 57.17 -14.27
Sabak Bernam 61.97 52.71 -9.26
Sungai Besar 65.75 58.92 -6.83
Tanjong Karang 67.00 56.64 -10.36
Pandan 68.70 53.12 -15.58
Sepang 71.96 54.92 -17.04
Cameron Highlands 72.05 60.01 -12.04
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Lipis 68.17 59.49 -8.68
Raub 65.48 53.89 -11.59
Jerantut 59.85 52.47 -7.38
Jelebu 77.60 69.84 -7.76
Jempol 73.96 66.10 -7.86
Tampin 80.25 68.21 -12.04
Kuala Pilah 71.61 66.23 -5.38
Rembau 73.97 55.47 -18.5
Masjid Tanah 80.46 69.62 -10.84
Alor Gajar 80.00 66.05 -13.95
Tangga Batu 79.34 62.94 -16.4
Bukit Katil 76.22 50.86 -25.36
Jasin 75.80 64.45 -11.35
Segamat 63.89 55.18 -8.71
Sekijang 80.40 68.90 -11.5
Pagoh 82.64 71.22 -11.42
Labis 74.07 58.71 -15.36
Ledang 76.80 58.71 -18.09
Ayer Hitam 82.34 76.11 -6.23
Kluang 68.49 53.09 -15.4
Parit Sulong 73.16 67.52 -5.64
Muar 73.07 57.83 -15.24
Sri Gading 80.18 68.85 -11.33
Batu Pahat 79.78 62.03 -17.75
Simpang Renggam 79.22 65.61 -13.61
Sembrong 88.19 73.50 -14.69
Mersing 80.52 75.37 -5.15
Tenggara 87.91 79.25 -8.66
Tebrau 84.04 65.57 -18.47
Pasir Gudang 84.21 65.56 -18.65
Johor Bahru 88.13 70.67 -17.46
Pulai 84.90 68.18 -16.72
Gelang Patah 81.36 57.50 -23.86
Kulai 69.50 61.16 -8.34
Pontian 82.58 72.71 -9.87
Tanjong Piai 86.36 67.65 -18.71
Average -10.55
Source: Malaysia Election Commission; Amer (2009).
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Table 4.9: Pakatan Rakyat (opposition’s party) votes percentage 2004 and 2008   
Constituencies Votes Percentage Increase/Decrease
2004 2008
Pendang 50.05 53.92 3.87
Bagan 54.24 74.24 20
Bukit Mertajam 59.18 55.75 -3.43
Tanjong 55.41 74.14 18.73
Tumpat 51.68 57.17 5.49
Pengkalan Chepa 58.39 62.99 4.6
Kubang Kerian 57.56 62.00 4.44
Pasir Puteh 53.51 53.63 0.12
Parit Buntar 56.85 60.68 3.83
Ipoh Timor 59.80 70.12 10.32
Ipoh Barat 50.13 65.40 15.27
Batu Gajah 57.12 72.11 14.99
Average 8.19
Source: Malaysia Election Commission; Amer (2009).
In the 2004 general election, Barisan Nasional controlled around 80 percent 
of parliamentary seats but in the 2008 general election, Barisan Nasional lost 82 seats 
to the opposition. In the constituencies that the Barisan Nasional has retained 
parliamentary seats, the vote percentage declined in almost all constituencies. On 
average Barisan Nasional lost around 10.9 percent of the votes in the 2008 general 
election. Meanwhile, the opposition party, Pakatan Rakyat managed to increase votes 
in most of the constituencies that belonged to them in the 2004 general election with 
an average of nine percent. The Pakatan Rakyat also defeated Barisan Nasional in 
most of the post 2008 by-elections (see Amer, 2008 and Malaysia Election 
Commission for detail) .
Since the 12th general election in 2008, the Malaysian government has 
become unstable and the political instability may have affected economic 
performance. A current economic indicator such as foreign direct investment has
declined sharply. World Investment Report 2010 reveals that foreign direct 
investment inflows declined by 81 percent.11 The declining trend of foreign direct 
investment is consistent with the literature that political instability affects foreign 
investment (Allesina and Perroti, 1996). This is consistent with the findings of the 
Japanese External Trade Organisation (JETRO) survey of Japanese firms in 
                                                          
11 It is quite likely that global events have also played a significant role in FDI flows.
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Southeast Asia conducted in 1997, in which political stability ranked the first among 
the different locational advantages for Japanese FDI. Therefore, the use of 
parliamentary seats composition of the government to measure political stability has
some theoretical backing.
4.7 The Panel Data
Most of analysis in this thesis is based on unbalanced panel data for eight 
Southeast Asia countries for the period 1960-2009, and for the 14 Malaysian states 
for the period 1970-2009. Note that the data for the 14 Malaysian states is not 
included in the data for Southeast Asia; while Malaysia is included in the Southeast 
Asia panel, it is national data that is used rather than the regional data that is used in 
the Malaysian states sample. For the Malaysia national level country analysis, the
data cover the period 1960-2009. The top panel of Table 4.10 reports summary 
statistics of the key variables for the Southeast Asian sample; inequality, democracy, 
regime category (based on the Epstein et al. 2006 classification), regime duration and 
growth. The bottom panel reports similar statistics for the Malaysian states.
Since this thesis is a cross-country study, conceptual problems might increase 
the errors term. However, measurement errors can be reduced by using panel data. A 
fixed effect panel data estimator is an efficient tool to abolish much of the 
unobserved errors term (Forbes, 2000). A larger number of observations also 
increases precision and thus produces potentially more robust regression results. 
Panel data allows enables the pooling of data and exploiting the similarity of 
individual or country specific trends in order to predict the behavior of other 
countries. Thus, panel data may generate more accurate predictions, rather than 
depending on individual country estimation results (Hsiao, 2007:5). 
Pooled OLS is efficient if error terms are uncorrelated with explanatory 
variables. With pooled OLS, it is assumed that the countries have similar 
characteristics that do not correlate with unobserved error terms or dependent and 
explanatory variables. However, that assumption seems to be unrealistic because 
every country has their own specific characteristics, which might influence the 
regression results.
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Table 4.10: Inequality, democracy, regime duration and growth, summary statistics
Country Gini Top20
(%)
Bot40
(%)
Democracy* Category Regime 
duration
(years)
Growth** 
rate
(%)
Southeast Asia
Malaysia 0.48 
(0.04)
52.52
(3.24)
21.76
(6.51)
4.80 
(2.58)
Partial 
democracy
14.37 
(11.12)
3.86 
(3.39)
Thailand 0.48 
(0.06)
51.12
(2.33)
26.22
(1.02)
1.71 
(5.84)
Partial 
democracy
4.29 
(4.05)
4.48 
(3.63)
The 
Philippines
0.47 
(0.02)
50.28
(1.50)
26.66
(0.62)
2.55 
(6.92)
Partial 
democracy
8.65
(7.13)
1.51 
(3.00)
Singapore 0.46 
(0.03)
ins ins -1.45 
(2.18)
Autocracy 20.41 
(14.26)
5.56 
(4.51)
Cambodia 0.40 
(0.03)
48.61
(1.52)
27.02
(0.59)
-2.69 
(4.74)
Autocracy 3.43 
(4.19)
5.90 
(3.50)
Indonesia 0.35 
(0.05)
45.87
(0.96)
28.35
(0.48)
-3.37 
(5.96)
Autocracy 10.82 
(9.03)
3.70 
(3.75)
Vietnam 0.35 
(0.02)
44.96
(0.95)
28.79
(0.35)
-7
(0)
Autocracy 27.51 
(19.22)
5.05 
(2.02)
Laos 0.34 
(0.03)
42.42
(1.23)
29.61
(0.56)
-5.10 
(3.06)
Autocracy 12.35 
(11.94)
3.76 
(3.07)
Malaysian States
Gini Voter 
turnout
(%)
Party 
dominance
(%)
Growth 
rate
(%)
Malaysian 
States
0.44
(0.05)
ins ins 73.39
(5.89)
79.24
(26.10)
5.83
(4.32)
Notes: * values range from -10 to +10, where +10 is the most democratic. Figures in brackets are 
standard deviations. ins denotes insufficient observations.  ** annual growth rate for Southeast Asia 
and 5-year average rate of growth for Malaysian states.
The Rationale of Fixed Effect: Time Invariant Differences
The panel data discussed above are used in the empirical analysis presented in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Estimation is carried out primarily using pooled OLS and fixed 
effects. Some models are also estimated using random effects. 
Historical Factors, Culture and Location
Each country in Southeast Asia has specific characteristics such as culture, 
geographical area, and history that might influence economic growth directly or 
indirectly. Time invariant variables such as the strategic location or the size of the 
country might influence economic growth. Southeast Asia countries as well as 
Malaysia’s states vary in size. The smallest country in Southeast Asia is Singapore. 
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However, Singapore is the most developed country in this region. Some authors such 
as Helleiner (1973) and Huff (1995) claim that Singapore’s strategic location reduces 
transportation costs which provides an advantage over her neighbourhood. 
According to Huff (1995):
Location was even more important in Singapore’s development of services exports 
(internationally traded services sold to non-Singapore residents). These included air 
traffic, telecommunications, shipping, and cargo handling activities, but above all 
international financial and business services. Government systematically built on 
Singapore’s location and time zone advantages to promote the Republic as a regional 
and international financial center.
Historical and cultural factors and bureaucratic systems are also unobserved 
variables. Studies of European countries show that political and social history is 
likely to be an important variation for economic development in the European region. 
Tabellini (2010) finds that European history and political institutions are strongly 
correlated with current regional economic development. On the other hand, in 
Malaysia historical factors also play a significant role that might affect growth. The 
Western Coastal area of Peninsular Malaysia had been central for economic activities 
and infrastructure development during British Occupation as the region is rich with 
natural resources (Asan, 2004). These factors might be correlated with the dependent 
and explanatory variables in the growth or inequality regressions. For example, 
government bureaucratic systems and culture might be correlated with education, 
democracy, or political stability. 
4.8 Data Transformations
Data transformations are often necessary in order to improve estimation 
(Chen et.al, 2003). 
Normality and Linearity Assumption
Normality is an important assumption in econometrics. However, some data 
especially the GDP is not normally distributed. In that case, the data was transformed
into natural log form. The transformation into natural log form has been done to
improve normality and generate more linear data. Figure 4.1a and 4.1b show the data 
before any transformation. The data is skewed to the left. The data after 
transformation are illustrated in Figures 4.2a and 4.2b. The data is normally 
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distributed (bell shape at the middle). The probability plot (P-P) is closer to 45 
degree line (4.2b) indicates that GDPpc in log form is more linear.
Figure 4.1a: Kernel density estimate (GDPpc Malaysia)
Figure 4.1b: Standardized normal probability (P-P) (GDPpc Malaysia)
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Figure 4.2a: Kernel density estimate (GDPpc Malaysia)
Figure 4.2b: Standardized normal probability (P-P) (log GDPpc Malaysia)
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Heteroscedasticity
One of the problem of the time series data is heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, 
White’s (Hubers) procedure has been applied to minimize heteroscedaticity and 
report corrected variances and standard errors.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity does not violate OLS assumptions and OLS estimates are still 
unbiased and BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators), however it will influence the 
standard errors. The confidence intervals for coefficients tend to be bigger but t-
statistics tend to be smaller. Therefore, it will be difficult to reject the null hypothesis 
unless the results generate large coefficients. The level of multicollinearity is 
measured using Vector Inflation Factor (VIF). The value of VIF must be in between 
0.1 and 10. The value outside the range will be considered high multicollinearity. 
This thesis reports the best specifications within acceptable VIF range or in the case 
that acceptable value is unachievable, this thesis reports the models with the lowest 
VIF value.     
 
4.9 Diagnostic Tests 
Several diagnostic tests were conducted to detect and solve empirical issues in 
economic modeling. The tests are listed below:    
1. In all time series regressions, tests for residual autocorrelation (Durbin 
Watson test) were conducted. If the residual autocorrelation is present it can be 
corrected using Prais Winsten AR(1), or through the introduction of dynamcis.  
2. In panel analysis, the heteroskedasticity and within-group autocorrelation 
tests were conducted. This thesis used the Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation to 
test for Autocorrelation/Serial Correlation in Panel Data. To detect hetereoscedacity, 
in a fixed effects model, a modified Wald Test was conducted. This is applicable in 
small N and large T or data fields (Green, 2000). Meanwhile, the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg was applied to the pooled OLS estimates. If both serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity appear, then feasible GLS  is the most efficient
estimator.  
Diagnostic tests are important for model selection. However, most of the 
analysis in this thesis, particularly Chapters 6 and 7, do not really involve model 
selection. Instead, they are an exploration of the robustness of the empirical support 
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for the theories of Kuznets and Williamson. Since model selection is not the main 
objective, rigorous diagnostic testing of all  regression models is in most cases 
unnecessary. Therefore, some contradictory results are reported in several models. 
This thesis uses panel data estimators (Pooled OLS, Fixed and Random 
Effects) in most of the estimates. Although GMM and other advanced econometric 
methods might yield different results, the gains are doubtful and the exploration of 
different econometric methods is not the objective of this thesis. All econometric 
estimators that have been used in this thesis are sufficient to explain the relationship 
between education, inequality and growth. As Wooldrige (2001:98) noted:         
In standard settings, where one would typically use ordinary or two-stage least squares, or 
standard panel data methods such as fixed effects, generalized method of moments can be 
used to improve over the standard estimators when auxiliary assumptions fail, at least in 
large samples. However, because basic econometric methods can be used with robust 
inference techniques that allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, the gains 
to practitioners from using GMM may be small.
4.10 Summary
This chapter provides a discussion of the data and variables used in this thesis. Table 
4.1 and Figure 4.1 summarize the general methodology and sources of data used in 
this thesis. The data has been classified into four categories, namely education, 
economic, inequality and polity and regime duration data. Malaysia is the main focus 
of this thesis but the analysis also includes Southeast Asia as a benchmark. As this 
thesis uses data from various sources, differences in definitions and methodologies 
might affect the quality of data. Therefore, this thesis exploits the advantage of panel 
data to reduce measurement errors. All the empirical analyses in the following 
chapters, except for the meta-analysis, are based on the data discussed in this chapter.
The next chapter presents a meta-analysis of the effects of education on inequality.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EDUCATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY: 
A META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS1 
 
5.1 Introduction
A large theoretical and empirical literature has explored the effects of 
education on inequality. Many empirical studies analyze the effects of education on 
individual earnings while others analyze the effects on the aggregate (national) 
distribution of income. Subsequent chapters of this thesis will present original 
(primary) data analysis relating to the effects of education on inequality, among other 
relationships, in Malaysia and Southeast Asia. The aim of this chapter is to revisit the
extant empirical body of evidence through a quantitative literature review (Stanley, 
2001). Specifically, this chapter provides a comprehensive review of the extant 
econometrics literature through a meta-regression analysis (MRA) of 66 empirical 
studies that collectively report 892 estimates of the effects of education on aggregate 
inequality. The aims of the MRA are twofold:
(a) To assess the effect of education on inequality. Does education increase, 
decrease, or have no effect at all on inequality at the national level? Under what 
conditions does education shape national inequality?
(b) To model the heterogeneity in the empirical estimates. What factors explain 
the wide variation in the reported estimates of the effect of education on inequality?
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents a review of the main 
theoretical arguments. Section 5.3 presents a brief discussion of the meta-analysis 
data. The results and analysis of the effect of education on inequality are presented in 
section 5.4. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.5.
5.2 Theoretical Background and Prior Evidence
Education is widely seen as one of the most efficient ways to reduce 
inequality (Toh, 1984). Education provides greater economic opportunities, 
especially to the poor (Blanden and Machin, 2004). It determines occupational 
choice and the level of pay and it plays a pivotal role as a signal of ability and 
productivity in the job market. Education shifts the composition of the labour force 
away from unskilled to skilled. While this process may very well initially increase 
                                                          
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 2011 MAER-NET Colloqium at Cambridge  
University, September 16th-18th. The chapter benefited from comments received from attendees. 
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income inequality (Chiswick, 1968), in the long term it is expected to reduce income 
inequality (Schultz, 1963).
Educational attainment plays a key role as a signal of ability and productivity 
in the job market; education is an effective signal of achievement. The selection and 
assessment process inherent in the education system indicates that individual 
performance has been determined before workers: ‘…will be selected into the 
occupational structure in which their particular educational background will be most 
productively employed’ (Tan, 1982:26). Although education may not necessarily 
always produce an accurate signal of labour productivity, limited information 
compels employers to use education as the main indicator. Stiglitz (1973:136) argues 
that:
It is often difficult for the employer to identify who will be a good employee; however, firms 
have observed that the qualities which lead to success in school are related to the qualities 
which make the individual more productive on the job. Although the correlation may be 
imperfect, competitive firms can use this information and offer the individuals who do well 
in school and complete more years of schooling the better jobs.
Better educated individuals are perceived to be better able to cope with technological 
and environmental changes that directly influence productivity levels. Thus, at the 
macro level, human capital is an important determinant for labor productivity and 
eventually economic growth (Tsu-Tan Fu et.al, 2002). Individuals with higher 
education are rewarded with higher earnings as payment for their productivity and 
ability (Knight and Sabot, 1990). 
Demand for higher education has grown tremendously and experienced rapid 
changes in past decades. This has been partly driven by the link between education 
and socioeconomic status; more highly educated individuals are more likely to gain 
better employment. The expansion of higher education increases the supply of higher 
educated workers into labour markets. This changes the composition of the labour 
force, as unskilled workers move into the skilled workers cohort. Initially this is 
expected to increase income inequality, but further increases in the supply of higher 
educated workers tend to lower the wage premium for skilled workers. However, 
based on their study in Tanzania and Kenya, Knight and Sabot (1983) argue that 
education expansion has two conflicting effects; there is a compression effect as well 
as a composition effect. The composition effect is the change in the proportion of the 
labour force that is educated; this affects inequality in a manner similar to the process 
postulated by Kuznets (see the following chapter). An increase in the number of 
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educated workers tends to initially increase inequality. However, inequality declines 
after reaching a certain threshold because of the compression effect. The 
compression effect refers to competition in the labour market. Increased supply of 
skilled workers decreases the wage premium to higher skill levels and thus lowers 
income inequality. Knight and Sabot (1983: 1136) explain the process as below:
…the expansion of the supply of educated labor relative to the demand has a 
powerful compressing effect on the intraurban educational structure of wages. The 
composition effect of educational expansion can indeed raise intraurban inequality, 
but the consequent compression effect outweighs it: relative educational expansion 
reduces inequality. Since this process occurs within the relatively expanding high-
income, urban sector, it is hastening the arrival at the point beyond which economic 
growth is associated with a reduction in overall inequality.
The contribution of education to reducing inequality among various 
socioeconomic groups is more ambiguous. Empirical evidence, especially at the 
macroeconomic level, fails to identify a significant role for education, even though it 
is widely believe to reduce inequality. According to Checchi (2001: 44), the effect of 
education will be significant if the initial level of education attainment is lower and 
the expansion of education is relatively fast. 
The impact of education will depend on many factors, such as the size of 
education investments made by individuals and governments, the rate of return on 
these investments and degree of government intervention. In many countries the 
expansion of higher education is not equally distributed and tends to benefit those in 
higher income brackets. For example, a study of Brazil in 1977 revealed that higher 
income earners enjoyed greater benefit from investment in education since their 
children had better educational opportunities compared to those from lower income 
groups (World Bank, 1977). Blanden and Machin (2004) also found a strong 
relationship between family income and university degree attainment in Britain as 
participation in higher education has increased. They argue that: 
Despite the fact that many more children from richer backgrounds participated in HE 
(higher education) before the recent expansion of the system, the expansion has 
actually acted to significantly widen participation gaps between rich and poor 
children.
These concerns notwithstanding, governments in most countries subsidise the 
costs of public higher education. In South-East Asian countries for instance, 
educational development has received strong financial support from governments, 
with some countries allocating a relatively high proportion of their government 
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expenditure to education (Asian Development Bank, 2008: 7-9, Lee and Francisco, 
2010: 9-10). Education subsidies increase opportunities for poor children to access 
education. Larger subsidies also mean a greater number of children will attend
university in the future. Nevertheless, Glomm and Ravikumar (2003) argue that the 
effect of subsidies and government spending on income inequality is not entirely 
clear. Public spending in education may widen the income gap between the rich and 
poor even though everyone has equal access to education. Education expansion 
would not benefit the poor if they do not have sufficient resources to attend school, 
particularly if they are taxed to raise government revenue to fund education 
(Sylwester, 2000; 2002). Educational spending, especially in higher education, 
usually benefits middle and upper class children rather than the lower income groups 
that would be expected to be the main target for redistributive policy. Stiglitz 
(1973:137) for instance argues that:
… since the beneficiaries are mainly children of the middle and upper income 
groups and state taxes are often regressive, the net effect of state support of higher 
education is redistribution from the poor to the middle and upper income groups. 
Jimenez (1986) postulated that public education expenditures ‘do not benefit the poor 
at all’, and thus, fail to reduce income inequality. There is evidence in Greece that 
public transfers of education services in primary and secondary led to a decline in 
aggregate inequality but transfers in tertiary education were found to have a 
negligible distributional impact (Tsakloglou and Antoninis, 1999).
Much of the empirical evidence suggesting a strong association between 
education and inequality has emerged since the seminal work of Mincer (1958). 
However, some of the evidence is contradictory. For example, Chiswick (1974) 
found that higher levels of schooling increase inequality. In contrast, Ahluwalia 
(1976) found a negative association between school enrolment and inequality. 
However, Ahluwalia’s results vary according to the measures employed. Secondary 
schooling is positively related to the shares of the middle 40 percent and the lower 
income groups, while an increase in the literacy rate is negatively associated with the 
income share of all income groups except the lowest 20 percent quintile. Winegarden
(1979) also finds that education increases the income share of the bottom quintile 
income.
More recent studies by Sylwester (2003) and Georgio (2003) find a negative 
relationship between higher education enrolment and inequality. However, they also 
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find that education has less impact on inequality in African countries compared to 
other regions. 
Studies on education and inequality have changed over time especially in 
terms of methodology. In the early period (1950s to 1960s) most of the studies, such 
as Anderson (1955) and Soltow (1960), used simple cross tabulations with some 
numerical examples. The studies from this era were also very much influenced by 
human capital theory and the Mincer equation pioneered by Mincer (1958) and 
Becker and Chiswick (1968). Most of these are single country studies focussing on
the United States (e.g. Aigner and Heins, 1967 and Chiswick, 1968).
During the 1970s to 1980s, studies in education and inequality extended 
Kuznets’ hypothesis by adding education in the inequality econometric model. 
Education had been used as one of the inequality determinants (Ahluwalia, 1976 and 
1976a). Since the 1990s, the availability of new datasets, especially from Deininger 
and Squire (1996), has enabled more advanced econometric methods to be employed.
Most of these studies employ panel data estimators.
Of particular interest to this chapter is that the relationship between education 
and inequality can vary between regions, the level of development and the type of 
political regime in place. Moreover, the relationship might not necessarily be linear. 
Figure 5.1 below illustrates the relationship between the Gini index of inequality and 
the average number of years of schooling among the 5 most developed countries in 
Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and The Philippines). 
Even if the two largest average years of schooling observations are removed, 
inequality and education follow a non-linear relationship, though it is not as 
pronounced.
5.3 Meta-Analysis Data
This section discusses the search strategy for identifying studies and the 
criteria studies had to have met in order to be included in the meta-dataset.
Search for Studies 
According to Stanley and Jarrell (1989), meta-analysis should commence 
with an extensive literature search. A comprehensive search was conducted from 
January through to May 2011, to identify the relevant econometric studies on the 
effects of education on inequality. Numerous databases and search engines were 
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explored, including Econlit, Jstor, Google Scholar and RePec. Keywords used in the 
search included ‘education’, ‘higher education’, ‘inequality’, ‘income distribution’, 
‘distribution of incomes’, ‘Gini’, ‘middle class’, and ‘income shares’. In addition, 
references cited in prior literature reviews and empirical papers were also 
investigated. This search process identified 852 articles in the Jstor database and 
1,414 articles retrieved from the Econlit database. 
Figure 5.1: Inequality and education in South-East Asia, 1960-2010
Criteria for Inclusion
Although there are over two thousand articles that investigate the relationship 
between education and inequality, meta-analysis requires comparable estimates. The 
studies that were ultimately selected satisfied the following three criteria:
(a) Reported econometric estimates: Meta-analysis in economics involves a 
compilation of regression results drawn from previous studies (see Stanley and 
Jarrell, 1989). Therefore, only empirical studies that provide regression results were 
included in the data set. This criterion excludes numerous earlier studies such as 
Soltow (1960) and the first study on education and inequality by Anderson (1955), 
because these studies do not employ econometric or regression methods; Anderson 
(1955) and Soltow (1960) use descriptive statistics. Note that both published and 
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unpublished (the so-called ‘Grey literature’) studies were included in the meta-
dataset.
(b) Income inequality as the dependent variable and education as an explanatory 
variable: The econometric study must have used inequality as the dependent variable 
and at least one measure of education as an explanatory variable. That is, to be 
included in the dataset, the estimated inequality equation needed to be some variant 
of the following general specification: 
PEED  xxEduI Z1 (1)
Where I is inequality, Edu is education, Z is a vector of other explanatory variables 
and ȝ is the error term. With this criterion, numerous studies such as Muller (2002) 
and Checchi (2003) were excluded: although these studies explore the relationship 
between education and inequality, inequality is not the dependent variable. Rather,
inequality is one of the explanatory variables. Influential studies such as Becker and 
Chiswick (1966), Tinbergen (1972) and Marin and Psacharopoulos (1976) were also 
excluded as these studies used returns-to-education as the dependent variable. 
Finally, as the focus is on income inequality, studies of land inequality and wealth 
inequality were excluded.
(c) Aggregate income inequality: The focus of this chapter is on the aggregate 
relationship between income and education. The Mincer (1974) equation is probably 
the most influential equation in the entire human capital literature.2 According to this 
framework, earnings differentials are determined in part by the level of schooling. 
Many studies of the effects of education on inequality have applied the Mincer 
approach to investigate the relationship between education and inequality.
Nevertheless, studies based on Mincer’s approach were excluded from the meta-
dataset as these refer to the earnings differential between individual workers, rather 
than aggregate income inequality. Therefore, numerous studies including those from 
the most prominent scholars in this field such as Mincer (1958) are excluded from 
the meta-analysis. This selection criterion is not likely to bias the results, since the 
focus of the chapter (and this thesis) in on the aggregate effects of education.
                                                          
2 Mincer’s human capital earnings function takes the following generic form:
HEE  2210 XXrSYlogYlog , where Y is earnings, 0Y is an individual’s earnings with 
no education and no experience, S is years of schooling and X is labour experience.
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Sixty-six studies met the criteria. These 66 studies report a total of 892
comparable estimates that can be included in the meta-dataset. Table 5A in the 
Appendix lists the authors of these studies, the year of publication, the sample 
coverage and the time period investigated.  
Effect Size
The studies included in the dataset vary in terms of measures of the 
dependent and explanatory variables. Nevertheless, they all provide estimates of the 
key association – the effect of education on inequality. All estimates were converted 
into a common and comparable measure. The choice of measure was the partial 
correlation. The partial correlation measures the strength of the association between 
education and inequality, holding all other factors constant. The partial correlation is 
a suitable measure for research synthesis as it is comparable between and within 
studies and is fairly straightforward to calculate (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012 
for detailed technical notes).      
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for the included studies. A slight
majority of the reported estimates show a positive effect of education on inequality, 
i.e. education increases inequality.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
Statistics Number Percentage
Number of Studies 66 -
Number of Estimates 892 -
Total Sample Size 184,771 -
Distribution of results
Positive 501 56.2%
Positive and statistically significant 240 26.9%
Zero 1 0.1%
Negative 391 43.8%
Negative and statistically significant 203 22.8%
Total 892 100%
Of the 892 estimates, 501 or 56.2 percent recorded positive partial correlations 
between education and inequality, with 240 of these, or 26.9%, being statistically 
significant. On the other hand, 391 or 43.8 percent estimates recorded negative 
coefficient while 203 or 22.8 percent were reported to be statistically significant.
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This distribution of results, however, tells us relatively little as it is likely to be 
dominated by sampling error, specification bias and possibly selection bias. Hence, it 
is necessary to delve much deeper into the reported estimates. 
5.4 Does Education Affect Inequality?
In this section MRA is applied to the meta-dataset to address the two research 
questions raised in the introduction: (1) what is the effect of education on inequality? 
and (2) what factors explain the heterogeneity in reported results.
Unconditional Estimates
The unconditional relationship between education and inequality was estimated by 
running the following simple MRA:
ijijr HE  0 (2)
Where r is the partial correlation between education and inequality of the ith estimate 
from the jth study (there are 66 js and 892 i). Equation 2 assumes that the only source 
of variation is sampling error, the ijH term.3
Table 5.2 reports estimates of the unconditional relationship between 
education and inequality. 
Table 5.2: The Effect of education on inequality, unconditional estimates
(Dependent variable = partial correlation)
OLS
(1)
Clustered SE
(2)
WLS & 
Clustered SE
(3)
Constant 0.023***
(2.68)
0.023
(1.05)
0.004
(0.14)
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Number of observations is 892. Column 1 reports OLS results, using robust standard 
errors. Column 2 adjusts standard errors for data clustering. Column 3 uses weighted least 
squares, using precision as weights. All models are fixed effects MRA.
Column 1 reports the results using standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. The 
results show that the average effect of education on inequality is +0.023; there is a 
positive relationship between education and inequality. Most researchers follow 
                                                          
3 Equation 2 is a fixed effects MRA. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) argue that fixed effects are 
less biased in the face of potential publication selection bias. In any case, the multivariate MRA 
presented below specifically allows and models heterogeneity in the underlying population effect size.
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Cohen’s (1988) suggestion when interpreting the magnitude of a zero order 
correlation; the effect is considered small if it less than 0.1, moderate if 0.25 and 
large if more than 0.4. Hence, the education-inequality association is very small 
according to Cohen’s criteria and of no practical significance. Doucouliagos (2011) 
derives similar guidelines for partial correlations stating that a partial correlation that 
is less than 0.07 can be considered to be small, with 0.17 considered to be moderate 
and 0.33 is large.
The results reported in Column 1 do not control for data dependence. Our 
dataset contains several estimates from each study. These estimates are not strictly 
independent of each other, violating an important OLS assumption. Hence, we need 
to adjust the standard errors for data clustering. Once this is done, in column 2, the 
unconditional average is no longer statistically significant. Column 3 reports the 
results using weighted least squares, using precision as weights and controlling for 
data dependence. The conclusion from Table 5.2 is that there does not appear to be 
any link between education and inequality. However, before accepting this 
conclusion, it is necessary to consider whether the reported results are affected by 
selection bias and heterogeneity. This is particularly important for our dataset as it
includes the results of several different measures of the dependent variable 
(inequality) and, hence, there is the real possibility that unconditional estimates are 
affected by heterogeneity.
Publication Bias
The estimates reported in Table 5.2 may be affected by publication selection 
bias. Researchers may have a strong preference, and incentive, to report only 
statistically significant results, suppressing insignificant results in order to increase 
the probability of securing publication (Card and Krueger, 1995:239). 
Simply looking at Table 5.1 it is clear that there is a range of results reported 
in this literature. Moreover, the theoretical literature “allows” for both negative and 
positive results: education can either increase inequality or decrease it. Hence, there 
is no strong reason to believe that there will be a large degree of publication selection 
bias in this literature. 
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2010) suggest a funnel plot to detect the presence 
of publication bias. The funnel plot is a useful graphical method to identify the shape 
or distribution of reported observations. Publication bias can be observed by plotting 
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precision (inverse standard error) with partial correlation. Figure 5.2 illustrates the 
funnel plot when partial correlations are used. Partial correlations are truncated at -1
and +1, potentially distorting the shape of the funnel plot. The Fisher z-
transformation removes this truncation. Because of the truncation, partial correlations 
might be downward biased. However, the truncation does not affect the majority of 
the estimates in our meta-dataset. Figure 5.3 repeats the funnel plot using the Fisher 
z-transformed partial correlations.4
The funnel plot will be symmetrical if the reported estimates are free from 
publication bias. The estimates with a larger standard error (less precision) will be 
spread at the bottom of the graph. Meanwhile more precise estimates form the top of 
the funnel.
At least two important points can be noted from the above funnel plot. First, 
the reported results are widely spread. This means that the results are heterogeneous 
and it is important to identify the factors that drive this heterogeneity. Secondly, the
distribution of results appears to be symmetrical; both positive and negative 
estimates are reported. Symmetry is an important characteristic in a funnel plot as it 
indicates the absence of publication bias.5 Therefore, based on the funnel plot above, 
there is no clear visible sign of publication bias in the studies of education and 
inequality. 
However, like all graphs, interpretation of funnel plots is largely subjective. 
Stanley (2005 and 2008) proposed an empirical test – the FAT-PET regression - that 
has to be conducted prior to the confirmation of any existence of publication bias. 
The existence of publication bias can be tested using the following regression: 
ijijseij SEr HEE  0 (3)
Where SE denotes the standard error of the partial correlation.6 These results are 
presented in Table 5.3. Column 1, reports the results of simple OLS using robust 
standard errors.
                                                          
4 Hunter and Schmidt (2004) caution against the use of the Fisher z-transformed correlations as they 
are likely to lead to an upward bias; the transformation replaces a negative bias with an upward bias.
5 Note that it is symmetry that is the key issue. The distribution does not need to contain both positive 
and negative correlations; a funnel plot can be symmetrical with all positive (or negative) valued 
observations.
6 Note that SE is the standard error of the partial correlation. It is not the standard error of the 
regression coefficient. 
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Figure 5.2: Funnel plot, partial correlations of the effects of education
on inequality (n=892)
Note: Dotted line indicates position of a zero partial correlation
Figure 5.3: Funnel plot, z-transformed partial correlations of the effects 
of education on inequality (n=892)
Note: Dotted line indicates position of a zero partial correlation
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Column 2 corrects for data dependence (multiple estimates reported within 
the same study), using clustered standard errors. Finally, column 3 uses WLS, using 
precision as weights with clustered standard errors. The coefficient on SE is not 
statistically significant, regardless of the estimation approach (columns 1, 2 and 3). 
This suggests the absence of publication selection bias in this literature and also that 
there is no evidence of an empirical effect either (columns 2 and 3). However, care
should be taken with both of these conclusions. It might be the case that 
heterogeneity (recall the spread in the funnel plot) dominates both the test for 
selection bias and genuine empirical effect. Hence, the following section tests these 
relationships within a multivariate framework.
Table 5.3: MRA-FAT-PET test for publication selection
(Dependent variable = partial correlation)
OLS
(1)
Clustered 
(2)
WLS & 
Clustered 
(3)
SE -0.000 -0.000 0.421
(-0.00) (-0.00) (0.91)
Constant 0.023*** 0.023 -0.024
(2.67) (1.05) (-0.48)
Adjusted R2 -0.001 -0.001 0.006
Notes: Number of observations is 892. Column 1 reports OLS results, using robust standard 
errors. Column 2 adjusts the OLS standard errors for data clustering. Column 3 uses 
weighted least squares, using precision as weights with standard errors adjusted for data 
clustering. SE is the standard error of the partial correlation.
Exploring Heterogeneity in Reported Results 
The general form of the MRA is given by:
¦ ¦  ijjiijijkikij SESEr HDEEE KZ 01 (4)
where Z is a vector of variables that reflect the distribution of genuine empirical 
effects and misspecification biases, K is a vector of variables that reflect publication 
selection heterogeneity, and SE is the estimate’s standard error. See Stanley (2008) 
for details on this general MRA model. 
The following version of specification was estimated:
¦  ijijkikij SEr HEEE 01 Z (5)
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This specification controls for heterogeneity in the Z vector variables but not the K
vector variables. Modeling of the publication process itself is not the main interest 
here, especially since Table 5.3 shows that there is no overall publication selection 
bias in this literature. All estimation is carried out through weighted least squares, 
using precision as weights. WLS is preferred because estimates do not have equal 
variances (recall the funnel plots) and also because it is important to assign greater 
weight to those estimates that are more precise as the information they provide is 
more valuable for statistical inference. Equation 5 offers estimates of the conditional 
effects of education on inequality.
The following groups of variables were included in the Z vector:
a. Measures of the dependent variable: The dependent variable in the primary 
econometric studies is income inequality (recall equation 1). In broad terms, 
inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient, the income share of the top earners, 
the income share of the middle class, or the income share of the lowest (‘bottom’)
earners. Controlling for these different inequality measures is important, as in theory 
the effects of education on inequality can very well differ depending upon which part 
of the income distribution we are analysing. For example, it is possible that education 
might have an entirely different effect on the share of the top income earners 
compared to the share of the lowest income earners. 
b. Measures of the explanatory variable: The key explanatory variable is 
education. A range of measures of education have been employed in the field: 
literacy; years of total schooling; secondary schooling; primary schooling; mean 
years of schooling; and expenditure on education. The meta-regression analysis tests
whether these alternative measures impact on the reported results.
c. Composition of data: Some studies use data for developed countries (73.7%), 
others for developing (26.3%). Some studies relate to democratic countries, while 
others to authoritarian and socialist countries. Geographical regions covered include 
Africa, Latin America and Asia. The education-inequality association might very 
well vary by region, level of development and political regime. Hence it is important 
to consider the effects of these dimensions.
d. Type of data: Most studies use panel data, but others use time series or cross-
sectional data. 
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e. Time variation: The average year of the data used is included in order to 
explore whether the effect of education on inequality varies with time (or is reported 
to vary over time).
f. Estimator: Most studies use OLS. However, some studies account for 
potential endogeneity between education and inequality using the IV estimator. 
Therefore it is interesting to explore whether estimation differences matter.
g. Specification: Studies differ also in their chosen econometric specification. 
There is a fairly wide set of econometric specifications used throughout this 
literature. Unfortunately, the use of too many dummy variables to capture all the 
specification differences may lead to econometric problems. Specifically, the 
specification can easily run out of degrees of freedom and multicollinearity can 
emerge as a real challenge.
Therefore, some of the potential moderator variables were combined to form 
the following five broad MRA variables: 
i. Government: This category incorporates all variables related to government 
activities, such as welfare, public administration and government transfers.
ii. Liberalization: All variables related to the liberalization process such as trade and 
openness, foreign direct investment and patents7 were combined to form this 
variable.
iii. Labour: All variables related to labour force structure, including women’s access 
to labour markets and labour regulation have been included in this variable.
iv. Non-Agricultural Sector and Urbanization: The aim of creating this variable was 
to capture variables that model some aspects of the Kuznets’ process. All related 
variables such as manufacturing, services, wholesale and urbanization have been 
incorporated into this variable. Chapter 6 explores the Kuznet’s process in greater 
detail.
v. Demographic: All variables related to demographics, such as age, population, 
non-white and female have been combined in this variable.  
On the other hand, some variables such as consumption and density were excluded 
entirely from the MRA as they appeared in a very small number of studies. The 
variables included in the MRA are listed and described in Table 5B in the Appendix,
together with their means and standard deviations. 
                                                          
7 Patents are included in some studies as a measure of knowhow emanating from overseas.
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 The MRA results are reported in Table 5.4 below. Column 1 reports the 
general model with all potential explanatory variables included in the specification of 
the meta-regression. Column 2 reports the specific model after sequentially removing
any variable that was not statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The 
general-to-specific model is preferred as it offers greater clarity regarding the 
underlying associations. Column 3 and 4 repeat the general and specific versions of 
the MRA after including author-study fixed effects. This is a panel-type MRA 
model. The author-study fixed effects can be included to capture any unobserved 
heterogeneity in the studies. The fixed effects were constructed as author-study 
dummy variables. For this purpose, the same value was assigned to studies that had 
the same author. The MRA model with fixed effects is:
¦  ijiijkikij SEZr HOEEE 01 (6)
Where Ȝ are the study-author fixed effects. Note that the use of the term ‘fixed 
effects’ might cause some confusion. In meta-analysis, models are divided into fixed 
effects and random effects. These terms, however, denote something different to the 
normal usage in empirical economics. The fixed effects meta-analysis model 
assumes that all studies measure the same underlying population effect. In contrast, 
the random effects meta-analysis model assumes that the population effect sizes are 
randomly distributed about a population mean.
Equation 6 is a fixed effects panel meta-analysis models, offering information 
on the within study findings. As such, it can be considered to be an extension of the 
traditional fixed effects model with conventional economics fixed effects added (the 
Ȝ). For technical details on this model see Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012). The 
inclusion of the Ȝ improves the overall fit of the MRA. A Wald test confirms the joint 
statistical significance of the fixed effects (see notes to Table 5.4 below).
 
Education and Income Inequality: A Meta-Regression Analysis
 
113
 
Table 5.4: MRA of the effects of education on inequality,
(Dependent variable = partial correlations)
General Specific General 
fixed effects
Specific fixed 
effects
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard Error 0.133 -0.578
(0.31) (-0.69)
Income Share Top -0.094** -0.095*** -0.098** -0.093***
(-2.60) (-3.56) (-2.10) (-2.86)
Income Share Middle 0.035 0.048
(0.61) (0.65)
Income Share Bottom 0.128** 0.139** 0.105 0.108**
(2.17) (2.65) (1.58) (2.04)
Income Share Ratio -0.063 -0.085
(-0.99) (-1.11)
Theil Index -0.116 -0.113** -0.221** -0.143***
(-1.60) (-2.44) (-2.43) (-3.70)
Other Inequality 0.024 -0.002
(0.39) (-0.06)
Secondary School -0.062 -0.096* 0.002
(-1.08) (-1.94) (0.04)
Tertiary School 0.045 0.134
(0.55) (1.36)
Education Attainment 0.009 0.044
(0.13) (0.42)
Education Inequality 0.052 0.107 0.051*
(0.95) (1.36) (1.86)
Literacy -0.035 0.053 0.066**
(-0.54) (0.76) (2.15)
Asia 0.005 0.070 0.058*
(0.07) (1.11) (1.74)
Africa -0.101 -0.128** -0.133*** -0.203***
(-1.42) (-2.58) (-3.74) (-6.50)
Socialist 0.120** 0.101*** 0.021
(2.47) (3.38) (0.49)
Developed -0.000 -0.010
(-0.00) (-0.18)
Democracy -0.065* -0.062** -0.041** -0.048***
(-1.75) (-2.33) (-2.59) (-3.82)
Non OLS 0.048 0.078 0.072**
(1.01) (1.54) (2.06)
Panel Data -0.056 -0.061** -0.115
(-0.90) (-2.45) (-1.54)
Political Stability 0.208** 0.216** -0.069 -0.097*
(2.27) (2.45) (-1.27) (-1.90)
Government 0.022 0.087** 0.092***
(0.55) (2.62) (3.37)
Liberalization -0.032 -0.032* -0.054**
(-1.06) (-1.68) (-2.32)
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Labour 0.031 -0.004
(0.49) (-0.16)
Employment -0.125 -0.142*** 0.211*
(-1.41) (-2.93) (1.91)
Non-Agricultural Sector -0.060** -0.070*** -0.079*** -0.084***
(-2.25) (-2.88) (-4.07) (-4.78)
Land and Natural Resources -0.084 0.033 0.109***
(-0.81) (0.42) (5.55)
Demographic 0.020 0.017
(0.28) (0.59)
Inflation 0.066 0.069** 0.046 0.100***
(1.00) (2.60) (0.86) (3.91)
Growth -0.034 -0.010
(-1.12) (-0.36)
YearData 0.000 0.009*
(0.06) (1.88)
EcoFreedom 0.021 0.092* 0.068***
(0.27) (1.92) (2.76)
SSCI -0.006 -0.025
(-0.26) (-0.73)
Nocountries -0.001 -0.001* -0.001
(-1.45) (-1.91) (-1.12)
NoYears 0.000 0.003
(0.07) (0.93)
Education lag -0.027 -0.052
(-0.34) (-0.65)
Capital 0.059 0.075*** -0.013
(1.06) (2.68) (-0.28)
Income 0.108** 0.094*** 0.165*** 0.087***
(2.43) (2.70) (5.26) (2.95)
Unpublished -0.142** -0.139*** -0.279 -0.196***
(-2.56) (-4.39) (-1.22) (-5.88)
DevelopmentJournal 0.052 -0.103 -0.068**
(0.92) (-1.53) (-2.48)
SociologyJournal -0.041 -0.494** -0.197***
(-0.47) (-2.28) (-5.36)
Constant 0.055 0.150***
(0.51) (4.28)
Observations 892 892 891 891
R-squared 0.362 0.338 0.529 0.487
Adj. R2-squared 0.332 0.325 0.477 0.457
Notes: Figures in brackets are t-statistics using standard errors adjusted for data dependence. 
Estimation using WLS, with precision used as weights. Shaded cells highlight variables that are 
robust. Wald test for study-author fixed effects: 42650.73, p =0.00. Fixed effects not reported for 
column 3 and 4.
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Measures of inequality
As already noted, various measures of inequality are available. While the 
Gini coefficient has some limitations,8 it remains one of the most popular measures 
of inequality. Indeed, in the dataset, 47.8 percent of the estimates used the Gini 
coefficient, while 14.7 percent used the income share of the bottom, 15.2 percent 
used the Theil Index, 10.2 percent used the income share of the rich and 5.4 percent 
and 2.4 percent used the income ratio and ‘other’ measures such as the Atkinson 
Index, respectively.  
The constant in the MRA (Table 5.4) quantifies the size of the effect of 
education on inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, holding other MRA 
variables constant. In most cases, the constant is not statistically significant,
suggesting that when inequality is measured using Gini, there is no effect of 
education on inequality. However in the preferred specific model (column 2), Gini is 
positive and significant, suggesting that education increases inequality, ignoring all 
other dimensions of the research process and all other dimensions of heterogeneity.
The MRA results also reveal that the Income Share Top variable has a robust 
negative coefficient. This indicates that, compared to the Gini coefficient, studies 
that used the income share of the rich report a larger negative (or smaller positive)
association between education and inequality. In contrast, the coefficient on the 
Income Share Bottom variable has a robust positive coefficient. This indicates that,
compared to the Gini coefficient, studies that use the income share of the bottom 
earners report a more positive relationship between education and inequality. Note 
that an increase in the share of bottom earners means a reduction in income 
inequality. Figure 5.4 illustrates this in the form of a partial regression plot. Hence, 
taken together, both these MRA variables indicate that an expansion in education 
erodes the income share of the top earners and increases the share of lower income 
group. That is, education reduces inequality at both tails of the income distribution. 
These results are consistent with the mainstream literature that advocates education 
as an effective tool for promoting income equality (Ahluwalia, 1976; Marin and 
Psacharopoulos, 1976; Winegarden, 1979; Perugini and Martino, 2008). 
Hence, it can be concluded from the MRA that education affects the two tails 
of the income distribution. Income Share Middle is not statistically significant: its 
                                                          
8 For example, it fails to capture between group changes, see Lambert and Aronson (1993) and Leigh 
(2007).
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value is no different than the base, which is Gini. We conclude that education has no 
effect on the share of the middle class.
The Theil index is statistically significant in the specific and fixed effects 
version of the MRA, with a negative coefficient. Hence, all else equal, studies that 
use the Theil measure of inequality report larger negative partial correlations 
between education and inequality. 
Figure 5.4: Partial regression plot, income share of lowest earners
Measures of Education
Several measures of education are used in the literature. Data on literacy have 
been available since the nineteen-century.9 This is not, however, a popular measure 
of educational attainment as it is often just an indicator of the ‘ability to sign 
document’ (Houston, 1983).10 Thus, the literacy rate might not be a good proxy for 
educational attainment, as it measures only low levels of education (van Leeuwen 
and Foldvari, 2008: 226). Psacharopoulos and Ariagada (1986) compiled information 
about the educational attainment of the labour force to fill the gap in education data. 
                                                          
9 European countries have used literacy to measure educational attainment since the Renaissance era.
10 As Houston (1983: 270) noted: ‘Those who signed their name in full are held to be literate, those 
who used initials or a mark are deemed illiterate.’
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However, an inadequate number of observations for most countries, as well 
as differences in the coverage across the countries, are major drawbacks in the use of 
their data. Currently, data on the school enrolment rate, average years of schooling 
and the literacy rate are more readily available (van Leeuwen, 2008:20). In their 
highly influential dataset on education, Barro and Lee (1993, 2000, 2010) used the 
average year of schooling as a measure of human capital. Their dataset also has 
limitations, as it neglects the quality of education such as government spending on 
education and teaching and learning quality (Barro and Lee, 1993:364). While it has 
some statistical validity, the use of the enrolment rate as a proxy for human capital 
has been criticized because students are outside of the labour force (Permani, 
2009:6). Therefore, their contribution to the economy is difficult to justify; although 
autoregression in the dataset might mean that enrolment rates are a useful proxy for 
human capital in the labour force. In our dataset, secondary schooling appears to be 
the most popular measure, with about 38.3% of the 892 observations using secondary 
school as the education measurement, while 22.9% used education attainment (e.g.
the number of years of schooling).11
In the specific MRA model, secondary schooling is statistically significant in 
the MRA with a negative coefficient. This suggests that compared to primary 
schooling, secondary schooling is more effective at reducing inequality. This finding 
is consistent with the previous literature that found secondary schooling to reduce 
inequality (Ahluwalia, 1976; 1976a; Knight and Sabot, 1983). This effect however 
disappears when author-study fixed effects are introduced in the MRA. 
Education inequality is not an important determining factor. Although 
inequality of education appears to have a positive correlation with income inequality,
it is not significant except in the author-study fixed effects specific model. This result 
is unexpected as some prior studies (e.g. Psacharapoulos, 1977 and Park, 1996) 
found that increases in education inequality increase income inequality. However, 
this result is in line with the study by Castelló and Doménech (2002), who find a low 
correlation between education inequality and income inequality (correlation = 0.27).
                                                          
11 On the other hand 7.8% used primary schooling, 12.4% used tertiary schooling, 6.2% used literacy, 
and 14.7% used education inequality.
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Regional Differences
Location and geography might very well condition the effects of education on 
inequality. Education is readily accessible in developed countries.12 Therefore, 
people living in developed countries have relatively greater opportunities to obtain
the higher quality education that eventually influences occupational choice and 
salary (Tselios, 2008:405). 
The base in the MRA is Latin America. The MRA coefficient on Africa is 
negative. This means that studies that include data from Africa report, on average, 
larger negative correlations between education and inequality. That is, education has 
a greater effect at reducing inequality in Africa. Figure 5.5 illustrates the MRA 
results for Africa in the form of a partial regression plot.
Of particular interest to this thesis is the coefficient on the Asia
dummy.Human capital accumulation is relatively high in Asia, with the enrolment 
rate for primary and secondary schools being more than 90 percent and 80 percent, 
respectively. Educational development has received strong support from Asian 
governments, with some countries allocating a relatively high proportion of their 
government expenditure to education (Asian Development Bank, 2008: 7-9, Lee and 
Francisco, 2010: 9-10). As an example, cross-country studies in Southeast Asia, such 
as Indonesia (Armida et.al, 2008), Thailand (Israngkura, 2008) and The Philippines 
(Balisacan and Piza, 2008), reveal that education is an important determinant of 
income differentials and income inequality. The Asia dummy is not significant even 
though it has a positive coefficient in the study-author fixed effects model. 
This suggests that controlling for all other influences, studies that include 
Asian countries in the sample find a similar effect as those that use data from Latin 
America: the incremental effect arising from Asia is, on average, zero. 
 
                                                          
12 More than half of the highly ranked universities in the world are located in the United States and 
Europe. 
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Figure 5.5: Partial regression plot, Africa
 
 
Time Dimension 
The results in Table 5.4 suggest that time does not have a significant impact 
on the reported findings when study-author fixed effects are excluded from the 
MRA. However, when these effects are included in the MRA, YearData emerges 
with a positive only in column 3 with a small level of significance (t-statistic = 1.88).
The number of years of data included in a sample also has a positive coefficient in 
the study-author fixed effects MRA (+0.03) but the effect is not significant. In 
contrast, the number of countries has a negative coefficient in the MRA: the more 
inclusive samples find smaller positive or larger negative effects.
Econometric Specification
Several variables in the MRA reflect specification differences in the 
underlying econometric models.
Democracy: has a robust negative and significant coefficient in the MRA. Studies 
that control for the degree of democracy find larger negative (or smaller positive) 
effects on inequality flowing from education. Democracy is potentially an important 
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factor in determining inequality. Lipset (1959) found that democratic countries tend 
to record higher levels of economic development, faster industrialization and 
urbanization progress, and greater education attainment.13 Democratic states provide 
greater space for their citizens to form unions and other political and economic 
organisations and offer equal rights to vote regardless of social status. Democratic 
systems allow their citizens including the poor to vote in elections, leading to more 
equal income distribution (Gradstein and Milanovic, 2004: 519). The redistributive 
channel through the democratic and political system has been investigated in 
numerous studies, such as Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 
and Persson and Tabellini (1994). These studies conclude that inequality falls as a 
result of the median voter’s power.  
It has long been recognized that democratic states tend to be more open in 
terms of access to education. Although the relationship between democracy and 
inequality is still unclear, many studies have a found negative relationship; 
democratic countries tend to experience lower income inequality (Muller, 1988:50). 
Given these arguments, it is important that democracy be included in a well 
constructed econometric model of inequality. And, this affects the reported effect of 
education on inequality. 
EcoFreedom: has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant in the fixed 
effect models. Berggren (1999) found that countries with higher levels of economic 
freedom have relatively lower inequality. Berggren postulated that most countries 
which recorded increases in the level economic freedom and civil liberties, have also 
successfully reduced income inequality. However, there is also evidence that 
economic freedom has a positive relationship with inequality. For example, Scully 
(2002) found higher levels of economic freedom to be associated with higher 
inequality: economic freedom promotes asset ownership which might benefit higher 
income groups. The MRA suggests that conditioning on economic freedom (i.e.
including economic freedom in the primary specification) reduces the size of the 
effect of education on inequality.
                                                          
13 As Lipset (1959:75) postulated: ‘In each case, the average wealth, degree of industrialization and 
urbanization, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries…If we had 
combined Latin America and Europe in one table, the differences would have been greater’
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Liberalization: has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant in the fixed 
effect model. Developing countries have embraced trade liberalization as one tool to 
boost growth and stimulate economic growth, technology transfer, increase 
productivity and improve international competitiveness. Since the implementation of 
the GATT agreement, it has been estimated that more than 80 developing countries 
began to open their markets in line with trade liberalization (UNCTAD, 1997). The 
effect of liberalization has long been a central debate in economic development.14
Globalization and trade liberalization opponents argue that it will reduce the 
role of government in the economy. National governments sometimes have to
compromise with the private sector as well as foreign direct investors by lowering 
taxes and providing greater incentives to business. This might restrict resources for 
education and other income redistributive measures. There is some evidence that in 
China and Mexico, external factors such as liberalization and foreign direct 
investment have had a significant impact on regional inequality (Zhang and Zhang, 
2003; Wan and Chen, 2007; Rivas, 2006; Wei et.al,2009). The MRA shows that 
controlling for liberalization increases the inverse relationship between education and 
inequality. This effect is significant once study-author effects are included in the 
MRA. 
Land and natural resources: does not have a robust coefficient. It is negative though 
statistically insignificant in column 1 but becomes positive and significant once
study-author fixed effects are included. The availability of land and natural resources 
increases a country’s wealth that can be utilized to finance education and other 
initiatives. It has been argued since the classical era that natural resources and 
education have a negative relationship. Marshall (1920:176) postulated that natural 
resources are ‘wasteful’ and can create a low ‘mind-set’ generation. Some studies 
find a negative association between the level of schooling and natural resources 
(Gylfason, 2001). Gylfason (p. 858) argues that natural resource rich countries are: 
… overconfident and therefore tend to underrate or overlook the need for good 
economic policies as well as for good education. In other words, nations that believe 
that natural capital is their most important asset may develop a false sense of 
security and become negligent about the accumulation of human capital.
                                                          
14 See Savvides (1998) and Park (1995) for further discussion on the effect of trade and foreign direct 
investment on inequality.
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The MRA suggests that the inclusion of land and natural resources in primary 
regression models (recall equation 1) does not have a robust effect on partial 
correlations between education and inequality, but it does affect the correlations 
when the within study effects are considered.
Government: has a positive coefficient that becomes significant when study-author 
fixed effects are included in the MRA. This indicates that studies that control for the 
effects of government spending find more positive (less negative) partial 
correlations. Government spending and welfare variables are expected to have a 
negative relationship with inequality, through the direct effect of government 
spending in general or indirectly through education spending channel. However, 
there is also some evidence that government spending in education in some 
countries, for example Malaysia, tends to favour higher income groups (Selowsky 
1979; Bowman et.al, 1986).
Non-Agricultural Sector and Urbanization: has a robust negative coefficient in all 
MRA models. Urbanization is an important factor to the determination of inequality.
In his seminal paper, Kuznets (1955) argued that a non-linear pattern in income 
inequality emerges from fundamental structural change, such as the modernization or 
urbanization process. Income inequality is usually lower in rural areas as most people 
are involved in similar economic activities, predominantly in agriculture. In contrast, 
per capita income in urban areas is generally based on education attainment, skills 
and entrepreneurship, which tends to increase faster than in the agricultural rural 
areas, resulting in an overall increase in income inequality (the Kuznets process is
discussed and assessed in detail in Chapter 6). The MRA results show that 
controlling for these effects of urbanization on inequality increases the negative 
partial correlation between education and inequality.
Publication process and selection bias: Standard Error is included in the MRA to 
capture and correct the estimates for selection bias. This variable is not statistically 
significant in either the general or the specific versions of the MRA. This confirms 
the results from the simple FAT-PET MRA, as well as visual inspection of the funnel 
plots, that there is no publication selection bias in this literature. Unpublished studies 
appear to report significantly more negative partial correlations. It is difficult to 
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explain why this might be the case. However, only 6% of estimates come from 
unpublished studies and, hence, the MRA coefficient on Unpublished might reflect 
something unique about these studies. Sociology journals report larger negative 
partial correlations compared to economics journals in the fixed effects model. The
specific version of the fixed effects MRA also suggests that there is some difference 
in the reported results between economics and development journals. The SSCI
variable is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no difference in the 
results between studies on the basis of the journal Impact Factors.
The MRA coefficients can be used to derive estimates of the effects of 
education on inequality. These are presented in Table 5.5. Column 1 reports the 
MRA predictions based on the following: the number of countries (Nocountries) is 
evaluated at the mean of 40, and with the following dummy variables all set to 1:
Inflation, Panel Data, Political Stability, Democracy, Capital, Employment, and
Income. This column evaluates the effects of primary schooling on inequality, for 
Gini and the Incomes Shares of the Top 20 and Bottom 40 percent and for different 
regions. Panel (a) reports the results for Latin America (and since Asia is not 
statistically significant to Latin America, these results also apply to Asia). Panel (b) 
reports the results for Africa. Column 2 sets the dummy variable Secondary 
Schooling to 1 so that the effects of secondary schooling are evaluated.
Table 5.5 MRA predictions, effect of education on inequality
PRIMARY 
SCHOOLING
(1)
SECONDARY 
SCHOOLING
(2)
PRIMARY 
SCHOOLING
(3)
SECONDARY 
SCHOOLING
(4)
Latin America (or Asia)
Gini 0.22 
(0.01 to 0.43)
0.12
(-0.06 to 0.30)
0.01 
(-0.15 to 0.16)
-0.09 
(-0.18 to 0.01)
Income shares Top 
20 and Bot40
-0.01 
(-0.29 to 0.26)
-0.11
(-0.35 to 0.13)
-0.23 
(-0.47 to 0.01)
-0.33
(-0.51 to -0.14)
Africa
Gini 0.09 
(-0.15 to 0.33)
-0.01
(-0.22 to 0.21)
-0.12 
(-0.30 to 0.05)
-0.22 
(-0.35 to -0.09)
Income shares Top 
20 and Bot40
-0.14 
(-0.44 to 0.15)
-0.24 
(-0.50 to 0.02)
-0.36 
(-0.60 to -0.11)
-0.45 
(-0.65 to -0.26)
Note: All estimates derived using the MRA coefficients reported in Table 5.4, column 2.
The MRA coefficient on Political Stability is particularly large (see Table 
5.4, column 2). As only 2% of the studies included this as a control, some degree of 
caution should be exercised in including this variable in the MRA predictions. 
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Hence, columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.5 repeat the MRA predictions after setting
Political Stability to 0.
Referring to columns 3 and 4, we can conclude from the MRA that primary 
schooling has had no effect on inequality in Latin America and Asia and it has had 
no effect on average inequality in Africa. However, primary schooling does appear to 
have had a negative effect on inequality in Africa in terms of income shares. That is, 
the MRA indicates that primary schooling has reduced income inequality in Africa at 
both ends of the income distribution.
With respect to secondary schooling, the MRA indicates that secondary 
schooling has led to a compression in incomes in Latin America, Africa and Asia. In 
all three regions, secondary schooling has resulted in reduced income inequality at 
both ends of the income distribution.
 
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter presented a quantitative review of the literature on the effects of 
education on inequality; also known as meta-regression analysis. The two aims of the 
meta-regression analysis were to assess the effect of education on inequality and to
model the heterogeneity in the empirical estimates. In general, this chapter shows 
that education is an effective mechanism for reducing inequality, particular in terms 
of the income share of the top 20 percent and the income share of the bottom 40 
percent.The results reveal that it is possible to explain much of the variation in the 
reported estimates. Drawing upon the findings of 66 econometric studies, this MRA 
produces several interesting results. 
First, education appears to have its greatest effect on the two tails of the 
income distribution, reducing the income share of the rich and increasing the income 
share of the poor. Hence, it can be concluded that education reduces the gap between 
the rich and the poor. Hence, it does appear from the MRA that on balance education 
is, on average, on effective tool for reducing income inequality.
Second, the distribution of education is not important. The unequal
distribution of education has no effect on income inequality. Some of the results also 
indicate that the level of secondary education appears to be more important in 
reducing inequality than does primary schooling.
Third, there are important regional differences in the effects of education. The 
MRA suggests that education in Africa is more effective in reducing inequality than 
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it is in Asia. Further research is required to investigate the source of such regional 
differences in the effects of education.
Finally, about half of the variation in reported estimates can be explained by 
study-specific factors, as well as measurement, specification and data differences 
employed in the primary econometric studies; research design shapes reported 
results. An important extension would be to apply MRA to investigate the effects of 
other factors on inequality. This would then assist policy makers in formulating a 
cost-benefit analysis of alternative interventions. 
The following chapter (Chapter 6) provides a comprehensive empirical 
analysis of the Kuznets hypothesis for Southeast Asia. The Kuznets curve is 
estimated for individual Southeast Asian countries and for all countries pooled 
together. The chapter also provides original primary data analysis on the effects of 
education on inequality.
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Appendix
Table 5A: Studies included in the meta-regression analysis, 
author(s), sample and year of publication
Author(s) Sample
Coverage
Time 
Period
Author(s) Sample 
Coverage
Time 
Period
Ahluwalia 
(1976)
Numerous 
countries
1960s-
1970s
Gupta, Davoodi 
and Terme 
(2002)
Numerous 
countries
1980-
1997
Ahluwalia 
(1976a)
Numerous 
countries 
1960s-
1970s
Higgins and 
Williamson 
(1999)
Numerous 
countries
1960s-
1990s
Aigner and 
Heins (1967)
US 1960s Janvary and 
Sadoulet (2000)
USA 1970-
1994
Ashby and 
Sobel (2007)
US 1980-
2003
Jha (1996) Numerous 
countries
1960-
1992
Barro (2000) Numerous 
countries 
1960-
1990
Keller (2009) Numerous 
countries
1970-
2000
Beck et.al 
(2007)
Numerous 1960-
2005
Koechlin and 
Leon (2007)
Numerous 
countries
1970-
2001
Bourguignon 
and Morrison 
(1990)
Developing 1960s-
1980s
Kumba (2009) Indonesia 1996-
2005
Braun (1991) US 1979 Lundberg and 
Squire (2003)
Numerous 
countries
1960s-
1990s
Breen and 
Penalosa 
(2005)
Numerous 
countries
1960-
1990
Motonishi 
(2006)
Thailand 1975-
1998
Brempong 
(2002)
African 1993-
2002
Nielsen and 
Alderson (1995)
Numerous 
countries
1952-
1988
Calderon and 
Chong (2009)
Numerous 
countries
1970-
2000
Nord (1980) USA 1960-
1970
Carter (2006) Numerous 
countries 
1975-
2004
Nord (1980a) USA 1960-
1970
Carvajal and 
Geithman 
(1978)
US 1960s Nord (1980b) USA 1960-
1970
Chambers 
(2010)
Numerous 
countries
1960-
1990
Odedokun and 
Round (2004)
African 1960s-
1990s
Checchi 
(2001)
Numerous 
countries
1970-
1995
Papanek and 
Kyn (1985)
Numerous 
countries
1952-
1978
Chiswick 
(1971)
Numerous 
countries
1950-
1960
Park (1996) Numerous 
countries
1960s-
1980s
Chong (2004) Numerous 
countries
1960-
1997
Park (1998) Numerous 
countries
1960-
2006
Chong, 
Gradstein and 
Calderon 
(2009)
Numerous 
countries
1971-
2002
Partridge, 
Partridge and 
Rickman (1998)
USA 1960-
1990
Cloutier 
(1996)
US 1979-
1990
Perugini and 
Martino (2008)
European 
Union
1995-
2000
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Conlisk 
(1967)
US 1960 Pose and Tselios 
(2009)
European 
Union
1995-
2000
Edwards 
(1997)
Numerous 
countries
1970s-
1980s
Psacharopoulus 
(1977)
Numerous 
countries
1970s
Glaeser, Matt 
and Kristina 
(2009)
US 1980-
2000
Ram (1981) Numerous 
countries
1970-
1975
Gregorio and 
Lee (2002)
Numerous 
countries
1960 &
1990
Ram (1984) Developed 
countries
1970s
Gupta and 
Singh (1984)
Numerous 
countries
1960-
1970
Rodgers (1983) Numerous 
countries
1970
Savvides 
(1998)
Numerous 
countries
1970s-
1990s
Tsai (1995) Developing 
countries
1960s-
1990s
Scully (2003) US 1960-
1990
Tsakloglou 
(1988)
Numerous 
countries
1950-
1975
Silva (2007) African 1997-
2000
Tselios (2008) European 
Union
1996-
2000
Stano (1981) US 1970 Tselios (2009) European 
Union
1995-
2000
Sylwester 
(2002)
Numerous 
countries
1960 &
1990
Winegarden 
(1979)
Numerous 
countries
1960s
Sylwester 
(2003)
Numerous 
countries
1960s-
1990s
Xu and Zou 
(2000)
China 1985-
1995
Sylwester 
(2003a)
Numerous 
countries
1970-
1990
Yorukoglu 
(2002)
USA 2000
Sylwester 
(2005)
Numerous 
countries
1970-
1989
Rahmah (2000) Malaysia 1970-
1995
Notes: Numerous countries means the sample cover both developed and developing countries. 
Source:  Authors’ compilation. See Bibliography for full references.
Chapter 5
 
128
 
Table 5B: Meta-regression variable definitions: education and inequality studies
VARIABLE 
NAME
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION (N=892)
Mean S.D
Partial 
Correlation
Partial correlation of the effect of education on inequality. This 
is the dependent variable in the MRA
0.023 0.257
Publication
Standard 
Error
Standard error of partial correlation. Used to correct publication 
selection bias.
0.511 8.574
SSCI Social Science Citation Impact Factor 1.155 0.980
Unpublished BD = 1: Study is unpublished 0.061 0.240
Development
Journal
BD = 1: Study published in a development journal (economics 
journal is the base)
0.258 0.438
Sociology
Journal
BD = 1: Study published in a sociology journal (economics 
journal is the base)
0.067 0.251
Inequality Measures
Gini BD=1: Gini coefficient (used as the base) 0.478 0.500
Income Share 
Top
BD=1: Income share of the top quintile  0.102 0.303
Income Share 
Middle
BD=1: Income share of the middle quintile  0.036 0.186
Income Share 
Bottom
BD=1: Income share of the bottom quintile 0.147 0.354
Income Share 
Ratio
BD=1: Income ratio between the top and the bottom quintile 0.054 0.226
Theil Index BD=1: Theil index 0.152 0.360
Other 
Inequality
BD=1: Other inequality measures, such as the Atkinson index 0.024 0.152
Education Measures
Primary 
School
BD=1:  Primary school enrolment or attainment (used as the 
base)
0.078 0.269
Secondary
School
BD=1 Secondary school enrolment or attainment 0.383 0.486
Tertiary 
School
BD=1: Tertiary school enrolment or attainment 0.124 0.330
Education 
Attainment
BD=1: Education enrolment/attainment 0.229 0.420
Education 
Inequality
BD=1: Education inequality 0.147 0.354
Literacy BD=1: Literacy rate 0.062 0.241
Location
Latin America BD=1: Countries in Latin American region included in samples 
(used as the base)
0.575 0.495
Asia BD=1: Countries in Asian region included in samples 0.687 0.464
Africa BD=1: Countries in African region included in samples 0.582 0.494
Developed BD=1: Developed countries included in samples 0.737 0.441
Socialist BD=1: Socialist countries included in samples 0.081 0.273
Estimator
Non OLS BD=1: Non-OLS estimator used (such as 2/3SLS, GMM and 
ML)
0.433 0.496
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Types of Data
Cross Section BD=1: Cross sectional data used (used as the base) 0.535 0.499
Panel Data BD=1: Panel data used 0.533 0.499
NoCountries Number of countries included in the sample 39.52 30.59
NoYears Number of years of data used in the sample 21.35 12.66
YearData Average year of data used in the study 1982 10.79
Socioeconomics and Political Variables
Democracy BD=1: Degree of democracy included as a control variable 0.107 0.309
Political
Stability
BD=1: Political stability included as an explanatory variable 0.020 0.141
Government BD=1: Government expenditure (welfare, public administration 
and government transfers) included as an explanatory variable
0.213 0.410
EcoFreedom BD=1: Economic freedom included as an explanatory variables 0.094 0.292
Liberalization BD=1: Liberalization measures (such as trade and openness, 
foreign direct investment and patents) included as explanatory 
variables
0.202 0.402
Labour BD=1: Labour force structure, womens’ access in labour market 
and labour regulation, included as explanatory variables
0.098 0.297
Employment BD=1: Employment included as an explanatory variable 0.109 0.315
Non-
Agricultural 
Sector
BD=1: Non-agricultural sector such as manufacturing, services, 
wholesale and urbanization, included as explanatory variables
0.196 0.311
Land and 
Natural 
Resources
BD=1: Land and natural resources included as explanatory 
variables
0.058 0.234
Demographic BD=1: Demographic variables such as age, population, black 
and female included as explanatory variables
0.241 0.428
Notes: BD means binary dummy, with a value of 1 if condition is fulfilled and zero otherwise.
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CHAPTER 6
KUZNETS’ CURVE1
6.1 Introduction 
In his Presidential address delivered to the American Economic Association in 
1955, Simon Kuznets postulated a relationship between economic growth and 
inequality, asking: ‘Does inequality in the distribution of income increase or decrease in 
the course of a country's economic growth?’ (Kuznets, 1955:1). Kuznets argued that 
inequality worsens initially as economic growth takes off but then decreases as growth 
continues beyond a certain threshold. Using income distribution data for developed 
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, Kuznets found 
that inequality increased at the beginning of their development and subsequently
declined as these countries became wealthier. 
Kuznets argued that this non-linear pattern in income inequality emerges from 
fundamental structural change, such as the modernization or urbanization process. 
Income inequality is usually lower in rural areas as most people are involved in similar 
economic activities, predominantly in agriculture. In contrast, per capita income in 
urban areas is generally based on skills and entrepreneurship and tends to increase faster 
than in the agricultural rural areas, resulting in an overall increase in income inequality. 
Thus, ‘…the increasing weight of urban population means an increasing share for the 
more unequal of the two component distributions’2 (Kuznets, 1955:8). Inequality is 
greater in the non-agricultural sector because of greater variation in production 
techniques and differences in skills; these eventually generate diversity and divergence 
in incomes. Therefore, when a country develops from an agrarian economy to a more 
modern one, income inequality is expected to increase. Ultimately, however, inequality 
starts to decline as education and urbanization provide opportunities for people from 
lower income groups to successfully move up the social hierarchy and improve their 
relative economic position. This process helps to reduce the gap between upper and 
lower income groups. 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Asia Pacific Week 2010 at the Australian National 
University, February 7-11, 2010.
2 This refers to the distribution between urban and rural areas.
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The aim of this chapter is to test the Kuznets hypothesis for Malaysia and 
Southeast Asia. The following chapter explores the path of regional inequality in 
Malaysia. Southeast Asia is one of the fastest growing regions in the world. Since the 
1970s, several countries in Southeast Asia have recorded rapid economic growth. As a 
result, this region has received a great deal of attention from individual researchers and 
international development institutions (Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, 1995; Booth, 1999).
Although this region has recorded high rates of economic growth, inequality does not 
appear to follow the classic path predicted by Kuznets. Indeed, these countries appear to
follow a wide range of patterns. For example, Figure 6.1 shows a steady decline in 
inequality in Malaysia (fitted using lowess smoother), while Figure 6.2 shows that 
inequality in Singapore appears to have followed a U-shaped curve, rather than the 
expected inverted U-shape.3 In contrast, Figure 6.3 shows a Kuznets type curve for 
Thailand.
This chapter makes three important contributions to the literature. First, it reports 
estimates of the Kuznets curve for Southeast Asia. The Kuznets hypothesis has been
tested extensively, but relatively little is known about Southeast Asia. 
Figure 6.1:  Inequality (Gini Coefficient) and development, Malaysia, 1960-2009
3 Removing the very first observation in the figure (for 1966) makes this U-shape look less pronounced. 
However, inequality in Singapore fell during the years from 1972 to 1980, before rising since then.
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Figure 6.2:  Inequality (Gini Coefficient) and development, Singapore, 1966-2005
Figure 6.3: Inequality (Gini Coefficient) and development, Thailand, 1962-2004
While a handful of studies on Southeast Asia have focused on individual 
countries,4 there is currently no study of Kuznets’ hypothesis for the broader Southeast 
Asia region. This chapter extends prior research by presenting estimates for both 
4 These include: for Malaysia (Anand, 1983; Perumal, 1989; Randolph, 1990; Shireen, 1998), Indonesia 
(Ritonga, 2005; van der Eng, 2009), Thailand (Ikemoto and Uehara, 2000), and the Philippines (Estudillo, 
1997). See Table 1 for other studies.
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individual countries and for the entire Southeast Asia region. It is important to know 
whether the hypothesis is universal and applicable anywhere or if ‘the Kuznets’ curve is 
neither a law nor even a central tendency’5. Do newly developing countries follow the 
path of the early developers (the now developed economies)? If newly developed 
countries follow a similar path, then this adds weight to the universality of the Kuznets 
curve. If they do not, then either there is no universal pattern, or governments might 
have learnt from the experience of the early developers and taken actions to avert a 
Kuznets association. 
Second, most of the previous studies on the Kuznets hypothesis for Southeast 
Asia used either a descriptive analysis (e.g. a simple scatter of the data or a description 
of trends in inequality data) or simple econometric methods, mainly because of the 
limited number of observations. However, with the availability of new datasets from the 
World Bank and the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United 
Nations University (UNU-WIDER), more observations are now available and it is 
possible to make use of panel data. This chapter test Kuznets’ hypothesis using both 
homogenous and heterogenous panel data estimators.
Third, previous studies have used a limited set of econometric specifications, 
typically GDP per capita (or growth) and its square as independent variables. This 
chapter expands the empirical analysis by considering specifications that include the 
effect of urbanization and employment in the non-agricultural sector.
The chapter is set out as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief review of the 
evidence on Kuznets’ hypothesis. The results are presented in Section 6.3. Explanations 
for the results are presented in Section 6.4, while Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. This 
chapter uses similar data as discussed in Chapter 4.
6.2 Literature Review: Is the Path of Inequality Non-Linear?
Kuznets’ hypothesis has attracted a great deal of attention from researchers, 
particularly those working in the areas of development, economic growth and inequality. 
In the more than 50 years since Kuznets’ presidential address in 1955, hundreds of 
studies have been undertaken related to his hypothesis. The Social Science Citation 
Index records more than 500 articles that have discussed the hypothesis (Moran, 
5 Statement by Gary S. Fields cited in Moran (2005, p. 232).
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2005:210). After Kuznets postulated his idea, economists (including those from 
international institutions such as The World Bank), commenced collecting time series 
and cross sectional data in order to test the hypothesis. Kravis (1960) was the earliest 
scholar to attempt to empirically confirm the Kuznets hypothesis. His findings were 
subsequently supported by numerous studies in the 1970s. One of the most influential 
early studies was Ahluwalia (1976). Ahluwalia used cross sectional data on inequality 
and GNP per capita for 60 countries and found that ‘inequality tends to widen in the 
early stages of development, with a reversal of this tendency in the later stages’ 
(Ahluwalia, 1976:309).  In contrast, Wright (1978) examined Kuznets’ hypothesis using 
cross sectional data on personal income before tax for 56 countries in 1965 and found 
that the results did not support Kuznets’ hypothesis.
The Availability of New Datasets 
While it received much support during the 1960s and 1970s, the Kuznets 
hypothesis has increasingly been challenged since the 1980s. With the accumulation of 
data, researchers have been able to use time series data rather than depending on cross 
sectional data, and many have used panel data to test the hypothesis. With the 
availability of ‘high-quality’ income distribution datasets (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 
1996), came a generation of new evidence challenging the Kuznets hypothesis. 
The new empirical evidence since the 1990s has tended to reject Kuznets’ 
hypothesis. Many studies suggest that the relationship between income levels and 
inequality is ambiguous, without a clear or systematic relationship.6 The evidence from 
several countries, particularly for East Asia, challenges the hypothesis of the inverted U-
curve hypothesis as providing an adequate description of the relationship between 
growth and inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002:184). Several countries in East 
Asia including Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea have managed to control inequality 
despite experiencing rapid economic growth (Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, 1995). In fact, 
The World Bank, (1993:29) found declining trends of inequality all over the East Asian 
region (Korzeniewicz and Moran, 2005:285).        
6 See, for example: Anand and Kanbur (1993a,b); Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire (1998); Deininger and 
Squire (1996, 1998); Kim (1997); Li, Squire and Zau (1998); Lipton (1997); Ram (1988; 1997); and
Ravallion (1995).
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For certain countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, India, Korea and Japan, the 
evidence points to an inverted-U curve, consistent with Kuznets’ hypothesis. In contrast, 
results for China and Taiwan, for instance, are inconsistent with the hypothesis 
(Chotikapanich and Rao, 1998; Fields, 2001:45). Deininger and Squire (1998:279) used 
a large time series dataset based on per capita income for developed and developing 
countries and found that the Kuznets hypothesis only appeared statistically significant in 
10% of the countries tested: about 10% showed a U-shaped pattern, while more than 
80% had a weak quadratic shape (Fields, 2001:45). Fields (2001) concludes that data for
developing countries does not seem to support Kuznets’ hypothesis. A recent study by 
Angeles (2009) employs country panel data derived from the World Development 
Indicators 2006. Despite developing an ‘alternative method’, which used employment 
outside agriculture as the explanatory variable instead of GDP per capita, the results 
also fail to confirm the Kuznets hypothesis. 
Prior Studies for Southeast Asia
In contrast to other regions, only a handful of studies explore the Kuznets 
hypothesis for Southeast Asia. Except for a few studies in Malaysia, most of these rely 
on a descriptive assessment of the hypothesis. Their results have generally not been 
confirmed using econometric methods. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the extant studies of the Kuznets hypothesis for Southeast 
Asia. There is support for the Kuznets hypothesis for Indonesia and for Viet Nam,
though these studies do not formally test the hypothesis. However, the results for other 
countries are inconsistent and most of the studies fail to confirm the Kuznets hypothesis.   
Several studies have been conducted to test Kuznets’ hypothesis for Malaysia. 
Anand (1983) tested the Kuznets hypothesis using state level cross sectional data and 
found that the results did not support the hypothesis. However, Perumal (1989) used 
regressions on different indices of inequality, for example the ratio of mean and median 
of household income against per capita income; these results are consistent with 
Kuznets’ hypothesis. Randolph (1990) used the Malaysia Lifetime Family Survey data 
1977 and found that the Kuznets curve is U-shaped rather than the expected inverted U. 
Shireen (1998) also had similar findings to Randolph (1990). Shireen (1998) argued that 
the relationship between inequality and GDP persisted, but in the opposite direction to 
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Kuznets’ hypothesis. Based on data from Mukhopadhaya (2001), Dhamani (2008) plots 
GDP growth against growth in Gini coefficient in Singapore and finds the result 
inconclusive with regard to the Kuznets hypothesis.
Table 6.1: Studies of the Kuznets hypothesis for Southeast Asia
Country Author(s) Type of 
data
Time 
period
Method Estimate 
of  b1
Estimate of  
b2
R² Kuznets’
hypothesis 
supported?
Indonesia van der Eng 
(2009)
Time Series 1970-
1997
Descriptive - - - Yes
Ritonga 
(2005)
Time Series 1970-
1997
Descriptive - - - Yes
Malaysia Anand 
(1983)
Cross-
sectional 
1970 OLS 0.0011
(0.42)
0.00003
(0.20)
0.59 No
Perumal
(1989)
Time Series 1957-
1984
Model 
A
Model 
B
OLS
OLS
0.000585
(3.32)
0.000162
(3.66)
-0.00000020
(-2.93)
-0.00000003
(-3.46)
0.81
0.78
Yes
Yes
Randolph 
(1990)
Time Series 1968-
1976
OLS -0.00821
(-3.81)
0.000866
(4.13)
0.67 No
Shireen 
(1998)
Cross-
sectional 
1984
1987
1989
OLS
OLS
OLS
-0.992
(-1.88)
-36E-05
(-1.41)
-0.028
(-1.64)
0.0619
(1.63)
5.2E-09
(1.87)
3.4E-07
(92.14)
0.39
0.53
0.56
No
No
No
Philippines Estudillo 
(1997)
Time Series 1961-
1991
Descriptive - - - No
Singapore Dhamani 
(2008)
Time Series 1975-
1997
Descriptive - - - No
Thailand Ikemoto 
and Uehara 
(2000)
Time Series 1981-
1998
Descriptive - - - No
Vietnam Cuong, 
Truong and 
van der 
Weide
(2010)
Cross-
sectional 
2006 Descriptive - - - Yes
Notes: The specification used for econometric studies is I = b0 + b1X1 + b2X12 where, I=Inequality and X1
is Income. The Kuznets hypothesis requires b1 to be positive and b2 to be negative. Figures in brackets are 
t-statistics. The studies listed above measure X as either household income or GDP per capita. Descriptive 
studies use either a simple graph or describe patterns in the inequality data.
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Small sample size has probably contributed to the inconsistent and poor results. 
For example, in the case of Malaysia, Randolph (1990) only used 9 observations. Anand 
(1983) and Shireen (1998) used state cross sectional data with only 12 observations. 
Perumal (1989) used less than 10 time series observations. Therefore, it is possible that 
the results might vary purely because of sampling error. 
It is important to note that the relationship Kuznets hypothesised is only one 
possible determinant of income inequality. Table 6.2 reports the results from several 
studies that have explored other determinants of inequality in various Southeast Asian 
countries. The table shows that factors such as education, occupation, employment, and 
geographical factors (urban and rural) are important determinants of inequality for 
Southeast Asian economies. Percentages differ across countries, but in some cases 
education explains up to 50 percent of income inequality. 
Like all hypotheses, the Kuznets process is an empirical matter. Inequality is a
complex process. In practice, the path taken by inequality might very well diverge from 
what Kuznets speculated: The Kuznets curve might not be an unavoidable by-product of 
development. The key feature of the Kuznets curve is demographic changes that shift 
inequality. Many factors could mitigate this. For example, the “growth with equity” 
literature suggests that it is possible to avoid the pattern altogether. Moran (2005, p. 228) 
argues that a strong agricultural sector and egalitarian land ownership can negate the 
pattern. Indeed, any process that narrows urban-rural income differentials will do so. For 
example, trade can reduce wage inequality if demand for unskilled labor rises relative to 
skilled labour. Further, initial conditions might make a difference. For example, the 
initial degree of inequality might shape the subsequent path of inequality. If the initial 
level of inequality is relatively high, then development might result in a lowering of 
inequality. Similarly, the initial degree of land inequality can moderate the subsequent 
path of income inequality.
Deininger and Squire (1998: 276) argue that the nature of technology 
(particularly the degree of divisibility of new technologies) and the extent of 
international capital mobility have contributed to “eliminating the historical link 
between growth and inequality”. 
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Table 6.2: Determinants of inequality in Southeast Asia, decomposition studies 
using Household Survey Data
Country Author(s) Inequality 
Determinants
Contribution Period Data Sources 
and No. of 
Observation
Indonesia Armida et. al 
(2008)
Wage and Salary
Education
Occupation
Employment 
sectors
43%
24-29%
20-25%
17-27%
1996-
1999
Indonesian 
Family Life 
Survey
n = 6726
Akita and 
Lukman 
(1999)
Spatial (Urban and 
Rural) 
23-25% 1987-
1993
National Socio-
economic Survey 
(SUSENAS), 
Indonesia 
n = 65000
Cameron 
(2000)
Education
Industrial sectors
Age
51%
19%
6%
1984-
1990
Statistical 
Yearbook of 
Indonesia
n = 6300
Malaysia Anand (1983) Occupation
Gender
Spatial (Urban and 
Rural)
Employment 
Sector
32%
7-9%
10%
16-19%
1970 Post-
Enumeration 
Survey (PES)
n = 25023
Shireen 
(1998)
Ethnic groups
Location
7-20%
9-16%
1979-
1989
Household 
Income Survey
n = 60000
Singapore Chia and 
Chen (2008)
Education
Occupation
Industry
29-34%
30-50%
2-5%
1979-
2001
Report on the 
Labour Force 
Survey 
n = 624083 
(1979) and              
n = 2046743 
(2001)
Thailand Israngkura 
(2008)
Urbanization
Regional
Education 
Employment
13-20%
16-21%
15-24%
16-23%
1986-
2000
Socio-Economic 
Survey (SES)
n = 25000 
Philippines Balisacan and 
Piza (2008)
Urban and Rural 
Education
19-22%
30-37%
1985-
2000
Family Income 
and Expenditure 
Survey
n = 16971 (1985) 
and 39615 (2000)
Vietnam Huong (2008) Agriculture
Manufacturing
Services
Other
12-21%
19-27%
36-37%
23-25%
1992-
1998
Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey
n = 4800-6000
Molini and 
Wan (2008)
Location
Community 
Facilities
Household 
structure
Education
31-33%
17-21%
16-17%
7-8%
1993, 
1998
Vietnamese 
Living Standards 
Surveys
n =3800-4300
Notes:  Cells report the percentage of each factor to inequality. The total can be less or more than 100% 
due to different subgroup decomposition.  Source: Compiled by author.
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Moreover, there is nothing inherently set in stone about the hypothesis. Thus, even if the 
Kuznets curve did exist, there is nothing inherent in the Kuznets hypothesis that suggests 
the relationship between inequality and income cannot change over time.
6.3 Econometric Specification
The World Bank (1993) classified Singapore as one of the Four Tigers, together 
with Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea. Meanwhile the other Southeast Asian 
countries (Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) are known as the newly industrial 
economies (NIEs). As shown in Table 4.9, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand are the most developed of the Southeast Asian countries. They
are usually labeled as high performing East Asian economies (World Bank, 1993) and 
have attracted attention from scholars in various fields. The necessary data for these 
countries is more readily available compared to other poorer countries in this region.
The approach here is to offer four sets of estimates. First, this study reports
country specific Kuznets’ curves for the five most developed countries for which there 
are sufficient time series observations. Second, combine these five countries into a 
pooled dataset and use panel data techniques to estimate the Kuznets curve. Third, 
construct a second pooled dataset that includes all Southeast Asian countries, including 
the countries for which we have few observations. Fourth, excludes Singapore from the 
pooled dataset. The sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of Singapore is justified on 
the grounds that its rural sector is minimal and also because we have many more 
observations from Singapore and, hence, wish to ensure that the results are not driven by 
the inclusion of this country.
As already noted, previous studies on the Kuznets hypothesis in Southeast Asia 
(Table 6.1) had access to a smaller number of observations: Studies such as Perumal 
(1989), Randolph (1990) and Shiren (1998), used less than ten observations. The 
availability of a new dataset from UNU-WIDER, with a larger number of observations,
enables us to revisit these earlier studies using longer time series, as well as to exploit 
the advantages of panel data. Moreover, panel data allows us to pool the data and exploit 
the similarity of individual or country specific patterns, producing more accurate 
predictions (Hsiao, 2007:5). However, if countries included in the panel differ widely, it 
may not be wise to pool data. This issue is discussed in panel data's section below.
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Due to differences in definitions and data collection problems, inequality data are
also subject to measurement errors. Most of the countries in Southeast Asia (except 
Indonesia) derive inequality coefficients based on income data, but the coverage of and 
definition of income differs. Inequality data in Singapore is mainly based on salary 
income but in other countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, inequality data is based 
on household income. The differences in definition and coverage of income may affect
the value of the Gini coefficients.7 Since this paper is a cross country study, these 
conceptual problems might introduce measurement errors in the panel data analysis. A 
fixed effect panel data estimator is an efficient tool to deal with the unobserved errors 
term (Forbes, 2000). 
Econometric Specification
Kuznets did not actually test his hypothesis empirically. He instead gave a 
numerical example comparing developed countries since the 1800s with less developed 
countries. Since then many economists have tested his hypothesis empirically. A 
standard way to explore the Kuznets hypothesis using time series data for an individual 
country is to estimate the following equation:8
tttt uGDPGDPI  2210 EEE (1)
Where, I is an inequality index, GDP is GDP per capita at constant price, u is the error 
term, and t denotes time. The cross section version uses cross country data and replaces t 
with a country index, i. For fixed effects panel data estimation, the Kuznets hypothesis is 
tested using the following equation:
itiititiit uvGDPGDPI  221 EED (2)
ZKHUH Ȟ DUH IL[HG HIIHFWV9 Note that equations 1 and 2 are models of unconditional 
Kuznets’ curves: they do not include any other explanatory variables. The conditional 
models are discussed in Section 6.5 below.
7 See for example Anand and Kanbur (1993b), Fields (1994), Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998) and 
Asian Development Bank (2007) for detailed discussions on the problems of inequality measurement.  
8 This is the traditional specification of Kuznets’ curve. The literature includes alternative specifications. 
For example, the income square term can be replaced with the inverse of income and it is possible to alter 
the specification to allow for more than one turning point. 
9 Fixed time period effects can also be included. This chapter presents both time series and panel data 
estimates. There are not enough observations for Southeast Asia for a cross-sectional analysis. This is not 
a major limitation, as we are more interested in the intertemporal pattern of income inequality.
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Authors such as Ahluwalia (1976), Barro (2000), and Frazer (2006) estimate 
these equations in natural log form. Anand and Kanbur (1993a) suggest that different 
functional forms might influence the overall results. In some cases, different functional 
forms change the curve’s shape and statistical significance level (see Fields, 2001). 
Deininger and Squire (1998) found that the Kuznets hypothesis was supported when 
they used pooled OLS but rejected when they included fixed effects. In contrast, Barro 
(2000: 25-28) found that the Kuznets hypothesis persists in similar specifications even 
after considering country fixed effects and time dimensions.
In order to make the analysis more comprehensive and consistent with the 
Kuznets process, several authors, for instance Ahluwalia (1976) and Angeles (2009), 
have used alternative explanatory variables, such as economic growth, non-agricultural 
employment and the proportion of urban population. Kuznets’ hypothesis is confirmed if 
the coefficient of explanatory variables and its square have positive and negative signs,
respectively. However, the estimated turning point is also important in identifying the 
practical importance of Kuznets’ curve.
This study uses various econometric specifications in order to explore the 
robustness of the results. Inequality is measured using Gini coefficients. While other 
measures of inequality are available, there are more observations available for Gini.
While the Gini coefficient has some limitations (e.g. it fails to capture between group 
changes, see Lambert and Aronson, 1993; Leigh, 2007), it remains one of the most 
popular inequality measures when testing Kuznets’ hypothesis. For the observations that 
are available (all observations for all Southeast Asian countries grouped together), the 
correlation coefficient between Gini and the income of the top 10% is 0.82, while the 
correlation coefficient between Gini and the income of the bottom 10% is -0.59. Hence, 
the Gini coefficient offers a reasonable and representative measure of the degree of 
inequality for the countries under investigation.
GDP per capita is measured in US dollars at constant prices (2000 as base year). 
Employment in the non-agricultural sector is measured as a percent of total employment. 
Urban population is measured in millions. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the data on 
inequality are mainly compiled from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID2) on 
the UNU-WIDER website. The data on GDP per capita, economic growth, employment 
and urbanization are accessed from WDI Online 2010, World Bank (2010) website. 
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Descriptive statistics of the inequality and output data used are presented in 
Table 4.9, reporting means and standard deviations of the main variables. Table 4.9
shows that Singapore has the fastest economic growth with the economy growing at 
7.9% per annum. Malaysia ranked second. The key question asked in this chapter is 
whether this growth performance has resulted in a Kuznets curve.
6.4 Kuznets’ Curves in Southeast Asia?10
GDP per capita as the Explanatory Variable11
The most common specification used to test the Kuznets hypothesis involves 
inequality measured using the Gini coefficient, with GDP per capita as the proxy for 
economic development. Kuznets’ hypothesis is supported if the coefficient 1E is 
positive and 2E is negative and both are statistically significant different from zero (see 
equations 1 and 2). Multicollinearity can be a problem when non-linear terms are 
included. Hence, this chapter also conducts Wald tests for the joint significance of the 
linear and non-linear terms. Table 6.3 reports the regression results when real GDP per 
capita is used as the explanatory variable. 
The first five rows report the country specific estimates, while the next three 
rows report the pooled results. The Kuznets hypothesis is supported for Thailand and for 
the Pooled OLS results when the less developed countries of the region are included (see 
last two rows in Table 6.3). The problem, however, is that these results are very 
sensitivity to the inclusion of countries. For example, re-estimating the last two rows of 
10 Diagnostic tests reveal that all the data used in this chapter to test Kuznets’ hypothesis has no first order 
serial correlation but it does have a heteroskedasticity problem. Since the data has a heteroskedasticity 
problem and no significant autocorrelation, then it is sufficient to use robust standard errors. All the 
estimates reported in this chapter use robust standard errors. An example of the diagnostic tests is reported 
in Appendix B.
11 The focus of this chapter is the exploration of the robustness of Kuznets’ hypothesis using different 
types of regression models as suggested in the extant literature. Therefore, all results have been reported 
and there is no discrimination between using GDPpc and logGDPpc even though the results are quite 
different. The issue of either GDPpc or logGDPpc is right or wrong is not applicable here, as the main 
objective of the chapter is to test various versions of Kuznets’ hypothesis. The distribution of logGDPpc is 
better than the GDPpc. This can also be seen from the explanatory power of R2. If the best model selection 
is the main objective, then the specification using logGDPpc is preferable. The usage of logGDPpc and 
GDPpc in Chapter 6 and 7 are driven by a ‘specific objective’, particularly to adopt consistent models in 
both chapters, as these two chapters are related to each other. In Chapter 8, growth was used to minimize 
model empirical issues e.g. multicollinearity. The VIF test reveals that the multicollinearity is very much 
higher using GDPpc and lnGDPpc compared to when growth is used as the dependent variable.
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Table 6.3 after removing Viet Nam from the sample sees a rejection of Kuznets’ 
hypothesis. 
Table 6.3: GDP per capita as the explanatory variable
Country Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant
(1)
GDPpc
(2)
GDPpc²
(3)
Adjusted
R²
Wald Test Supports 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
Indonesia 0.402*** -0.185 0.148 0.029 0.314 No
(n=17) (6.19) (-0.78) (0.73) [0.74]
Malaysia 0.543*** -0.020 -0.0002 0.401 5.472 No
(n=14) (12.16) (-0.63) (-0.05) [0.02]
Philippines 0.869** -0.916 0.539 0.132 0.765 No
(n=11) (2.37) (-0.99) (0.96) [0.50]
Singapore 0.469*** -0.004 0.0002** 0.544 41.28 No
(n=35) (20.73) (-1.42) (2.54) [0.00]
Thailand 0.297*** 0.368*** -0.132*** 0.400 20.742 Yes
(n=18) (7.89) (4.14) (-3.18) [0.00]
Pooled OLS 
Five
0.446***
(36.18)
0.001
(0.63)
0.00002
(0.24)
0.024 7.94
[0.00]
No
(n=95)
Pooled OLS 
All (n=107)
0.432***
(40.51)
0.004**
(1.98)
-0.00007
(-0.90)
0.057 3.900
[0.05]
Weak
Pooled OLS
ex Singapore
0.352***
(22.21)
0.132***
(5.92)
-0.025***
(-5.06)
0.331 20.78
[0.00]
Yes
(n=72)
Notes:  Coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are multiplied by 1000. Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust 
standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Wald test provides a 
test for the joint statistical significance of the linear and non-linear terms. Figures in square brackets are prob-values. n 
denotes the number of observations. The first set of pooled OLS results relate to the 5 main countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). The second set of results includes also Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. 
The final set of results excludes Singapore.
lnGDP per capita as the Explanatory Variable
Following Ram (1988; 1991; 1997), Thornton (2001) and Frazer (2006), Table 
6.4 reports the results when the natural logarithm of GDP per capita is used as the 
explanatory variable to test Kuznets’ hypothesis. There is now evidence for the Kuznets 
hypothesis for Malaysia and Thailand (again), and also when all countries are pooled. In 
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the case of Malaysia and Thailand, the lnGDP variables have the expected sign but they 
are each individually not statistically significant, though they are jointly statistically 
significant.
Table 6.4: lnGDP per capita as the explanatory variable
Country Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant
(1)
lnGDPpc
(2)
lnGDPpc²
(3)
Adjusted
R²
Wald Test Support 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
Indonesia -0.374 0.252 -0.022 0.121 0.137 No
(n=17) (-0.21) (0.42) (-0.43) [0.87]
Malaysia 0.249 0.116 -0.011 0.395 4.660 Yes 
(n=14) (0.15) (0.27) (-0.39) [0.03]
Singapore 4.338*** -0.866*** 0.048*** 0.624 30.635 No 
(n=35) (7.84) (-7.09) (7.19) [0.00]
Thailand -2.691 0.888* -0.061 0.265 10.440 Yes 
(n=18) (-1.61) (1.75) (-1.61) [0.01]
Philippines 17.892 -5.180 0.386 -0.111 0.993 No 
(n=11) (1.15) (-1.11) (1.10) [0.41]
Pooled 
OLS
-0.396**
(-2.03)
0.208***
(4.12)
-0.012***
(-3.87)
0.200 14.148
[0.00]
Yes 
Pooled 
OLS
All (n=107)
-0.370**
(-2.00)
0.200***
(4.13)
-0.012***
(-3.81)
0.253 16.90
[0.00]
Yes
Pooled 
OLS
excluding 
Singapore
-0.952***
(-2.10)
0.368***
(2.76)
-0.024***
(-2.43)
0.306 18.56
[0.00]
Yes
(n=72)
Notes:  Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical significance of the linear and non-
linear terms. Figures in square brackets are prob-values. n denotes the number of observations. The first set of pooled 
OLS results relate to the 5 main countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). The second set 
of results includes also Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The final set of results excludes Singapore.
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Growth as the Explanatory Variable
As already noted, Southeast Asia is one of the fastest growing regions in the 
world. Economic growth has averaged around 4-8% annually. As noted earlier, Kuznets 
framed his hypothesis in terms of economic growth. The results presented in Table 6.5
show that the expected inverted-U curve appears only for Indonesia and the Philippines.     
Table 6.5: Growth as the explanatory variable
Country Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant
(1)
Growth
(2)
Growth²
(3)
Adjusted
R²
Wald Test Support 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
Indonesia 
(n=17)
0.303***
(18.11)
0.012
(0.573)
-0.001
(-0.35)
-0.009 4.213
[0.04]
Yes
Malaysia 0.064** 0.051 0.004 0.060 0.933 No
(n=13) (2.03) (0.59) (0.67) [0.43]
Singapore 0.475*** -0.002 0.00002 0.002 1.206 No
(n=35) (67.99) (-0.76) (0.09) [0.31]
Thailand 0.436*** 0.011 -0.0004 -0.081 0.556 No
(n=18) (5.48) (0.51) (-0.31) [0.58]
Philippines 0.529*** 0.0003 -0.001** 0.317 10.020 Yes
(n=11) (24.89) (0.19) (-2.55) [0.00]
Pooled 
OLS 
(n=94)
0.447***
(33.96)
-0.001
(-0.54)
0.0003
(1.30)
-0.009 0.909
[0.41]
No
Pooled 
OLS
All (n=106)
0.435***
(33.02)
-0.002
(-0.95)
0.0005***
(2.22)
0.014 1.176
[0.28]
No
Pooled 
OLS
excluding 
Singapore
0.414***
(22.42)
-0.0007
(-0.31)
0.0006***
(2.43)
0.021 0.296
(0.59)
No
(n=71)
Notes:  Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical significance of the linear and non-
linear terms. Figures in square brackets are prob-values. n denotes the number of observations. The first set of pooled 
OLS results relate to the 5 main countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). The second set 
of results includes also Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The final set of results excludes Singapore.
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Employment of Non-Agricultural Sector as the Explanatory Variable
Kuznets also argued that changes in inequality result from economic 
transformation from an agricultural based economy to a non-agricultural (industrial and 
services) economy. This economic transformation has occurred in all Southeast Asian
countries. During the 1980s, only 30-40% of workers in Southeast Asia worked in the 
non-agricultural sector. The contribution of the agricultural sector to both GDP and 
employment has declined significantly since the 1980s for all countries (Jomo, 2006). 
Table 6.6: Employment in the non-agricultural sector (nag) as the 
explanatory variable
Notes:  Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical significance of the linear and non-
linear terms. Figures in square brackets are prob-values. n denotes the number of observations. The first set of pooled 
OLS results relate to the 5 main countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). The second set 
of results includes also Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The final set of results excludes Singapore. The employment 
data used to construct this table commence in 1980.
Country Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant
(1)
Nag
(2)
Nag²
(3)
Adjusted 
R²
Wald Test Support 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
Indonesia
(n=8)
-0.129
(-0.11)
0.017
(0.34)
-0.0002
(-0.30)
-0.017 0.929
[0.45]
No
Malaysia
(n=10)
-1.285
(-0.55)
0.050
(0.81)
-0.0003
(-0.86)
0.241 2.997
[0.11]
No
Singapore
(n=25)
-1024.095***
(-6.00)
20.646***
(5.99)
-0.104***
(-5.98)
0.596 279.957
[0.00]
Yes 
Thailand -1.195** 0.085** -0.001*** 0.369 12.082 Yes 
(n=11) (-2.48) (3.86) (-4.11) [0.00]
Philippines -2.896 0.117 -0.001 0.020 5.674 Weak
(n=7) (-1.53) (1.71) (-1.65) [0.07]
Pooled 
OLS
0.612***
(5.69)
-0.005
(-1.52)
0.00003
(1.59)
0.002 1.405
[0.25]
No 
Pooled 
OLS
All (n=65)
0.443***
(3.98)
-0.00007
(-0.02)
0.000003
(0.15)
-0.008 0.0005
[0.98]
No 
Pooled 
OLS ex
Singapore
0.483***
(2.81)
-0.002
(-0.27)
0.00002
(0.37)
-0.042 0.360
[0.70]
No
(n=40)
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Malaysia and Singapore recorded the highest composition of employment in the 
non-agricultural sector with more than 80% of the working population in the non-
agricultural sector. In fact, in land constrained Singapore, almost all employment occurs 
in either services or manufacturing. Meanwhile the composition of non-agricultural 
sector employment in other countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines 
has risen to around 55-65%. 
This rapid expansion of employment in the non-agricultural sector may lead to 
changes in inequality as Kuznets expected. The data here commence from 1980. 
Kuznets’ hypothesis is supported for Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines (Table 
6.6), though the level of statistical significance for the Philippines is rather low.
However, the results for the pooled data do not provide empirical support for the 
Kuznets hypothesis. 
Proportion of Urban Population as the Explanatory Variable
Kuznets also suggested that inequality increases as the proportion of the urban 
population increases, before declining after it exceeds a certain threshold. All countries 
in Southeast Asia have recorded rapid expansion in their urban population. For example, 
in Malaysia, urban population has grown by 2% annually. During the 1960s, only a 
quarter of the population lived in urban areas; by 2008 this had risen to more than 70%. 
Therefore, Kuznets’ hypothesis might be revealed for Southeast Asia countries when 
using the proportion of population that is urbanized as the key explanatory variable. 
Table 6.7 below shows that the Kuznets hypothesis is supported for Malaysia, Thailand 
and when all countries are combined. These results are similar to those found when 
lnGDP was used as the explanatory variable (Table 6.4).
Panel Data Estimates
Fixed and Random effects 
Since the 1990s, the empirical evidence on the Kuznets hypothesis has been varied and 
inconsistent. Indeed, sometimes contradictory evidence is presented using a similar 
dataset, but varying the empirical methodology employed (see Fields, 2001:41-47). 
Fields and Jakubson (1994) tested the Kuznets hypothesis using cross sectional data for 
developing countries and found a significant inverted-U shaped curve only when OLS 
was employed. The results changed to a significant U shape when fixed effect estimation 
Kuznets’ Curve
148
was used. A similar procedure was adopted by Ravallion (1995), Deininger and Squire 
(1998), Schultz (1998) and Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998), using panel data.
Interestingly, their findings were consistent; as Fields (2001:41-42) noted:
…when country fixed effects are included…the coefficients on income and income 
square (or income inverse in some cases) are not statistically significantly different from 
zero at conventional levels.’ 
Table 6.7: Proportion of urban population as the explanatory variable
Country Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables 
Constant 
(1)
Urban 
Population
(2)
Urban 
Population² (3)
Adjusted 
R²
Wald 
Test 
Support 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
Indonesia 
(n=17)
0.450***
(4.25) 
-0.006 
(-0.96)
0.0001 
(0.93)
-0.100 0.459
[0.64]
No
Malaysia
(n=14)
0.549*** 
(4.55)
0.0006 
(-0.01)
-0.00003 
(-0.53)
0.512 7.920
[0.00]
Yes
#Singapore 
(n=35)
0.471*** 
(7.08)
-0.007 
(-1.64)
0.002** 
(2.15)
-0.040 0.364 
[0.70]
No
Thailand 
(n=18)
-0.751 
(-0.98)
0.091 
(1.43)
-0.002 
(-1.27)
0.263 13.446
[0.00]  
Yes
Philippines 
(n=11)
0.682** 
(3.01)
-0.010 
(-0.88)
0.0001 
(0.91)
-0.101 0.511 
[0.62]
No
Pooled OLS 
(n=95)
0.360*** 
(9.95)
0.004**
(2.69)
-0.00003**
(2.55)
0.065 4.07 
[0.02]
Yes
Pooled OLS
All (n=107)
0.342***
(11.74)
0.004***
(3.45)
-0.00003***
(-3.11)
0.118 11.901
[0.00]
Yes
Pooled OLS
ex Singapore
(n=72)
0.273***
(4.79)
0.009**
(2.57)
-0.00009**
(-2.20)
0.113 6.58
[0.01]
Yes
Notes:  Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical significance of the linear and non-
linear terms. Figures in square brackets are prob-values. #Data for Singapore is measured by urban growth, as the
urban proportion for Singapore was 100% since 1960 to 2008. n denotes the number of observations. The first set of 
pooled OLS results relate to the 5 main countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). The 
second set of results includes also Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The final set of results excludes Singapore.
The fixed and random effects and two-way fixed effects results presented in 
Table 6.8 below do not provide support for the Kuznets hypothesis.12 Except for the 
12 The fixed effects estimates control for omitted variables that differ between countries but which are 
constant over time. The fixed time effects control for omitted variables that differ over time but are 
constant between countries.
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fixed effects estimates for the urban population specifications, there is no support for the 
Kuznets hypothesis. Table 6.8 uses data for the 5 most developed countries in the region. 
If data from all countries is combined, there is again no evidence to support Kuznets’ 
hypothesis. Appendix A reports the panel data analysis results from all countries 
combined but excluding Singapore. Interestingly, removing the observations from 
Singapore make some difference. There is now evidence supporting the hypothesis when 
GDP per capita and log GDP per capita are the explanatory variable.13 However, that 
this effect disappears when time dummies are also included.
Table 6.8: Panel data, random, fixed and 2 way fixed effects
(5 most developed countries)
Estimator                                                       Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant GDPpc GDPpc² Adj. R² Wald Test Support?
Random 
Effects
0.461***
(13.64)
-0.004
(-0.63)
0.0000002
(0.24)
0.061 32.668
[0.00]
No
Fixed 
Effects
0.462***
(34.67)
-0.005
(-1.167)
0.0000002*
(1.95)
0.602 30.622
[0.00]
No
2 Way 
Fixed 
Effects
0.473***
(11.28)
-0.009
(-0.77)
0.0000004
(1.26)
0.807 4.536
[ 0.02]
No
Constant lnGDPpc lnGDPpc² Adj. R² Wald Support?
Random 
Effects
0.369*
(1.71)
0.008
(0.15)
0.0005
(0.16)
0.047 3.116
[0.05]
No
Fixed 
Effects
0.464**
(2.10)
-0.019
(-0.36)
0.002
(0.72)
0.583 2.135
[0.12]
No
2 Ways 
Fixed 
Effects
0.904
(1.68)
-0.142
(-1.24)
0.011
(1.67)
0.793 1.855
[0.17]
No
Constant Growth Growth² Adj. R² Wald Test Support?
Random 
Effects
0.448***
(13.82)
1.074
(0.75)
0.0050
(0.03)
0.080 0.538
[0.59]
No
13 This is, however, weak, with the p-value > 0.05, though less than 0.10.
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Fixed 
Effects
0.447***
(53.33)
1.133
(0.74)
-0.0003
(-0.01)
0.543 0.538
[0.59]
No
2 Ways 
Fixed 
Effects
0.449***
(15.32)
-1.729
(-0.29)
0.3060
(0.80)
0.480 0.435
[0.65]
No
Constant Nag Nag² Adj. R² Wald Test Support?
Random 
Effects
0.554***
(4.45)
-1.453
(-0.32)
0.0001
(0.01)
0.087 1.291
[0.28]
No
Fixed 
Effects
0.563***
(3.95)
0.179
(0.04)
-0.0184
(-0.50)
0.653 2.042
[0.14]
No
2 Ways 
Fixed 
Effects
0.805***
(4.66)
-3.040
(-0.51)
-0.0188
(-0.37)
0.665 4.801
[0.02]
No
Constant Urban 
Population
Urban 
Population²
Adj. R² Wald Test Support?
Random 
Effects
0.450***
(8.17)
0.003
(0.76)
-0.00002
(-1.06)
-0.005 1.09
[0.34]
No
Fixed 
Effects
0.477***
(12.97)
0.004
(1.63)
-0.00006**
(-2.09)
0.560 4.66
[0.01]
Yes
2 Ways 
Fixed
Effects
0.680***
(7.69)
-0.004
(-0.83)
0.00007
(0.11)
0.573 3.64
[0.03]
No
However, some degree of caution is warranted when using panel data. Dowling 
and Valenzuela (2009) warn that:
‘When data are pooled and a regression is run, we are implicitly assuming that all 
countries have the same income-inequality relationship - that is, the curve relating these 
two variables is the same for all countries. If the structural pattern is different, then a 
regression of this type will have no meaning’ (p. 248). 
Pooling data helps to identify results on average. However, this average might not be 
representative of what is happening in particular countries and it need not be necessarily 
representative of the countries as a group. Note that our data is unbalanced with many 
missing observations. Pooling such data is valid if the missing data arises because of 
random factors rather than systematic ones. If the data is unbalanced because of 
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systematic reasons, then it is not valid to pool it. Estimator consistency requires that 
errors are not correlated with regressors. But, this might not be the case in our study.14
Pooling the data implies parameter constancy between the cross sections. To 
formally test this assumption I estimated a random-coefficients model (Swamy, 1970). 
The assumption of parameter constancy is strongly rejected by the data ( 2F =909.45, 
with a prob-value of 0.00).15
Heterogenous Panels
The concern regarding the wisdom of pooling data can be partly addressed by 
applying heterogenous panel estimators. This study considers the pooled mean-group
(PMG) and the mean-group (MG) estimators. The heterogeneous panels have received 
much attention in macroeconomic analysis recently, particularly in dealing with ‘data 
fields’.16 Heterogenous panel estimators are suited to small N and long T (N < T)
(Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1997 and 1999).17 The other estimators such as fixed and 
random effects (as well as GMM) may produce inconsistent estimates in large T. The 
SURE estimator can be an alternative for small N but it is only efficient if N < T is fairly 
small (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999: 622). The Hausman test is applied to compare the 
efficiency of PMG and MG and for comparison purposes the dynamic fixed effects. The 
pooled mean-group estimator allows for heterogeneity in the short-run dynamics but 
imposes homogeneity in the long-run responses. The mean-group estimator reports the 
unweighted average of individual regressions. The dynamic fixed effects estimator 
restricts all the coefficients of the cointegrating vector to be equal across all panels and 
forces the speed of adjustment and all the short-run coefficients to be equal.
Section 6.5 below shows that time dimension has some effects on the pattern of 
Kuznets’ curve in Thailand. There is also evidence in the United States that Kuznets’
14 Fielding and Torres (2005) suggest averaging data for each country so that a pure cross-section is then 
analysed. In our case, however, this is not an option as we then have far too few observations for a 
regression based analysis. 
15 This is not affected by the inclusion of Singapore. The assumption of parameter constancy is strongly 
rejected even when Singapore is removed from the sample ( 2F =796.68, with a prob-value of 0.00), and 
when Singapore, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are removed ( 2F =72.80, with a prob-value of 0.00)
16 Quah (1990) calls small N and large T as ‘data fields’ to differentiate it from microeconomic panel 
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995:79)
17 In our case, for Southeast Asia N=9 and T=49, for Malaysian states N=14 and T=38. Pesaran (2004) 
notes that T or N less than or equal to 10 can be defined as ‘small’.
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curve differs in between the short and long run. Oskooee and Gelan (2008: 679) found 
that economic growth increases inequality in the short run while in the long run, 
economic growth reduces inequality. Therefore, the study of short and long run 
relationship might generate interesting results. Some of these results are presented in 
Table 6.9 below.18 There is evidence in favour of Kuznets’ curve when urbanization data 
and the dynamic fixed effects estimator is used and when non-agricultural data and the 
pooled mean group estimator is used. The panel data results are, broadly, consistent with 
those we have found for individual countries: The evidence in favour of Kuznets’ 
hypothesis is not robust. 
The Results from Different Datasets
The WIID2 dataset contains two types of data, Gini and reported Gini. Reported 
Gini are the Gini coefficients from original sources, while Gini are the adjusted Gini 
coefficients reported by The World Bank. The World Bank estimates the Gini 
coefficient using a parametric extrapolation to ensure all coefficients meet Lorenz curve 
assumptions. But according to Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) this new calculation may 
produce different results. They suggested that: “It would be advisable, and relatively 
inexpensive, to include not only the recalculated series but also the original Gini values 
in secondary dataset” (p.787).
Tables 6.3 to 6.9 used Gini as the dependent variable. The results using Reported 
Gini estimates using pooled OLS are reported in Table 6.10. As a further check this 
chapter also used data from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). UTIP 
uses Theil’s measure of inequality applied to industrial pay inequality data. The 
advantage of this dataset is that it offers more observations. 
18 The Hausman test indicates that the pooled mean-group estimator is preferred to the mean-group 
estimator. Note that the error correction term (EC) has in all cases the expected negative sign.
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Table 6.9: Heterogenous panel estimates of Kuznets’ hypothesis
(5 most developed countries)
Mean group Pooled mean group Dynamic fixed 
effects
lnGDP: Long-run coefficients
lnGDP 234.20 (1.00) -0.104 (-1.04) -0.07 (-1.37)
lnGDP2 -19.03 (-1.00) 0.007 (1.16) 0.007 (2.26)**
lnGDP: Short-run coefficients
EC -0.56 (-3.08)*** -0.63 (-4.86)*** -0.57 (-2.60)***
ǻOQ*'3 34.64 (0.89) 0.60 (0.40) 0.73 (1.08)
ǻOQ*'32 -2.60 (-0.90) -0.03 (-0.26) -0.04 (-1.11)
Urbanisation: Long-run coefficients
Urbanisation 0.058 (0.94) 0.005 (1.27) 0.006 (1.96)*
Urbanisation 2 -0.001 (-0.88) -0.0001 (-0.23) -0.0001 (-1.79)*
Urbanisation: Short-run coefficients
EC -0.72 (-4.62)*** -0.62 (-3.42)*** -0.55 (-2.51)**
ǻOQ*'3 0.51 (1.36) 0.12 (1.25) -0.04 (-1.78)*
ǻOQ*'32 -0.01 (-1.27) -0.01 (-2.46)** 0.01 (0.87)
Nag: Long-run coefficients
Nag -7.02 (-1.02) 0.02 (16.76)*** -0.01 (-0.92)
Nag2 0.04 (1.03) -0.0002 (-14.27)*** 0.0001 (0.75)
Nag: Short-run coefficients
EC -0.61 (-1.78)* -0.62 (-2.04)** -0.37 (-3.43)***
ǻ1DJ 1.60 (1.00) 1.53 (0.97) -0.006 (-1.85)*
ǻ1DJ2 -0.01 (-1.04) -0.08 (-0.98) 0.0001 (5.32)***
When pooled the Gini data for Southeast Asia involves 108 observations for 
economy wide inequality. For the same countries, the UTIP dataset has 158 observations 
for industrial pay inequality. The results using the UTIP data are also presented in Table 
6.10. These results are similar except for the specification that uses GDPpc as the 
explanatory variable. Thus, different datasets do not appear to have a significant impact 
on Kuznets’ hypothesis, with the exception of the specification that uses the dollar value 
of GDP per capita.
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Table 6.10: Alternative datasets (5 most developed countries)
Estimator Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant GDPpc GDPpc² Adjusted
R²
Wald 
Test
Support 
Kuznets?
Pooled OLS
(Gini) 
(n=95)
0.446***
(36.18)
0.001
(0.63)
0.00002
(0.24)
0.024 7.94
[0.00]
No
Pooled OLS 
(Gini 
Reported) 
(n=95)
0.436***
(38.57)
0.003
(1.29)
-0.00002
(-0.24)
0.054 10.980
[0.00]
Yes
UTIP data 
(n=158)
0.070***
(25.84)
-3.664***
(-3.38)
0.0952 
(1.83)
0.145 64.27 
[0.00]
No
Constant lnGDPpc lnGDPpc² Adjusted R² Wald Test Support 
Kuznets?
Pooled OLS
(Gini) 
(n=95)
-0.396**
(-2.03)
0.208***
(4.12)
-0.012***
(-3.87)
0.200 14.148
[0.00]
Yes 
Pooled OLS
(Gini 
Reported)
-0.297 
(-1.59)
0.179***
(3.72)
-0.010***
(-3.42)
0.211 15.087
[0.00]
Yes
(n=95)
UTIP data 
(n=158)
0.063***
(28.67)
-0.019***
(-7.41)
0.004***
(4.26)
0.294 41.44
[0.00]
No
Constant growth growth² Adjusted R² Wald 
Test
Support 
Kuznets?
Pooled OLS 
(Gini) 
(n=95)
0.447***
(33.96)
-0.001
(-0.54)
0.0003
(1.30)
-0.009 0.909
[0.41]
No
Pooled 
OLS
(Gini 
Reported) 
(n=95)
0.436***
(34.29)
-0.002
(-0.85)
0.0004**
(2.26)
0.020 2.953
[0.06]
No
UTIP data 
(n=158)
0.057***
(16.19)
0.112 
(0.37)
0.052
(0.99)
-0.003
0.62 
[0.54]
No
Constant Non-
agricultural 
employment
Non-agricultural 
employment²
Adjusted R² Wald 
Test
Support 
Kuznets?
Pooled OLS 
(Gini) 
(n=95)
0.612***
(5.69)
-0.005
(-1.52)
0.00003
(1.59)
0.002 1.405
[0.25]
No 
Pooled OLS
(Gini 
Reported)
(n=95)
0.645***
(6.67)
-0.006**
(-2.29)
0.00005**
(2.51)
0.062 4.399
[0.02]
No
UTIP data 
(n=158)
0.150***
(4.68)
-0.002**
(-2.47)
0.0000012 
(1.87)
0.39 30.41 
[0.00]
No
Constant Urban 
Population
Urban 
Population²
Adjusted R² Wald 
Test
Support 
Kuznets?
Pooled OLS
(Gini) 
(n=95)
0.360***
(9.95)
0.004**
(2.69)
-0.00003**
(2.55)
0.065 4.07
[0.02]
Yes
Chapter 6
155
Pooled OLS
(Gini 
Reported)
(n=95)
0.373***
(10.83)
0.003**
(2.10)
-0.00002
(-1.85)
0.060 3.98
[0.02]
Yes
UTIP data 
(n=158)
0.063***
(25.27)
0.00002***
(2.95)
-0.0000007***
(-4.06)
0.010 19.71 
[0.00]
Yes
Notes:  Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical significance of 
the linear and non-linear terms. Figures in square brackets are prob-values.
In unreported country specific estimates this study found a lack of robustness in 
the evidence, similar to when the Gini for national inequality is used. For example, in 
the case of Malaysia with 14 observations, Table 6.3 shows that there is no Kuznets 
curve when GDP per capita is used to explain inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient, but that there is a Kuznets curve in terms of the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita. The comparable estimates using the UTIP data with 33 observations show 
that there is no Kuznets’ curve when GDP per capita is used (coefficient on GDP per 
capita = -0.012 with a t-statistic of -1.09 and the coefficient on GDP per capita squared 
= 0.00000238 with a t-statistic of 0.85). In contrast to the case when the Gini coefficient 
is use, this thesis finds that with the UTIP data when the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita is used there is now no evidence of Kuznets’ curve (coefficient on GDP per 
capita = -0.22 with a t-statistic of -1.60 and the coefficient on GDP per capita squared = 
0.015 with a t-statistic of 1.56).
Does a Higher Quality Dataset Make a Difference?
As previously noted, in many cases there are several observations on inequality 
for a given year. The WIIDC dataset ranks inequality data according to the quality of the 
dataset. The preference is, naturally, to use the highest quality data. Hence, this study 
has opted to choose the highest quality observation to explore Kuznets’ curve. As a 
robustness check, the differences in data quality have been tested to see the effect the
findings. This involved replacing the higher ranking inequality data with the lower 
ranking data. The results are broadly similar, suggesting that the quality of data does not 
drive the results presented here.19
19 For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported here, but are available upon request from the 
authors. They are summarized in Table 6.13.
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The Effect of Different Definitions: Income vs Expenditure 
Since inequality can be defined using income or expenditure, an interesting 
question is whether either definition makes a difference to the results. Inequality 
coefficient estimates based on income tend to be higher by five percentage points 
compared to those using expenditure. As discussed in Section 6.2, Indonesia calculates 
inequality based on expenditure while Malaysia calculates inequality based on income. 
Some countries such as Thailand and Philippines use both types of definitions. 
However, these differences in the basis of inequality measures do not change the 
results. The results from the panel data analyses suggest that Kuznets’ hypothesis cannot 
be confirmed in Southeast Asia, as none of the specifications support Kuznets’ 
hypothesis.20
6.5 Discussion and implications
“A successful theory of the Kuznets curve should therefore not only explain the inverse-U
shaped pattern of inequality in the development experience of European economies, but also 
account for the lack of such a relationship in the histories of many Latin American and 
Asian countries.”  (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002: 183)
Table 6.11 summarizes the results from the various specifications and estimations,
considering whether there is statistical evidence in favour of a Kuznets’ curve and also 
whether it the turning point occurs within a reasonable range. It is evident from Table 
6.11 that there is a lack of robustness and that the evidence in favor of Kuznets’ 
hypothesis is patchy. 
When all countries are pooled and country fixed or random effects are 
considered, there is little evidence in support of the Kuznets hypothesis. The key 
exception emerges when the relationship is expressed in terms of urbanization.21
Figure 6.4 illustrates the path of inequality for all observations from all countries 
combined, with the natural log of GDP per capita as the measure of development.  
While the path appears to be non-linear, it does not follow the classic Kuznets shape. 
There is a classic Kuznets’ curve for part of the data range, but not all.
20 These results are also available upon request.
21 Urban population also replaced with the log of urban population. The results are similar in supporting
Kuznets’ hypothesis.
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Table 6.11: Summary of the results
COUNTRY & 
ESTIMATOR
GDPPC LNGDPPC GROWTH NAG URBAN 
POP
Indonesia No No Yes No No
Malaysia No Yes-Un No No Yes-Un
Singapore No No No Yes-Un No
Thailand Yes-Un Yes No Yes Yes
Philippines No No Yes-Un Weak No
Pooled OLS 5 
countries
No Yes No No Yes
Pooled OLS all 
countries
Weak Yes No No Yes
Pooled OLS all 
excluding 
Singapore
Yes-Un Yes No No Yes
Random Effects No No No No No
Country Fixed 
Effects
No No No No Yes
Time and Country 
Fixed Effects
No No No No No
Mean-group 
estimator
No No No No No
Pooled mean-
group estimators
No No No Yes No
Dynamic fixed 
effects
No No No No Yes
Alternative 
Datasets 
Reported Gini 
(Pooled OLS)
Yes-Un Yes No No Yes
Alternative 
Datasets UTIP 
(Pooled OLS)
No No No No Yes
Lower Quality 
Data
(Pooled OLS)
Yes-Un Yes No No No
Expenditure Data 
(Pooled OLS)
No No No No No
Notes: Yes indicates a statistically significant inverted U-curve consistent with Kuznets’ hypothesis. Yes-
Un indicates an inverted U-curve with a turning point that does not occur within a reasonable range of the 
influencing variable. Weak indicates a low level of statistical significance for an inverted U-curve. 
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Figure 6.4: Inequality and development in Southeast Asia, Gini Coefficient, all years
The individual country regressions show that the Kuznets hypothesis receives 
some support for specific countries, depending on the measure of economic 
performance. Each individual country receives some support for at least one measure of 
economic performance, with more widespread support found for Thailand. Even in this 
case, however, the Kuznets hypothesis explains only a fraction of the observed variation 
in inequality.22 Moreover, often the estimated turning does not lie within a reasonable 
income range.
The results in Table 6.11 reveal no systematic or consistent support for Kuznets’
hypothesis in Southeast Asia, though there is some evidence to support the hypothesis 
when inequality is compared to urbanisation. This lack of robust evidence raises two 
related questions: (1) what factors might explain the lack of a Kuznets’ curve, and (2) 
what are the determinants of inequality in Southeast Asia? With regard to (1), this 
chapter focuses on two explanations: the time span of the data and government efforts to 
mitigate inequality.
22 The UTIP data produces larger adjusted R-squared.
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Time Span
Kuznets’ hypothesis is a long run phenomenon. While the data for Southeast 
Asia span over 40 years, this might not be sufficient to reveal the long run pattern. 
Researchers have no option but to analyze the observations that are available, but this 
might only reveal short term or medium term patterns. For example, in contrast to our 
findings, Ikemoto and Uehara (2000) found no evidence of Kuznets’ hypothesis for 
Thailand. Figure 6.5 shows the time series pattern in inequality in Thailand. Ikemoto and 
Uehara’s (2000) study period spanned from 1962 to 1998. 
Figure 6.5: Time series pattern of inequality in Thailand, 1962-2004
On the basis of the data available to them at the time, they concluded that:
income inequality in Thailand increased very rapidly from the latter half of the 1980s 
to 1992 but the direction of change after 1992 is still not clear” (p. 439).
However, as can be seen from Figure 6.5, inequality has declined sharply since the end 
of 1990s. With the benefit of more data, it can now be concluded that Thailand follows 
the classic Kuznets curve patter. It is certainly possible that with the accumulation of 
more data, different patterns will emerge for all countries studied in this chapter.
Perhaps, if the dataset covers an even longer period in the future, the results might be 
different.
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The Political Economy of Dampening Kuznets’ Curves
The Kuznets curve might be endogenous. If governments are concerned about 
the possibility of Kuznets type effects, they might implement policies that are directly 
aimed at reducing poverty and inequality. For example, in the case of Indonesia, 
Cameron (2002: 2) noted that: 
The Kuznets hypothesis has received very mixed empirical support and the relationship 
between inequality and per capita income varies widely even within Southeast 
Asia…The Indonesian government nevertheless recognised the possibility of increasing 
inequality when it enshrined equity as a major policy goal, alongside growth and 
stability, in the third Five Year Plan (1980–1984). It was around this time that concern 
about perceived increases in inequality was being expressed in the media and other 
public fora.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that high levels of inequality have a negative effect on 
political stability and reduce economic growth. In Malaysia, inequality is a very 
sensitive issue. High income disparity between Malays and Chinese in the early period 
after independence resulted in the May 13, 1969 riots. As a result of this, like many 
other governments, Malaysian governments implemented various policies to try and 
contain inequality. Two such policies were rural development programs and education. 
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, Malaysia has been very successful at steadily reducing 
inequality over time. The relationship of political stability and inequality in Malaysia is 
consistent with the political economy theory of the Kuznets curve proposed by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002). Acemoglu and Robinson (2002: 199) argued that:
The historical and contemporary evidence suggests that the downward segment of the 
curve is driven by political reforms and their subsequent impact. In turn these political 
changes are induced by the rising social tension and political instability that arises from 
the increased inequality on the upward segment of the curve.   
The one difference here being that there was not necessarily an upward segment to 
induce political reforms. The mere threat and possibility of this segment might be 
sufficient to induce governments into action in order to prevent Kuznets’ curve from 
emerging.
Rural Development Programs
Kuznets (1955) argued that increased inequality in the early stages of 
development arises because of urban and rural income differentials. Inequality will most 
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likely be higher in urban areas than in the rural areas. Therefore, an increase in the 
proportion of the population that is urbanized can increase inequality; the development 
process is usually faster in urban areas, benefiting urban dwellers more than those in 
rural regions. However, the evidence in Southeast Asia shows that rural-urban disparity 
has declined with development. For instance, in Malaysia, the urban-rural disparity ratio 
decreased significantly from 2.14 in 1972 to 1.13 in 1995 (Mahadevan, 2007). 
Governments in Southeast Asia have taken active steps to develop rural areas through 
various development programs, such as land and infrastructure development programs. 
For example, the Malaysian government established the Integrated Agricultural 
Development Program (IADP) which was specifically designed to increase the 
productivity of agriculture in rural areas. The IADP provides physical infrastructure 
such as irrigation and roads, as well as other agricultural support services for rural 
communities (Ragayah, 2008:180). In Indonesia, since the 1970s, Presidential 
Instruction (Inpres) has provided financial assistance to build infrastructure for village 
development (Armida et. al, 2008:98-99). These rural development programs increase 
rural productivity and thereby help to reduce the gap between rural and urban areas. 
Strong efforts to balance development between rural and urban areas have successfully 
reduced income inequality. As a result, countries such as Malaysia have been successful 
in lowering inequality in the early stage of their development, nullifying Kuznets’ 
predictions.  
The Role of Education and Industrialization
Education has been widely recognized as an important factor for Southeast Asian 
economic success. Human capital accumulation is relatively high in Southeast Asia, with 
the enrolment rate for primary and secondary schools being more than 90 percent and 80 
percent, respectively. Educational development has received strong support from 
governments, with some countries allocating a relatively high proportion of their 
government expenditure to education (Asian Development Bank, 2008: 7-9, Lee and 
Francisco, 2010: 9-10). 
Education has an effect on inequality through income differentials. According to 
Kuznets (1955), income differentials between groups of people can be attributed to 
‘exceptional ability or attachment to new industries or for a variety of other reason’ 
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(p.12). Labor income is usually determined by education and skills, thus educational 
expansion can increase income differentials between lower and higher income groups. 
On the other hand, expansion of education can reduce inequality by increasing the 
number of educated workers compacting real salaries and consequently diminishing
inequality (Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, 1995).
Cross country studies in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia (Armida et.al, 2008), 
Thailand (Israngkura, 2008) and The Philippines (Balisacan and Piza, 2008), reveal that 
education is an important determinant of income differentials and income inequality.
Indeed, any change in labor force educational composition can affect inequality (Knight 
and Sabot, 1983:1132).
Expansion of education in Southeast Asia has been accompanied by rapid 
industrialization since the 1970s. This has created job opportunities, stimulated
economic growth, and lowered inequality. In Malaysia, industrialization since the 1970s 
has provided job opportunities and increased household income in both rural and urban 
areas. Ragayah (2008:187-188) explained the situation in Malaysia as follows:
Industrial development was promoted to provide greater employment and improve 
incomes of the urban poor. The tightening of the labour market in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s together with increased productivity of a more educated labour force led to 
rising wage rates…Transfer incomes remitted to the rural households by family 
members that have migrated to the urban areas played a significant role in mitigating 
inequality and poverty incidence. In fact it was the ability of the rural labour force to 
find jobs in the modern sector and the subsequent income transfers that helped the 
distribution of income in the rural areas…
Education expansion has contributed to 24 to 29 percent of inequality decomposition in 
rural and urban Indonesia, but rapid industrialization has provided job opportunities in 
high level poverty areas, particularly in rural areas, thus reducing inequality (Almida et 
al. 2008, p. 115). Cameron (2002, p. 15) notes that:
Although urban inequality has increased, this change has largely been offset by declines 
in rural inequality. Indonesia can be considered to be ‘lucky’ in the sense that its 
industrial centre happens to be close to rural Java where many of the country’s poorest 
families make their home. These households have benefited from the off-farm 
employment opportunities that industrialisation has offered. In this way the gap between 
rural households in the Outer Islands and rural households in Java has been reduced, as
has rural inequality.
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Controlling for Effects of Government Intervention and Education
Equations 1 and 2 present the unconditional version of the Kuznets hypothesis.
The preceding discussion suggests that the Kuznets hypothesis is only one factor 
shaping the path of inequality and that the effect might be mitigated by government 
intervention and education. In order to explore this further, a conditional version of the 
Kuznets hypothesis was estimated:
itititititiit uEduGovGDPGDPI  21221 JJEED (3)
Here the coefficients 1E and 2E provide a test for Kuznets’ hypothesis conditional on 
controlling for the effects of government intervention and education. Table 6.12 reports 
the results of using GDP per capita to capture the Kuznets process, with different 
versions of Equation 3 estimated using pooled OLS. Pooled data was used simply 
because the conditional model of Kuznets’ curve imposes greater strain on degrees of 
freedom, ruling out individual country regressions. Column 1 adds the share of 
government in GDP (Government), which has a statistically significantly negative 
coefficient. This is consistent with the political economy argument made above; the 
larger is the share of government the more equal are incomes. Columns 2 and 3 add 
inequality in education (EduGini, measured by an education Gini coefficient). This data 
comes from Castelló and Doménech (2002). For all countries included in their dataset, 
Castelló and Doménech (2002) find a low correlation between education inequality and 
income inequality (correlation = 0.27). However, for Southeast Asia, they find that the 
correlation is rather stronger, though negative (correlation = -0.50). Table 6.12 shows 
that education inequality has a statistically negative coefficient, indicating that the more 
unequal is education the more equal are incomes. This result remains in column 3, where 
the government variable is removed. Unfortunately, there are few observations on 
educational inequality, so there is a very large reduction in the number of observations 
compared to column 1 (down from 107 to 38!). Column 4 replaces inequality in 
education with land inequality (LandGini, measured by a Gini coefficient for land). This 
data comes from Frankema (2006). Unfortunately, data on land inequality is even 
scarcer and, hence, very few observations available for this variable: only 14 
observations. Columns 5 and 6 use the average years of schooling as a control variable
(YearSchool).
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Table 6.12: Conditional Kuznets’ curve, Southeast Asia, GDP per capita as the 
explanatory variable, pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.536*** 0.712*** 0.574*** 0.151 0.525*** 0.406***
(20.76) (12.91) (14.39) (1.58) (11.62) (4.61)
GDPpc -0.005* -0.003 0.010* 0.221*** -0.0126*** -0.0127***
(-1.73) (-0.31) (1.78) (6.83) (-3.41) (-3.49)
GDPpc² 0.0000002** -0.0000001 -0.0000005* -0.000003*** 0.0000004*** 0.0000004***
(2.07) (-0.33) (-1.93) (-5.59) (3.11) (3.41)
Government -0.006*** -0.009** - - -0.010*** -0.009***
(-4.58) (-2.34) (-3.78) (-3.23)
EduGini - -0.338***
(-3.17)
-0.361***
(-2.87)
- - -
- -
LandGini - - - 0.322
(1.64)
YearSchool - - - - 0.015*** 
(4.01)
0.054**
(2.32)
YearSchool² - - - - - -0.003*
(-1.79)
Support 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
NO NO YES
[10,000]
YES
[36,833]
NO NO
n 107 38 38 14 79 79
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.34 0.22 0.64 0.26 0.28
Notes:  Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Figures in square brackets are the estimated values of GDPpc at 
which inequality starts to fall. n denotes the number of observations.  Countries included: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
This is the level of human capital rather than the degree of inequality in 
education. These results show that inequality increases as the number of years of 
schooling rises, though the effect appears to be non-linear.23 Inequality appears to 
increase with schooling until a peak of 8 years and then inequality starts to decline. 
Table 6.12 above shows that when the larger datasets are used (columns 1, 5 and 
6) there is no evidence of a Kuznets’ curve. Indeed, the results show the opposite effect, 
with inequality initially falling and then rising. Interestingly, a Kuznets curve emerges in 
columns 3 and 4 where the effect of government is omitted from the regression and a 
smaller number of observations are used. 
Table 6.13 reports the results when the natural logarithm of GDP per capita is 
used instead of the level of GDP per capita.
23 The two years of schooling variables in column 6 are jointly statistically significant.
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Table 6.13: Conditional Kuznets’ curve, Southeast Asia, lnGDP per capita as the 
explanatory variable, pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.239 -0.661** -0.818** -1.475** -0.075 -0.076
(-1.31) (-2.03) (-2.18) (-2.14) (-0.36) (-0.38)
lnGDPpc 0.185*** 0.342*** 0.345*** 0.449* 0.161*** 0.140**
(3.91) (3.93) (3.73) (1.98) (2.77) (2.38)
lnGDPpc² -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.027 -0.011*** -0.010***
(-3.76) (-3.82) (-3.59) (-1.65) (-2.96) (-2.55)
Government -0.003*** -0.006** - - -0.007*** -0.007***
(-2.81) (-2.11) (-3.15) (-2.79)
EduGini - -0.208*
(-1.87)
-0.200
(-1.61)
- - -
- -
LandGini - - - 0.345*
(1.92)
YearSchool - - - - 0.011** 
(2.34)
0.037 
(1.46)
YearSchool² - - - - - -0.002
(-1.08)
Support 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
YES
[4,488]
YES
[2,375]
YES
[3,693]
YES
[4,084]
YES
[1,507]
YES
[1,097]
n 107 38 38 14 79 79
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.47 0.43 0.61 0.27 0.27
Notes:  Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Figures in square brackets are the estimated values of GDPpc at which inequality starts to 
fall. n denotes the number of observations. Countries included: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
The size of the government sector is again important and has a robust negative 
effect on inequality, while years of schooling again have a non-linear effect on 
inequality.24 There is now evidence of a Kuznets curve in all specifications, though there 
is wide variation in the estimated turning points, some of which are rather low. It is
concluded from this analysis that the evidence for the Kuznets’ hypothesis is fragile. The 
results are sensitive to the specification of the econometric model (e.g. levels versus 
logs). In contrast, both government and education have a robust effect on inequality, 
regardless of the specification. This is consistent with the argument made above that the 
lack of a robust result for Kuznets’ curve in Southeast Asia might be explained by the 
active role taken by governments in the region to stem the rise of inequality.
24 The two years of schooling variables are jointly statistically significant, even though they are 
individually not.
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6.6 Conclusions
Kuznets hypothesized that inequality and development exhibit a systematic 
pattern: inequality increases in the earlier stages of development before declining at a 
later stage as a result of subsequent development. Kuznets’ hypothesis has been tested 
for a wide range of countries and time periods. The results are mixed and varied 
depending on the data and methodology employed, as well as the countries studied.
This chapter attempts to test Kuznets’ hypothesis for Southeast Asia using 
various econometric specifications, estimators and alternative datasets. This chapter
finds that there is no systematic relationship between inequality and economic growth
across countries, though there is evidence for individual countries depending on the 
specification. The strongest support for the hypothesis emerges when the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita is used as the explanatory variable and when the proportion 
of the population that lives in urban areas is used as the explanatory variable. Of the 
countries investigated, Thailand appears to have the most pronounced evidence of 
Kuznets’ curve. 
Although data and measurement problems might influence results, it appears that 
inequality need not necessarily follow the path of Kuznets’ curve. Countries such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia have successfully generated economic growth and development
while capping inequality through active government policies, especially through
education and rural development. Chapter 7 takes a closer look at inequality in Malaysia 
by empirically investigating patterns in regional inequality within Malaysian States.
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Appendix A: Panel data, random, fixed and 2 way fixed effects 
(All countries excluding Singapore)
Notes: All Southeast Asian countries included except for Singapore.
Estimator                                                       Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant GDPpc GDPpc² Adj. R² Wald Test Support?
Random Effects 0.393***
(18.57)
0.006**
(2.62)
-0.0001***    
(-3.07)
0.100 6.93
[0.01]
Yes
Fixed Effects 0.413***
(20.90)
0.005*
(1.82)
-0.0001***
(-2.52)
0.65 3.36
[0.00]
Yes
2 Way Fixed 
Effects
0.387***
(6.87)
0.009
(1.20)
-0.0002
(-1.76)
0.71 1.46
[0.24]
No
Constant lnGDPpc lnGDPpc² Adj. R² Wald Support?
Random Effects -0.353
(-0.93)
0.220*
(1.94)
-0.015
(-1.80)
0.037 3.72
[0.06]
Weak
Fixed Effects -0.247**
(-0.66)
0.199
(1.80)
-0.014
(-1.72)
0.672 3.21
[0.08]
Weak
2 Ways Fixed 
Effects
-0.405
(-0.44)
0.217
(0.86)
-0.013
(-0.75)
0.672 0.723
[0.40]
No
Constant Growth Growth² Adj. R² Wald Test Support?
Random Effects 0.408***
(20.22)
0.002
(1.53)
0.0001
(0.69)
0.039 4.35
[0.17]
No
Fixed Effects 0.418***
(36.91)
0.003**
(2.20)
0.00006
(0.32)
0.631 4.35
[0.04]
No
2 Ways Fixed 
Effects
0.399***
(8.17)
0.008
(0.49)
-0.0003
(-0.20)
0.663 0.225
[0.64]
No
Constant Nag Nag² Adj. R² Wald Test Support?
Random Effects 0.462***
(4.17)
0.0008
(0.19)
-0.00002
(-0.65)
0.015 0.039
[0.84]
No
Fixed Effects 0.489***
(3.78)
0.0009
(0.20)
-0.00003 
(-0.78)
0.726 0.043
[0.83]
No
2 Ways Fixed 
Effects
0.581***
(2.07)
0.001
(0.16)
-0.00006 
(-0.78)
0.677 0.029
[0.87]
No
Constant Urban 
Population
Urban 
Population²
Adj. R² Wald Test Support?
Random Effects 0.356***
(7.01)
0.004
(0.01)
-0.00006** 
(-2.06)
0.64 2.541
[0.12]
No
Fixed Effects 0.379***
(7.56)
0.004
(1.59)
-0.00006** 
(-2.23)
0.026 3.43
[0.07]
Weak
2 Ways Fixed
Effects
0.493***
(1.99)
-0.0002
(-0.024)
-0.00004
(-0.46)
0.691 0.00
[0.98]
No
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Appendix B: Example of Diagnostic Tests (Based on Table 6.8)
GDPpc as the Explanatory Variable
Diagnostic Tests Results Interpretation
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
(xtserial Stata routine)
0.092
[0.79]
No first order autocorrelation
Modified Wald Test for 
Heteroskedasticity
(xttest3 Stata routine)
234.89
[0.00]
Heteroskedasticity problem
Jarque Bera Normality Test 0.414
[0.81]
Normality in error 
distribution
lnGDPpc as the Explanatory Variable
Diagnostic Tests Results Interpretation
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
(xtserial Stata routine)
0.054
[0.84]
No first order autocorrelation
Modified Wald Test for 
Heteroskedasticity
(xttest3 Stata routine)
81.36
[0.00]
Heteroskedasticity problem
Jarque Bera Normality Test 0.700
[0.70]
Normality in error 
distribution
Growth as the Explanatory Variable
Diagnostic Tests Results Interpretation
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
(xtserial Stata routine)
0.091
[0.79]
No first order autocorrelation
Modified Wald Test for 
Heteroskedasticity
(xttest3 Stata routine)
46.21
[0.00]
Heteroskedasticity problem
Jarque Bera Normality Test 3.01
[0.22]
Normality in error 
distribution
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Employment of Non Agricultural Sector as the Explanatory Variable
Diagnostic Tests Results Interpretation
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
(xtserial Stata routine)
36.77
[0.10]
No first order autocorrelation
Modified Wald Test for 
Heteroskedasticity
17.06
[0.00]
Heteroskedasticity problem
Jarque Bera Normality Test 3.491
[0.17]
Normality in error 
distribution
Proportion of urban population as the explanatory variable
Diagnostic Tests Results Interpretation
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
(xtserial Stata routine)
0.004
[0.96]
No first order autocorrelation
Modified Wald Test for 
Heteroskedasticity
46.82
[0.00]
Heteroskedasticity problem
Jarque Bera Normality Test 0.335
[0.85]
Normality in error 
distribution
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CHAPTER 7
MALAYSIAN REGIONAL INEQUALITY
“What is the mechanism by which regional income differentials increase in early 
development stages, then stabilize, and then diminish in mature periods of 
growth?”(Williamson, 1965: 45)
7.1. Introduction
The pattern of regional inequality as nations develop remains a contested 
issue. To many, growth and development present the hope of converging regional 
incomes, while some see the possibility of diverging regional incomes. Others argue 
that the path is non-linear. For example, Williamson (1965) advanced the hypothesis 
that regional inequality might follow a Kuznets’ type pattern, rising in the early 
stages of development and subsequently declining with further growth. Williamson’s 
(1965) study triggered an important debate in this area: Does regional inequality 
follow a systematic pattern? 
While numerous attempts have been made to study the pattern of regional 
inequality, no systematic pattern of regional inequality has yet been established. 
Most empirical studies have explored patterns of regional inequality in developed 
countries, predominantly Europe and the United States.1 Studies of regional 
inequality in the United States (Amos, 1988; Barro et.al., 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1996) 
reveal a U-curve pattern, contradicting Williamson’s prediction. Amos (1988: 565) 
concludes that: ‘…regional inequality appears to follow a pattern of increase-
decrease-increase, contrary to the simple inverted-U pattern of increase-decrease.’ In 
contrast, the pattern of regional inequality in Japan provides support for 
Williamson’s hypothesis (Barro et.al., 1991). 
A newer wave of studies has investigated regional inequality in developing 
countries, particularly China, India, Brazil and Indonesia.2 These studies tend to 
contradict Williamson’s hypothesis. This chapter adds to this growing literature by 
investigating regional inequality in Malaysia. 
Malaysia is a rapidly developing Southeast Asian country, growing by 8% on
average per annum during the 1990s prior to the Asian financial crisis and 
1 See, for example, Smolensky, (1961), Williamson (1965), Amos (1988), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
et.al (1991) and Fan and Casetti (1994).
2 See Ying (1999), Kanbur and Zhang (2005) and Wan, Lu and Chen (2007) for studies of China; Kar 
and Sakthivel (2006) and Das and Barua (1996) for India; Azzoni (2001) for Brazil; and Akita and 
Alisjahbana (2002) and Resosudarma and Vidyattama (2006) for Indonesia. 
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approximately 6% on average in the post-crisis period.3 Successive Malaysian 
governments, while concerned with developing the nation, have also been concerned 
about the effects of rapid development on inequality and social conflict. This chapter
analyzes the effects of economic development on regional inequality using panel data 
for the 14 Malaysian states (or Negeri) for the period 1970 to 2009. 
This chapter makes three contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on 
Malaysia have either used time series or cross-sectional data. However, with the 
accumulation of state level data it is now possible to analyze panel data. This chapter
analyzes the patterns in panel data of regional inequality in Malaysia and explore 
whether a stylized Kuznets’/Williamson curve exists: What effect has rapid 
economic development had on Malaysian regional inequality?
6HFRQG ı- DQG ȕ-convergence are also investigated. This enables us to 
explore whether regional incomes are converging, and to analyze the dispersion in 
regional incomes. 
The third contribution is to explore the impact of the Malaysian New 
Economic Policy (NEP) on regional inequality. The NEP was a deliberate attempt to 
reduce poverty and inter-ethnical income differentials. While many authors have 
explored the NEP’s success at achieving these objectives, this study is the first to 
explore whether the NEP affected regional income disparities. 
This chapter is set out as follows. Section 7.2 presents a review of the main 
theoretical considerations followed by a review of the prior empirical literature in 
section 7.3. The analysis of regional inequality in Malaysia is presented in section 
7.4. Section 7.5 discusses the findings, with conclusions drawn in section 7.6.
7.2. Theoretical Considerations
The literature identifies several factors that can shape the path of regional income 
differentials. Some factors shape the path of inequality within a region, while others 
affect regional income differentials (inequality between regions).
Kuznets’ Curve 
According to Williamson (1965), the evolution of regional inequality will 
tend to follow a pattern similar to Kuznets’ inverted U-curve, increasing at the early 
stage of development and subsequently decreasing during the course of further 
3 During the Asian economic crisis (1997/1998), economic growth in Malaysia declined sharply,           
-9.6 per cent in 1998 compared to 4.6 percent in 1997.
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development (Kuznets, 1955; Moran, 2005). Williamson (1965: 5-10) outlines 
numerous factors that can influence the shape of regional inequality, such as 
migration, government policies, capital mobility and interregional linkages.  
Neoclassical Convergence versus Endogenous Growth Divergence
According to neoclassical economics, poor regions will tend to grow faster 
than more developed ones. The Solow growth model predicts that regional income 
convergence will occur because of diminishing returns in production (Barro, 1991:
407). Mobility of capital and technology will result in regions with a relatively low 
capital-labor ratio growing faster than the richer regions (Barro et al., 1991:154).
In contrast, endogenous growth and new economic geography theories argue 
that instead of regional convergence, the process of economic growth can result in 
regional divergence. Richer regions might grow faster than poorer ones as they take 
advantage of economies of specialization, spillovers from knowledge capital and 
economies of scale (Krugman, 1991:484-487).
Government Policies and Political Dimensions
The possibility of divergence in regional incomes opens the way for political 
intervention. Governments are unlikely to remain passive observers. Policies such as 
regional development assistance can influence regional inequality patterns: such 
assistance often tends to be concentrated in more developed areas in order to meet 
industry demand. Williamson (1965) observed that government budget or 
development allocation in the United States ‘favors the fast-growing industrial 
regions and helps even more rapid growth there…’ (p.7). 
Weak interregional linkages are common during the initial phase of 
development. Infrastructure and transportation networks are more developed in cities 
with relatively more people and industries. Government investment in new 
infrastructure and improved interregional linkages can boost regional economic 
growth, thus attracting new migration and industries. These processes can result in 
increased regional inequality in the initial phase of development due to industry and 
labor concentration, but regional inequality might decline subsequently as industry 
and labor spread to new locations across states and regions. Free capital movement, 
appropriate government policies and better infrastructure can all stimulate growth 
and hence reduce income inequality at the latter stages of development.
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Agglomeration Effects
Firms will prefer to base their operations in locations that are close to reliable 
sources of raw materials, good facilities and transportation networks, and have easy 
access to financial, legal and business support services.4 By operating in the same 
location or cluster, firms in similar industries are able to take advantages of 
economies of scale. They also have relatively easier access to markets and industry 
information, which can be shared through formal or informal meetings, discussions 
and social activities. These processes facilitate cost minimization and profit 
maximization. These advantages encourage inter-regional migration to cities and the 
more developed states and regions. Higher wages in developed states attract skilled, 
educated and younger workers. Williamson (1965: 5-6) argues that:
Selective migration of this type obviously accentuates the tendency toward regional 
income divergence: labour participation rates, ceteris paribus, will tend to rise in the 
rich and fall in the poor regions; furthermore, precious human capital tend to flow
out of the South and into the North, making regional endowment per capita all the 
more lopsided and geographic imbalances all the more severe. 
Counteracting these factors is greater competition for land, raw materials and 
labor in more developed areas that ultimately increases firms’ production costs. This 
could then result in some firms moving to cheaper locations such as those found in 
less developed regions. McCann (2002: 54) explains in detail the process of firms’ 
allocation and movement:
If everything else is unchanged, and if the firms all achieve constant returns to scale, 
the increase in the price of land will reduce the profitability of all of the firms at that 
location. Similarly, the increase in the local land price will mean that the living costs 
of labour employed will also go up. In order to maintain the local labour supply the 
firms will also have to increase wages. Once again, this will reduce the profitability 
of the firms in the area. The reduce profits will mean the firms located here will be 
less competitive than their competitors located elsewhere and will struggle to survive 
in the market. Some firms will move away to alternative location while others will 
simply go out of business.     
While all these processes are theoretically plausible and consistent with some 
of the observed patterns, the net effect of these processes on the shape of the path of 
regional inequality is an empirical matter.
4 McCann (2002, Chapter 2) provides an extended discussion on this issue. Marshall (1920) observed 
that during the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, successful firms tended to cluster in the same 
location (cited from McCann, 2002:35).
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7.3. Prior Studies on Malaysian Regional Inequality
There have been several studies on income inequality in Malaysia. Several 
studies explored inequality in Malaysia without taking a regional perspective. Lim 
(1973) focused on inequality between ethnic groups in Peninsular Malaysia and 
Singapore. Snodgrass (1980) and Tan (1982) examined trends in inequality for 
Peninsular Malaysia. Jomo (1990a) surveys the distribution of incomes, assets and 
capital since Independence. Ragayah (2004 and 2008) discussed trends in income 
inequality in Malaysia from 1960 to 1999 and found that inequality declined during 
the New Economic Policy (1971-1990) period, but increased thereafter. As discussed 
in Chapter 6, several studies have tested Kuznets’ hypothesis for Malaysia but more 
specific study at regional level, Anand (1983) tested Kuznets’ hypothesis using state 
level cross-sectional data and found that the results did not support the hypothesis. 
Shireen (1998) also found that the relation between inequality and GDP was in the 
opposite direction to Kuznets’ hypothesis. 
Shireen (1998) studied the links between income inequality and economic 
development, using data from 1957 to 1989. Shireen also examined inequality in 
urban and rural areas, as well as inequality between ethnic groups. In contrast to 
previous studies that focused on Peninsular Malaysia, Shireen’s (1998) study covered 
the regions of Sabah and Sarawak. Shireen (1998) also touched on inter-ethnic 
inequality, finding that the average income for all ethnic groups had increased in the 
period studied. 
Shireen (1998) applied the Williamson Index to evaluate regional inequality 
in Malaysia from 1970 to 1990, finding that regional inequality fluctuated over time. 
Asan (2004) also estimated regional inequality using the Williamson Index, finding 
that regional inequality patterns seemed like an inverted U curve. Asan linked that 
pattern to differences in economic structures. Development programs were 
concentrated in more developed states while less developed states depended on 
agricultural economic activities. A similar argument was made by Ismail (2004), who
argued that regional inequality emerged mainly from differences in economic 
development between states. Habibullah et. al., (2008) examine income convergence 
in Malaysia using non-linear unit root tests for the period 1965 to 2003. They find 
long run convergence in only five states (Kedah, Negeri Sembilan, Perak, Perlis and 
Selangor). Finally, Hasnah and Sanep (2009) used location quotient analysis to study 
Malaysian development gap for the period 1970 till 2006. Their results suggest that 
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the development gap between regions and states in the Malaysian economy 
continued large due to different economic activities.
7.4 Poverty and Regional Inequality in Malaysia
Poverty Reduction
Malaysia has been very successful at reducing poverty levels. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, various policies and programs were implemented to improve living 
standards in the rural sector and to eradicate poverty and reduce ethnic income 
inequality.
Within 20 years, poverty levels dropped from 52.4% to 17.1%. Poverty levels 
fell in both rural and urban areas. Poverty levels in rural areas declined from 51% in 
1970 to 22% in 1990, while poverty levels in urban areas declined to only 7.5% by 
the end of the NEP.5 The incidence of poverty declined steadily from 1992 to 2009 
from 12.4% in 1992 to only 3.8% in 2009. 
Figure 7.1: Incidence of poverty, Selangor, Sabah, and average of all Malaysian 
States, 1970 to 2009
Source: Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit, Economic Reports and Malaysia Plans, various 
years 
5 However, there is some dispute over the reliability and accuracy of the reduction in poverty data. For 
example, in 1983, the Prime Minister’s Department declared that the official poverty rate was 43%, 
while the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) announced that the poverty rate in 1984 was only 18%, 
suggesting a halving of the poverty rate (equivalent to 4 million people) within one year (Jomo, 1990: 
473).    
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Figure 7.1 illustrates the average incidence of poverty for all 14 states, as well 
as for the state with the lowest poverty levels (Selangor) and the state with the 
highest poverty level (Sabah). As Figure 7.1 illustrates, all states have experienced a 
significant decline in the poverty rate from 1970 to 2009.
Uneven Patterns in Inequality
In general, Malaysian national inequality has declined over time (recall 
Figure 2.3), with similar trends for both rural and urban areas as shown in Figure 7.2 
below.6
Figure 7.2: Malaysian inequality in urban and rural areas 1970-2009
Source: Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit, Economic Reports and Malaysia Plans, various 
years 
Despite the overall decline in inequality, it is evident that significant regional 
income differences remain. For example, Kuala Lumpur is the richest jurisdiction (in 
terms of GDP per capita) and has a relatively high Gini coefficient. In contrast, 
Kelantan is the poorest region and has a relatively low Gini coefficient. Figure 7.3
compares the path of GDP per capita for the poorest region (Kelantan) and one of the 
6 However, inequality remained at reasonably high level for the first ten years of NEP implementation 
even though significant government expenditure was allocated to increasing Malays ownership and 
control of wealth. As noted in Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986:13) ‘During the Fourth Plan period (1981-
1985), development expenditure increased three times compared with that of the Third Malaysia Plan, 
1976-1980 and eight times compared with that of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1976.’ Hart 
(1994:48) notes that public development expenditure over GNP increased from about 8% in the 
late1960s to 25.6% in the mid 1980s period.
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richest regions (Selangor), showing that regional incomes have diverged, rather than 
converged, over time. Kelantan relies predominantly on agricultural whereas 
manufacturing is the largest contributor (57% in 2008) to Selangor’s economy 
(Selangor State Investment Centre, 2012). Figure 7.4 compares Selangor to Kuala 
Lumpur (KL). The data for KL commence in 1985. Since then the two regions have 
diverged over time, with incomes in KL rising faster than those in Selangor.
Figure 7.3: Regional income divergence, Kelantan compared to Selangor
Figure 7.4: Regional income divergence, Kuala Lumpur compared to Selangor
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Figures 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate examples of the divergence between Malaysian regions. 
Thus, while the level of poverty and inequality in Malaysia has fallen overall (Figure 
7.1 and 7.2), there has been a noticeable divergence in regional inequality. Malaysia 
has successfully managed to reduce inequality at the national level. She has, 
however, so far not been as successful at reducing regional income differentials.
7.5. Methodology and data
Alternative Approaches
There are several approaches to the empirical analysis of regional inequality. These 
either use data on regional incomes or direct measures of inequality, typically the 
Gini coefficient.
(i) The Williamson Index: The Williamson Index is constructed by calculating the 
variation in regional income dispersion relative to the national average (Williamson, 
1965). This is a weighted coefficient of variation, using share in the national 
population as weights: 
(7.1)
where Vw is the population weighted measure of regional inequality, is GDP per 
capita in region i, is GDP per capita in Malaysia, is population in region i and N 
is Malaysia’s population. One advantage of the Williamson Index is that it controls 
for the population effect by considering the weighted share in each regional 
variation. This reduces estimation bias as regions with large populations tend to 
experience greater income variation (Felsenstein and Portnov, 2005: 650).  
(ii) Kuznets’ hypothesis: Kuznets’ hypothesis postulates an inverted U-shaped 
association between inequality and development. Formally, this involves regressing a 
measure of regional inequality (for example the Gini coefficient) on GDP and GDP 
squared. For fixed effects panel data estimation, Kuznets’ hypothesis is tested using 
the following equation:
(7.2)
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where I is a measure of inequality, GDP is GDP per capita, ȞDUHIL[HGHIIHcts and u 
is a random error term.7 The hypothesis is supported if the respective coefficients are 
statistically significantly positive and negative, and if the estimated turning point 
falls within a reasonable range. 
(iii) beta-and sigma-convergence: This is a direct test of the convergence hypothesis 
and is a very popular method for regional inequality analysis. The concept of ȕ-
convergence in regional inequality is related to the hypothesis that less developed 
regions will grow faster than more developed ones. The estimated model is:
(7.3)
where and denote per capita income in region i at time t and the initial period, 
respectively. A negative relation between the level of initial income per capita and 
subsequent economic growth implies that poorer regions are, on average, growing 
faster than richer ones. 
On the other hand, ı-convergence measures the dispersion of per capita 
income across regions (measured as the standard deviation in the log of incomes). A 
KLJKHU YDOXH RI ı-convergence indicates higher levels of regional inequality, while 
ORZHUYDOXHVRIı-convergence suggest lower levels of regional inequality.8 It is not 
XQFRPPRQ IRU WKH UHVXOWV IURP ȕ- DQG ı-FRQYHUJHQFH WR FRQIOLFW )RU H[DPSOH ȕ-
convergence suggests declining inequality in the US between 1970 and 1980, while 
ı-convergence is positive, indicating increased inequality (Barro et.al, 1991). Similar 
UHVXOWV KDYH DOVR EHHQ IRXQG IRU %UD]LO $]]RQL  ZKHUHE\ ı FRQYHUJHQFH
VXJJHVWV UHJLRQDO LQHTXDOLW\ KDG GHFOLQHG IURP  WR  EXW ȕ FRQYHUJHQFH
generates different results.  
Different methods can generate different results. Hence, this chapter explores
various tests in order to examine robustness and identify any regularity in the results.
Descriptive Data
As was explained in Chapter 4, the analysis uses panel data for Malaysian states for 
the period 1970 to 2009. Figure 7.5 presents a scatter diagram of the regional Gini 
7 Fixed time period effects can also be included.  
8 In addition to the analysis of unconditional convergence, the literature also looks at conditional
convergence. That is, instead of assuming that regions are converging towards a single steady state, 
they are allowed to converge to their own steady state. This is particularly important with respect to 
cross-country data rather than regional data within a country. 
it0iioit yln)y/yln( HED  
ity 0iy
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coefficients and regional GDP per capita, pooling all the available observations. 
While there is a clear inverse relationship between regional inequality and regional 
incomes, it is not of the Kuznets’ inverted-U shape (with or without the last two GDP 
per capita observations in Figure 7.5). Note, however, that while inequality does 
ultimately rise with development, it does not reach the relatively high levels of 
inequality that are observed at the earlier stage of Malaysian regional development.
Table 7.1 reports current data on GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient for 
the Malaysian states, highlighting that regional inequality continues to be an 
important issue in Malaysia. States with high GDP per capita tend to record higher 
inequality. The three most developed states in terms of GDP per capita (Kuala 
Lumpur, Terengganu and Pahang) have among the highest levels of inequality, 
0.446, 0.399 and 0.411 Gini coefficients respectively. Meanwhile Kelantan, which 
has the lowest GDP per capita, recorded the lowest Gini coefficient. In addition, 
there is wide variation in inequality across the states. For instance, while recording
the highest inequality levels, the more developed states such as Selangor, Penang and 
Perak were also the most successful in reducing inequality. 
Table 7.1: GDP per capita and regional inequality in Malaysia
State GDP per capita 
2009
(constant 2000 
RM)
Gini 1970 Gini 2009
Kuala Lumpur 14,496.04 0.486** 0.374
Penang 10,162.53 0.493 0.419
Terengganu 8,760.615 0.478 0.418
Melaka 7,014.789 0.467 0.411
Perak 6,359.53 0.473 0.400
Selangor 5,793.044 0.515 0.424
Johor 5,485.688 0.431 0.393
Negeri Sembilan 5,457.706 0.507 0.372
Sarawak 5,434.239 0.501* 0.448
Perlis 4,989.83 0.400 0.434
Pahang 4,620.736 0.455 0.382
Kedah 3,946.964 0.438 0.408
Sabah 3,449.606 0.490* 0.453
Kelantan 2,375.958 0.486 0.393
Notes: Calculated from Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit, Economic Reports various years and 
Malaysia Plans various years data. * the earliest data available is 1979 and ** is 1986.
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Figure 7.5: Gini and level of development (GDPpc), all Malaysian States, 
1970 to 2009
7.6. Empirical Results 
Coefficient of Variation
The time series graph of the coefficient of variation in Malaysian regional per 
capita income is presented in Figure 7.6 (this series is not weighted for population 
differences).
Figure 7.6: Coefficient of variation in incomes, Malaysian States, 1970-2009
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The coefficient of variation in regional incomes measures the variation as a 
percentage of the mean. The coefficient of variation in the 1970s and 1980s was 
relatively low but has since increased significantly. This increase in the coefficient of 
variation over time suggests that regional incomes are diverging in Malaysia. Figure 
7.7 is the equivalent graph using Williamson’s Vw measure of regional inequality. 
Using this measure, there appears to be significant oscillation but no overall trend: 
regional incomes are neither converging nor diverging in Malaysia.
Figure 7.7: Williamson’s measure of regional inequality, Malaysian States, 
1970-2009
Kuznets’ and Williamson curve 
Williamson (1965) postulated that regional inequality might follow the 
pattern of a Kuznets’ curve. Hence, several versions of the Williamson curve 
(essentially a Kuznets’ curve using regional data) were estimated. First, Gini is used
as the dependent variable, with GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared as the 
explanatory variables. These results are presented in Table 7.2, using pooled OLS, 
fixed effects, random effects and two-way fixed effects (state and time dummies). 
The results are robust and show the opposite of a Kuznet’s curve: A U-shape rather 
than an inverted-U curve. That is, they show that regional inequality initially falls 
with development but it then increases with subsequent development both within 
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regions and between them.9 Table 7.3 reports the results when Vw is used as the 
measure of inequality. Once again, there is no evidence of a regional Kuznets’ curve 
for Malaysian states. 
Table 7.2: Regional inequality and development (Gini as the dependent variable)
Notes:  Coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are multiplied by 1000. Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust 
standard errors. *** denote significance at the 1% level. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical 
significance of the linear and non-linear terms. Figures in square brackets are prob-values. Number of 
observations is 107.
Table 7.3: Regional inequality and development (Vw as the dependent variable)
Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant
(1)
lnGDPpc
(2)
lnGDPpc²
(3)
Adjusted
R²
Wald Test Supports 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
-1.334
(-0.86)
0.428
(1.08)
-0.026
(-1.05)
0.08 1.19
[0.32]
No
0.454
(0.90)
-0.023
(0.98)
0.059
(0.97)
0.461 0.00
(0.98)
No
Notes: Coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are multiplied by 1000. Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust 
standard errors. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical significance of the linear and non-linear 
terms. Square brackets report the prob-value. Number of observations is 40. Estimation is by OLS (Durbin-
Watson = 0.539. Second row is Prais-Winsten AR(1) results (Durbin-Watson = 1.45).
There is an issue regarding pooling data especially for cross countries study 
(Dowling and Valenzuela, 2009: 248). However, as this chapter is dealing with 
regions within the same nation, pooling observations across regions is less likely to 
be an issue. Nevertheless, Table 7.4 reports results that allow for heterogenous panels 
9 Here the most common specification, GDP per capita is used. Using the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita produces similar results.
Estimator Estimated coefficients on explanatory variables
Constant
(1)
GDPpc
(2)
GDPpc²
(3)
Adjusted
R²
Wald 
Test
Supports 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
Pooled OLS 0.494*** -0.0224*** 0.000001*** 0.243 18.42 No
(38.69) (-4.29) (2.84) [0.00]
Fixed effects 0.513***
(59.31)
-0.0269***
(-7.95)
0.000001***
(4.49)
0.435 63.27
[0.00]
No
Random 
effects
0.509***
(47.36)
-0.0258***
(-7.45)
0.000001***
(4.68)
- 55.47
[0.00]
No
Feasible GLS 0.4967
(98.65)
-0.029*** 
(-12.06)
0.000002***
(9.35)
0.256 145.44
[0.00]
No
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using the pooled mean-group estimator, the mean-group estimator and, for 
comparison purposes, the dynamic fixed effects (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999).
Table 7.4: Heterogenous panel estimates of Kuznets’ hypothesis ǻOQ*LQLDVWKH
dependent variable)
Mean group Pooled mean group Dynamic fixed 
effects
lnGDP: Long-run coefficients
lnGDP 3.02 (0.64) -21.81 (-0.71) -0.43 (-2.12)**
lnGDP2 -0.20 (-0.69) 1.44 (0.71) 0.02 (1.89)*
lnGDP: Short-run coefficients
EC -0.16 (-3.30)*** -0.01 (-2.00)** -0.08 (-4.18)***
ǻOQ*'3 0.22 (0.90) 0.38 (1.36) -0.01 (-0.37)
ǻOQ*'32 -0.01 (-0.95) -0.02 (-1.50) 0.01 (0.11)
Notes:  Figures in brackets are t-statistics. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The Hausman test indicates that the pooled mean-group estimator is preferred to the mean-
group estimator (Chi Sq = 2.11, prob-value = 0.35). 
Here the natural logarithm of GDP per capita is used as the dependent 
variable (using GDP per capita produces similar results). Once again, the results find 
no evidence in favor of Kuznets’ curve for regional Malaysia. Indeed, the dynamic 
fixed effects estimates show the opposite (as indicated clearly by Figure 7.5). The 
error correction term (EC) indicates a very low correction rate.
The diagnostic tests suggest that the State level data has both serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity problems. Therefore, the time series data (VW) is 
corrected with the Prais Winsten AR(1) procedure. Meanwhile in panel data, the 
feasible GLS estimator is more efficient as it correctes for both serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003). However, the results are very 
similar.10
ı- DQGȕ-convergence 
3DWWHUQVLQUHJLRQDOLQFRPHVFDQDOVREHDQDO\]HGWKURXJKȕ-convergence (the 
existence of a negative relationship between the rate of income growth and the initial 
OHYHORILQFRPHDQGı-convergence (declining cross-sectional dispersion in regional 
incomes). Figure 7.8 illustrates the pattern of the standard deviation in the natural log 
of regional per capita incomes. The dispersion in Malaysian regional incomes is 
10 The diagnostics tests are reported in Appendix A.
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FOHDUO\ULVLQJRYHUWLPHVXJJHVWLQJı-divergence.7KHWHVWIRUȕ-convergence involves 
testing whether income growth is linked to initial income levels. 
Figure 7.9 below VXJJHVWV ȕ-convergence: On balance, those regions 
commencing with a smaller initial income level have subsequently recorded faster 
growWK UDWHV +RZHYHU JLYHQ WKH DEVHQFH RI ı-convergence, it is concluded that 
ZKLOH LWKDVRFFXUUHGȕ-convergence has not been rapid enough to reduce regional 
inequality. 
Figure 7.8ı-convergence in Malaysian regional incomes
Figure 7.9ȕ-convergence in Malaysian regional incomes
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7KHXQFRQGLWLRQDOȕ-convergence model
Table 7.5 presents the results for unconditional convergence, where it is 
assumed that all regions are converging to the same steady state (Equation 3). The 
ILUVW URZ UHSRUWV UHVXOWV IRU WKH HQWLUH SHULRG VKRZLQJ ȕ-convergence. The rate of 
convergence is 2%, consistent with the ‘legendary 2%’ found elsewhere (Sala-i-
Martin, 1996: 1325; Quah, 1996: 1354). The associated half-life suggests that it will 
take about 34 years for half of the regional income differentials to disappear.11
However, even though there is beta-convergence it is insufficient to offset sigma-
convergence.
7DEOHȕ-Convergence Model (OLS Estimation)
Period ȕ
(1)
ș
rate of 
convergence
(2)
Half-
life
(3)
R2
(4)
N
All years
-1970-2009
-0.097**
(-4.04)
0.020 34 0.09 107
NEP years
-1970-1990 
Post-NEP 
years
1991-2009
0.0006
(0.01)
-0.021
(-0.34)
0
0
-
-
0.00
0.00
51
56
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ** and *** denote statistically significant at the 
5% and 1%  levels, respectively. All estimations based on Equation 3:
Data are five-year averages.
When the data are partitioned into the NEP and the post-NEP periods, there is a lack 
of precision and none of the results are statistically significant. This suggests that the 
NEP did not have an impact on bringing regional incomes closer together.
As was the case in Chapter 6, a conditional Kuznets curve was estimated. 
This is presented in Table 7.6, which follows the same format as Table 6.12 in 
Chapter 6 except that two variables: inequality in education and inequality in land,
are not included as there are no data on these. There is no evidence of a Kuznets 
curve in any of the specifications. The evidence in fact suggests a ‘U’ shaped curve, 
this is statistically significant in most specifications. These results indicate that 
inequality has decreased and then increased as the states have became more 
developed. Surprisingly, the NEP shows positive effects on inequality, implying that
11 The rate of convergence is calculated as , where n is the number of years. The 
associated half-life is calculated as .
it0iioit yln)y/yln( HED  
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inequality was higher during the NEP period. The results in this chapter are 
consistent with the evidence in Chapter 8 (see Table 8.1). This evidence accords with
the criticism that the NEP failed to reduce inequality. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
NEP has successfully reduced poverty but had an insignificant impact on inequality.
The variable ‘Government’ has a negative coefficient, but most of these results are 
not statistically significant suggesting that government has no effect on inequality. 
Schooling has negative effect on inequality but it is not significant in linear 
specifications. However, schooling appears to have a negative effect initially (it 
reduces inequality) but then has a positive effect ultimately (Column 4 and 8). The 
results suggest that schooling may reduce inequality during the early period of 
development but it then increases inequality in the subsequent period. This pattern 
appears to be the direct opposite of what was found for Southeast Asia. In Chapter 6, 
a non-linear pattern was found with education initially increasing inequality and 
subsequently decreasing it. 
Table 7.6: Conditional Kuznets’ curve, Malaysian States,
pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.452*** 0.443*** 0.513*** 1.065*** 2.532*** 2.379*** 2.290*** 2.375***
(28.51) (22.68) (9.98) (5.40) (5.25) (4.21) (4.02) (4.22)
GDPpc -0.129**
(-2.37)
-0.093*
(-1.78)
-0.103*
(1.92)
-0.088*
(-1.69)
-0.504***
(-4.27)
-0.462***
(-3.41)
-0.422***
(-3.04)
-0.356**
(-2.50)
GDPpc² 0.00001* 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.020**
(1.95) (1.64) (1.59) (1.11) (4.15) (3.34) (2.91) (2.36)
NEP 0.034***
(3.73)
0.030***
(2.91)
0.025**
(2.36)
0.027**
(2.48)
0.027***
(3.13)
0.027***
(2.68)
0.022**
(2.22)
0.023**
(2.26)
Govt - -0.007** -0.004 0.002 - -0.023 -0.021 -0.018
(-0.27) (-0.18) (0.06) (-0.94) (-0.85) (-0.69)
YearSchool - - -0.003
(-1.45)
-0.052***
(-2.85)
- - -0.003
(-1.50)
-0.034*
(-1.86)
YearSchool² - - - 0.001**
(2.60)
- - - 0.001
(1.66)
Support 
Kuznets’ 
Hypothesis?
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
n 107 93 93 93 107 93 93 93
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.45 0.32 0.32 0.33
Notes: The GDPpc variables are in measured in constant prices in columns 1 to 4 and in natural 
logarithm of the constant prices in columns 5 to 8. Coefficients for GDPpc and GDPpc2 in columns 1 
to 4 are multiplied by 10,000. Figures in brackets are t-statistics using robust standard errors. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. n denotes the number of 
observations.  Data are five-year averages.
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7.7 Discussion and Implications
Table 7.7 summarizes the results of our regional inequality analysis.
Table 7.7: Summary of results
ANALYSIS RESULTS
Regional Inequality Pattern
Coefficient of variation Divergence
Williamson Index No overall trend
ı-convergence Divergence
ȕ-convergence Convergence
Kuznets’ and Williamson’s Curve
Panel Data Opposite or no support for Kuznets’ 
curve
Heterogenous panels Opposite or no support for Kuznets’ 
curve
Time Series No support for Kuznets’ curve 
Contrary to Williamson’s (1965) expectations, the pattern of inequality in Malaysia 
does not follow a Kuznets’ curve. Moreover, the results tend to suggest divergence in 
regional incomes. Regional imbalances continue despite government spending and 
programs undertaken in order to improve inequality. This problem is officially 
acknowledged by the government. For example, according to the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan 2006-2010 (p.355):
…all states recorded economic growth and increase in the mean monthly household 
income. The quality of life also improved in the rural and urban areas. However, in 
terms of regional balance, little progress was made in reducing development gaps 
between regions, states as well as rural and urban areas.
There are a number of factors that might explain the lack of a Williamson/Kuznets
curve, and the apparent U-shaped path of regional inequality.     
Time Span
Both Kuznets (1955) and Williamson (1965) used cross section data of 
developed and developing countries. Williamson (1965) used developing countries 
such as Brazil to represent the ‘early development stages’, with the UK, the US and 
Germany representing the ‘later or more developed stages’. More recent studies (e.g.
Chen, 1996; Azzoni, 2001; Wei, 2009) use time series data. Thus, the important 
questions are:  (1) what constitutes the ‘early development’ period? and (2) does the 
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early development period commence with Malaysia’s independence or the earliest 
available data? This issue is important as it is possible that different time periods 
might generate different results. In Malaysia, independence came in 1957, but the 
earliest available data at the state level is 1970. Hence, the pattern of regional 
inequality prior to 1970 is unidentified. It is possible during this earlier period there 
was an increase in inequality (i.e. from 1957 to 1970). This might very well mean 
that the analysis could be missing the first part of the pattern identified by Amos –
increasing, then decreasing and then increasing again. 
Historical Factors
Regional inequalities in Malaysia can be directly linked to historical factors 
(Asan, 2004). For example, the west coast states, such as Melaka and Penang, were 
the earliest British settlements. Melaka was the first to be settled by the British in 
1785, followed by Penang in 1876. Melaka and Penang then became the British 
government capital states in Malaysia. The other west coast states such as Perak, 
Selangor and Negeri Sembilan were rich with tin resources. The tin industry boomed 
in the late 18th century due to massive demand from Europe. The west coast region 
became the main centre for economic activities in Peninsular Malaysia. 
Immigration from China and India, encouraged by the British government to 
provide workers for mines and rubber estates, resulted in increases in the population 
in the west coast region. Rapid population growth encouraged economic activity in 
these areas. The Malays that worked in the traditional agricultural sector also 
obtained benefits, becoming the main rice suppliers for the Chinese and Indian 
workers. Therefore, Malays who lived in the west coast region earned higher income 
and enjoyed a better quality of life.       
These areas benefited from British infrastructure development, with the 
highest investment occurring during the Draft Development Plan (DPP) during 1950-
1955. The DPP (1950-1955) allocated 66 percent of development expenditure for 
infrastructure development, and under the First Five Years Plan (1956-1960) 54
percent of the funding was allocated. Most of the infrastructure investment occurred 
in the dominant economic areas, contributing to the process of divergence in regional 
incomes.12
12 For example, Port Swettenham (now Pelabuhan Klang) was built in Selangor as the main port. The 
first railway also built in 1885 to link mining areas and rubber estates in Selangor and Perak with the 
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Investment Attraction and Industrial Concentration
One possible source of regional disparity is industrial concentration. Spinager 
(1986) found that 74% of industries were located in the western region. These 
industries, which are mostly labor intensive, provided job opportunities for people in 
these states and hence contributed to reduce income inequality. Industrial
concentration continues to exist in some states especially in the western region. Perak 
and Selangor have the fastest industrial growth, about 10 percent annually.
Domestic and foreign investment was also higher in the west coast states. 
Table 7.8 shows that the domestic and foreign investment in Selangor for 2000 was 
RM2547 million and RM5225 million respectively, far higher than Kedah, Kelantan 
and Sabah. A similar trend was also found in 2005 and 2008.
Investment inflows correlate with infrastructure, with the more developed 
west coast states with better infrastructure attracting more investment. According to 
the Eighth Malaysia Plan (p.142):
…the availability of good infrastructure in these states continued to make them 
attractive destination for investments. In the manufacturing sector, the highest 
growth of 10.1 per cent per annum was achieved by Perak followed by Selangor 9.8 
per cent and Pulau Pinang 9.6 per cent. The average annual growth rate of the 
manufacturing sector in the less developed states was higher than the national 
average at 9.4 per cent. Among the less developed states, Kedah, Pahang, 
Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak had an average annual growth rate of more than 8.0 
per cent. The manufacturing projects implemented in the States of Pahang, Sabah, 
Sarawak and Terengganu were mainly related to the petro-chemical and gas 
industries, electrical and electronic, and wood-based industries. 
Table 7.8:  Investment by States (RM Million)
States 2000 2005 2008
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Selangor 2,547.0 5,255.0 4,684.0 3,817.0 2,866.0 9,005.0
Kedah 155.0 861.0 254.0 1,510.0 288.0 2,279.0
Kelantan 30.0 3.7 121.0 4.2 17.6 66.0
Sabah 311.0 59.0 926.0 278.5 620.6 343.8
Source: Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit, Economic Reports various years and Malaysia Plans 
various years data.
Globalization and External Factors
Government efforts to reduce regional income inequality can also be 
influenced by external factors beyond the governments’ control. For example, there 
is some evidence that in China and Mexico external factors such as globalization and 
Port Swettenham. The port became the main port in Peninsular Malaysia to facilitate export import 
activities.
Chapter 7
 
191
 
foreign direct investment have had a significant impact on regional inequality (Zhang 
and Zhang, 2003; Wan and Chen, 2007; Rivas, 2006). Since Independence in 1957, 
Malaysia has experienced several economic crises, including oil price hikes in 1975, 
the global economic recession in 1985, the Asian financial crisis 1997 and the global 
economic crisis since 2008. Graphical analysis in Figures 5, 6 and 8 show that 
regional inequality has risen after economic crises. For instance, the coefficient of 
variation (Figure 7.6) increased substantially from 0.415 in 1987 to 0.495 in 1990. 
Regional inequality development programs were severely affected by economic 
crises. As an example, during the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1985-1990) numerous 
projects to reduce regional income disparity were delayed due to budget constraints 
(The Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1985-1990:165). In addition, commodity prices such as 
palm oil and rubber fell during the crisis, affecting eastern region states that relied 
mainly on agricultural based economic activities. This might be an explanation for 
the significant rise of regional inequality after 1986.  Regional inequality also rose 
gradually after the Asian financial crisis 1997 and the global economic crisis 2008. 
Government Policies
Williamson (1965) contended that regional inequality increases because of 
federal government policy biases, such as development policies that favor urban 
areas. Kuznets (1955) argued that increased inequality in the early stages of 
development arises because of urban and rural income differentials. Inequality will 
most likely be higher in urban areas than in the rural areas. Therefore, increases in 
the proportion of the population that is urbanized can increase inequality. As the 
development process is usually faster in urban areas, those who are living in the 
urban area will derive more benefit. However, the evidence in Malaysia shows that 
rural-urban income disparity has declined with development, even as regional 
income inequalities have increased. The urban-rural disparity ratio decreased 
significantly from 2.14 in 1972 to 1.13 in 1995 (Mahadevan, 2007). The Malaysian 
government has taken active steps, especially during the New Economic Policy 
(1971-1990) period, to develop rural areas through various development programs, 
such as land and infrastructure development programs. For example, new townships 
and resettlement areas have been developed since the 1970s under the New 
Economic Policy. The main objective of the resettlement program was to provide 
rural communities with better infrastructure and facilities, thus to encourage them to 
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become involved in modern sector activities. These rural development programs 
increased rural productivity and thereby helped to reduce the gap between rural and 
urban areas. Most of the resettlement programs were located in less developed states. 
The Fifth Malaysia Plan (1985-1990:185) documented the mechanism as follow:
These settlers, who were originally from rural areas, resided in various new 
townships and settlement areas of the Pahang Tenggara Development Authority 
(DARA), Jengka Regional Development Authority (JENGKA), Johor Tenggara 
Development Authority (KEJORA), Kelantan Selatan Development Authority 
(KESEDAR), and Terengganu Tengah Development Authority (KETENGAH), 
thereby getting better access to urban services and facilities. The new townships 
programs, to a limited extent, also facilitated the participation of the originally rural 
population in productive modern sector activities. 
Strong efforts to balance development between rural and urban areas have 
successfully reduced income inequality. As a result, inequality was lower in the early 
stage of development, nullifying Williamson and Kuznets’ predictions.  So why did 
it then increase? A key question for future research is to identify why inequality has 
subsequently increased.
7.8 Conclusions
Inequality is a major political and economic issue. In this chapter the path of 
regional inequality for 14 Malaysian states for the period 1970 to 2009 was analyzed.
Using a variety of tests, this chapter finds no evidence of a Kuznets’ (or Williamson) 
curve at the regional level. Indeed, the evidence shows the reverse effect: It appears 
that regional inequality initially falls, but then increases with further economic 
development. This pattern appears to be consistent with evidence from several other 
developing countries. 
Analysis of convergence shows that regional incomes converge at a rate of 2 
percent per annum, similar to the evidence reported for other countries. However, 
this rate of convergence appears to be insufficient to prevent divergence in regional 
incomes. The New Economic Policy was successful in reducing poverty and 
inequality at the national level. However, it was unsuccessful at reducing regional 
inequality. If continued regional disparities and their possible long run adverse 
effects on society and the economy continue to be a policy issue, the task for policy 
makers will be to find ways to keep a lid on rising regional inequality. 
The next chapter discusses the effects of inequality on growth in Malaysia 
and Southeast Asia. Various growth models are estimated that explore the relative 
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contributions of education and inequality on growth. These models also incorporate
the effects of democracy and regime duration on growth.
Appendix A: Diagnostic Tests for Panel Data and Time Series
Panel Data
Diagnostic Tests Results Interpretation
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
(xtserial Stata routine)
487.621
[0.00]
Has first order autocorrelation
Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity
(xttest3 Stata routine)
351.64
[0.00]
Heteroskedasticity problem
Jarque Bera Normality Test 16.657
[0.00]
Non Normality in error 
distribution
Time Series
Diagnostic Tests Results Interpretation
Durbin Watson statistic 0.539 Autocorrelation problem
Residual correlation 0.729
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CHAPTER 8
INEQUALITY, DEMOCRACY, REGIME DURATION AND GROWTH
8.1 Introduction   
While many authors agree broadly that inequality has an adverse effect on 
growth, others dispute this conclusion. Theoretical models predict a very wide range 
of outcomes: Inequality can have a positive, negative, or zero effect on growth, and 
multiple equilibria are possible (Benabou, 2000). There is also much discussion over 
the channels through which inequality can potentially affect growth. Moreover, there 
is much discussion on the various interdependencies, such as the effects of inequality 
on democracy (Solt, 2008; Kelly and Enns, 2010).
The burgeoning empirical literature has tried to resolve the theoretical 
debates by investigating whether equity and growth are substitutes or compliments.1
Using cross-sectional data, the early empirical literature concluded that inequality 
harmed long run growth. The more recent availability of panel data enabled many to 
draw a new conclusion: controlling for country fixed effects, inequality assisted 
growth. The extant evidence, however, is characterized by wide differences in 
empirical results. Indeed, a common finding in the literature is that the estimated 
results of the effect of inequality on growth are fragile (Forbes, 2000; Partridge, 
2005).
The majority of the existing empirical studies adopt a cross-country 
framework. While this enables analysis of a broader set of countries (often both 
developed and developing), it exposes the analysis to the intrinsic excess 
heterogeneity that exists between diverse nations, making it harder to disentangle the 
various effects and reveal the underlying associations. A small group of studies 
focuses on more homogenous country samples. For example, Schneider and Wagner 
(2001) study the effects of inequality on growth in 14 European Union countries. 
Keane and Prasad (2002) study the effects of inequality on growth in the former 
Eastern European nations. Partridge (2005) focuses on US states and Ghosh and Pal 
(2004) focus on Indian states. Similarly, Krieckhaus (2006) notes that the growth 
effects of inequality may be region-specific and, hence, it is important to conduct the 
empirical analysis for specific regions. This chapter adds to this pool of studies by 
focussing only on Southeast Asia, as well as Malaysia separately.
1 Interest often lies on the economic effects of the distribution of wealth, but lack of data forces 
researchers to use income distribution data. The two series are highly correlated.
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This chapter takes the view that a more regionally focussed sample and study 
is more informative of the underlying growth process than including Southeast Asian 
countries as part of a wider cross-country sample. This chapter also presents an 
econometric case study for one of these countries, Malaysia. Partridge (1997, 2005) 
and Panizza (2002) advocate the analysis of individual countries, noting that cross-
country studies are usually affected by data comparability problems, especially the 
use of different inequality definitions and measures. In contrast, state level data for a 
given country are usually collected by the same agency using a similar methodology. 
Hence, such data may be less prone to measurement errors than cross-country data 
(Panizza, 2002:26). In addition, Partridge (2005) argues that using country specific 
data reduces disparities in economic growth as every country has different initial 
conditions and resource bases, rules and regulations and historical and 
socioeconomic background.2
Three features of the region make Southeast Asia a particularly interesting 
case study. First, several countries in this region have recorded impressive growth 
rates3 and their governments have been especially concerned with the path of 
inequality over the course of their rapid economic development. The links between 
inequality and growth are an important part of the policy agenda within the region. 
Second, over most of the period studied (1960-2009), Southeast Asia has been ruled 
by autocracies and partial democracies, with some transitions to democracy. 
According to Epstein et al.’s (2006) classification, 59 percent of the observations 
relate to autocratic regimes (Polity score -10 to 0), 27 percent relate to partial 
democracies (Polity score +1 to +7) and the rest (14 percent) relate to democracies 
(Polity score +8 to +10).4 Third, many governments in this region are relatively long 
lived and some are ruled by a single party, raising the question of the impact of 
regime duration on economic growth. These countries have attracted attention from 
scholars in various fields but there has not yet been any specific analysis of the links 
between inequality and growth in this region, nor of the economic consequences of 
long lived political regimes. 
2 Each region within a country also has its own unique characteristics and history. However, such 
differences tend to be smaller within countries than between them.
3Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand are the most developed of the 
Southeast Asian countries. They are regarded as high performing East Asian economies (World Bank, 
1993). Singapore is one of the Four Tigers (World Bank, 1993). Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand are 
known as the newly industrial economies (NIEs).
4 The data were discussed in Chapter 4.
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There is a large literature on the effects of inequality on growth (de 
Dominicis, de Groot and Florax, 2008) and an even larger literature on the effects of 
democracy on growth (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008). And, while there is a 
large literature analysing the duration of democracies and transitions into and out of 
democracy (e.g. Przeworski et al. 1996; Epstein et al. 2006; Gates et al. 2006), there 
is a dearth of studies on the effects of regime duration on growth.5 This chapter 
contributes to the literature by presenting a region specific analysis of the effects of 
inequality, democracy and regime duration. The analysis commences first with a 
replication of the Persson and Tabellini (1994) growth model,6 followed by 
consideration of additional control variables suggested by the empirical growth 
literature.
This chapter is set out as follows. Section 8.2 provides a review of the key 
theoretical considerations and some of the prior empirical studies. The results are 
presented in Section 8.3. Issues of endogeneity are discussed in Section 8.4. The 
chapter is concluded in Section 8.5. The data used in this chapter are described in 
Chapter 4.  
8.2 Theoretical Considerations and Prior Evidence
Inequality and Growth
Competing theories provide rival predictions regarding the links between 
inequality and growth. Classical economic models predict that inequality is 
beneficial for growth. For example, Kaldor (1956) associates higher income 
inequality with higher savings and hence higher investment that translates into future 
growth. High income inequality, especially a high income share for the top income 
earners, is deemed to be good for growth as it increases savings in the economy. 
Galor and Tsiddon (1997) also predict a positive relationship between inequality and 
growth particularly during periods of technological advances. High technology 
industries require highly skilled workers. Firms will offer higher wage and salary 
levels in order to attract and retain this highly skilled labour, resulting in higher 
5 An important part of the growth effects of democracy literature considers non-linearities in the 
relationship. This literature, however, essentially deals with transitions, exploring the consequences of 
moving between one regime and another (or change in the degree of democracy). Our concern here is 
on the duration of the regime, be it an autocracy, partial democracy or democracy.
6There are other models available. For example, Alesina and Rodrik’s (1994) model considers land 
inequality as an important determinant of the effects of inequality on growth. However, the required 
data on land inequality are very scarce for Southeast Asia.
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inequality. This concentration of skilled labour combined with investment in 
advanced technology promotes high growth rates in the future. 
The prospect that inequality may be harmful to growth was raised by Persson 
and Tabellini (1992; 1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Adopting a political 
economy framework, they argue that higher levels of inequality in democratic 
societies encourage median voters, who are dominated by the lower income group, to 
press governments to direct spending towards redistributive activities. Consequently, 
higher inequality is expected to reduce future growth, as government spending is 
channelled to relatively less productive activities such as transfer payments. 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) argue that increases in inequality force 
governments to emphasize redistributive fiscal policies that are usually financed 
through higher taxes. Increases in taxes consequently suppress economic growth. 
Redistributive fiscal policies more often benefit the poor. Therefore, if the proportion 
of the poor is greater and dominates voting or political power, government spending 
is more likely to support redistributive policies. In addition, several redistributive 
policies such as transfer payments and direct assistance to the poor are less 
productive economic activities because they do not result in new products or new 
investments. Alesina and Perroti (1996) argue that an increase in inequality is 
harmful for growth when inequality increases socio-political unrest and political 
instability. High inequality promotes crime and violence that might increase political 
instability, while political instability diminishes growth due to economic uncertainty. 
However if this inequality prompts  government spending on the poor which then 
reduces crime and illegal activities, this in turn may create a climate more favourable 
for investment and hence contribute to growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1992).
Saint Paul and Verdier (1996) make the point that higher inequality need not 
result in redistributive taxes. A key factor is the nature of political participation and 
the distribution of power. For example, in the US, political awareness and 
participation of the poor is much lower than amongst the rich. Consequently, 
political pressure tends to result in government decisions that favour higher income 
groups. 
Galor and Zeira (1993) link inequality and growth through the effect of 
capital accumulation. Capital accumulation is influenced by the effectiveness of 
capital markets which provide an avenue for the poor to finance their education and 
assets accumulation. The poor face a particularly difficult borrowing constraint when 
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capital markets are tight, preventing them from exploiting investment opportunities 
even when the investment offers a relatively high rate of return. Galor and Zeira 
(1993:36) argue that: 
If borrowing is difficult and costly, those who inherit a large initial wealth and do 
not need to borrow have better access to investment in human capital…Hence the 
distribution of wealth affects the aggregate amounts of investment in human capital 
and of output. 
Imperfect capital markets lead to higher inequality as the rich have better 
opportunities for investment. 
Much of the evidence on the relationship between inequality and growth 
remains inconclusive in part because authors use differing specifications and 
datasets. For example, Persson and Tabellini (1994) found a negative relationship 
between inequality and growth. Their finding was challenged by Partridge (1997), 
who argues against Persson and Tabellini’s dataset choice of including countries at 
widely different levels of development. 
Deininger and Squire (1998) used their new improved inequality dataset to 
investigate whether there exists a systematic relationship between inequality and 
growth. As well as looking at inequality, they examined the relationship between 
asset (land) inequality and growth. Their results show a negative relationship 
between asset inequality and long term growth.  
Li and Zou (1998) also reassess the relationship between income distribution and 
economic growth. They use a similar specification to Alesina and Rodrik (1994) but 
divide government spending into two categories, production and consumption 
services, finding a significant positive association between income inequality and 
economic growth. 
Regime Duration
Several Southeast Asian countries have been ruled by dominant parties, e.g.
Malaysia and Singapore. Dominant party regimes have received relatively little 
attention from researchers (Greene, 2008). It is not theoretically clear how having a 
dominant party in a country affects growth and inequality. On the one hand, 
dominant ruling parties have the ability to maintain power for an extended period of 
time and are therefore in a position to implement growth promoting policies, such as 
openness to trade and capital accumulation, regardless of the level of inequality. 
They do not need to give into demands for redistribution that come at the expense of 
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investment and growth. On the other hand, lack of an effective opposition may 
ultimately render the dominant ruling party prone to corruption and capture by 
sectional interests. The longer the regime remains in place, the more vulnerable it 
becomes to corruption and rent seeking behaviour.7 Regime duration means 
government stability. However, government stability does not necessarily mean 
government effectiveness (Sartori, 1997). The effect of regime duration on growth is
an empirical issue.
Olson (1982) argues that the duration and stability of a regime influences
growth. While regime duration may initially be good for growth, Olson claims that 
over time, sectional interest groups will succeed in increasing their influence and 
ability to capture rents. Dictatorships are expected to be able to hold out longer in 
meeting “encompassing interests” such as promoting growth than democracies, 
which are more vulnerable to rent seeking activities. However, this is conditional on 
the survival of the regime. Thus, dictatorships whose hold on power is slipping are 
more likely to resort to pillage than focussed on promoting long-term growth. 
Thus, regime duration can either increase or decrease growth. The 
relationship might be non-linear with growth initially increasing with regime 
duration but decreasing beyond a certain threshold. These effects might be 
moderated by democracy. That is, regime duration might have a lower positive 
(greater negative) effect on growth than less democratic regimes.
There is a small but growing literature on the effects of political regimes on 
economic performance. Following this line of enquiry, Grier and McGuire (2010) 
present evidence of a non-linear relationship between autocracies and growth. As 
they put it: “A dictator in his sixth year of power is different from a dictator in his 
first year”. (p.4). Jong-A-Pin and De Haan (2011) find a negative association 
between regime duration and growth accelerations. Jong-A-Pin (2009) finds that 
7 Most of the governments in Southeast Asia score below 5 (out of 10) in the Corruption Perception 
Index 2010. Singapore scores a high 9.3, equivalent to the score for developed countries. Malaysia’s 
score was only 4.4 and Thailand 3.5, while the other countries, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Philippines scored below 3 out of 10 rating (Transparency International, 2011). Weatherbee 
(2004:183) notes that: “In most Southeast Asian countries corruption always lurks in the background 
of elite transactions. Corruption becomes a problem when it is so dysfunctional that it slows or 
prevents the attainment of the goals of good governance. In some countries corruption is so systemic 
that it has replaced the rule of law (in Cambodia and Indonesia, for example) and the corrupt shrug it 
off with a sense of impunity when they are exposed. In other countries the rule of law has been 
corrupted to stifle democratic opposition: Malaysia and Singapore for example. In some countries 
military professionalism has been hollowed out because of corruption: the Philippines and Indonesia 
for example. From the point of view of businessmen the most corrupt countries in Southeast Asia are 
Vietnam and Indonesia.”
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countries with a stable political regime grow generally faster than countries without a 
stable political regime.
8.3 The Results
The econometric analysis was conducted separately for two unbalanced panel data 
samples - the 14 Malaysian states, the 8 Southeast Asian countries - and time series 
data for Malaysia. For both panel data samples, the analysis commenced with a 
Persson and Tabellini type growth model and then estimated a more general 
economic growth model. This chapter presents first the results for Malaysian states
and Malaysia as a nation. The advantage here is the disaggregate nature of the data 
and the focus on one specific country. This comes at a cost of using measures of 
democracy and regime duration that differ from those used in the Southeast Asian 
sample. 
Malaysian States
The estimates for Malaysian states are reported in Table 8.1. Pooled OLS is used for 
all the estimations.8 Sample size (and years studied) varies depending on the 
specification.
As noted earlier, there are no direct measures of democracy at the state level 
for Malaysia. Instead, this chapter use alternatively: (1) voter turnout as a measure of 
democratic participation; (2) Vanhanen’s (2001) measure of democracy 
(participation times competition); and (3) Gates et al. (2006) adjustment to 
Vanhanen’s measure. This chapter reports only the results using the voter turnout 
measure. In unreported regressions the author found that the other constructed 
measures of democracy were not statistically significant in explaining regional 
growth (these results are available from the author). The results for our Persson and 
Tabellini ‘type’ model are reported in Table 8.1, column 1. The Persson and 
Tabellini model also includes convergence (measured as the natural logarithm of per 
capita GDP at the start of the 5-year averages), the schooling rate and inequality.
8 Results using fixed effects are not reported here but they basically confirm the results presented in 
Table 8.1. The fixed effects themselves are jointly statistically insignificant and, hence, we prefer the 
pooled OLS results. There is some disagreement in the literature about the wisdom of including fixed 
effects. Some authors challenge the use of fixed effects on the grounds that inequality is a persistent 
process. Partridge (2005) and Barro (2000) both argue that fixed effects exaggerate the bias from 
measurement error. 
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Column 2 reports the results from the regime duration model where party 
dominance and its square are our proxy variables for regime duration for Malaysian 
states. Column 3 includes both the voter turnout and the party dominance variables. 
The results from the more general growth model are presented in column 4. Column 
5 adds a dummy variable for the period 1970 to 1990 during which the National 
Economic Policy (NEP) was in place. This provides a test of whether the NEP had a 
significant impact on growth. In column 6 the voter turnout variable was added
together with party dominance and the other control variables.
Table 8.1: Inequality, politics and growth, 14 Malaysian States (1970-2009)
Variables Persson 
and 
Tabellini 
model
(1)
Party 
dominance 
model
(2)
Both 
interactions
(3)
With 
controls
(4)
With
NEP
(5)
Full
model
(6)
Gini 1.649
(1.44)
-0.204
(-0.36)
1.783
(1.61)
0.513
(0.78)
0.266
(0.40)
3.045*
(2.74)
Convergence -0.128*
(-1.92)
-0.103*
(-2.74)
-0.144*
(-2.22)
-0.079
(-1.59)
-0.015
(-0.25)
-0.029
(-0.36)
Education -0.025
(-1.60)
-0.003
(-0.30)
-0.028*
(-1.75)
-0.006
(-0.49)
-0.001
(-0.01)
-0.016
(-1.02)
VoterTurnout 0.010*
(1.81)
- 0.013*
(2.04)
- - 0.018*
(2.31)
VoterTurnout* 
Inequality 
-0.059
(-0.33)
- -0.063
(-0.34)
- - 0.119
(0.47)
Party 
dominance
- 0.008*
(2.81)
0.009*
(2.47)
0.008*
(3.13)
0.008*
(3.30)
0.010*
(2.77)
Party 
dominance
squared
- -0.065*
(-2.78)
-0.066*
(-2.15)
-0.064*
(-2.88)
-0.064*
(-2.96)
-0.066*
(-2.33)
Population - - - -0.722
(-0.41)
-1.019
(-0.59)
-3.350*
(-1.86)
FDI - - - 0.246
(0.70)
0.147
(0.44)
-0.174
(-0.46)
Government - - - 0.148
(0.94)
0.098
(0.65)
0.023
(0.13)
Capital - - - -0.482
(-1.25)
-0.397
(-1.09)
-0.397
(-1.07)
NEP - - - - 0.124*
(1.68)
0.218*
(2.58)
Wald
-turnout
3.97
[0.02]
- 4.01
[0.02]
- - 3.45
[0.04]
Wald
-dominance
- 3.99
[0.02]
3.38
[0.04]
5.05
[0.01]
5.84
[0.00]
4.51
[0.01]
R2 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.41
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.27
Observations 70 105 70 91 91 66
Notes: The dependent variable is the average growth rate measured over 5-year periods. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The constant is not reported. Wald-turnout
tests the joint statistical significance of the voter turnout variables. Wald-dominance tests the joint 
statistical significance of the party dominance variables. Square brackets report prob-values. The 
coefficient on Party dominance squared is multiplied by 1000. All estimates use pooled least squares. 
When the voter turnout variables are used, years covered are 1986 to 2009.
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The results show a generally positive relationship between inequality and 
growth but this is not statistically significant, except in the full model in column 6, 
where the sample size is also the smallest. Therefore it is concluded that inequality 
does not have a robust effect on between (and within) regional growth in Malaysia. 
Voter turnout always has a positive and statistically significant coefficient.9
That is, conditional on party dominance, greater voter turnout is associated with 
higher regional growth rates. This is consistent with the view that greater political 
participation encourages the adoption of growth promoting policies and initiatives. 
The voter turnout and inequality interaction term is never statistically significant. 
This result suggests an absence of evidence supporting the Persson and Tabellini 
model for Malaysia and states. Inequality does not reduce growth when interacted 
with democracy.
The coefficient on the party dominance variable always has a positive 
coefficient and is always statistically significant and party dominance squared always
has a negative coefficient and is also statistically significant. This result indicates that 
non-linearity in party dominance is important to growth; party dominance has a 
positive effect on growth but eventually it is detrimental to growth. The results 
suggest a turning point at about 60 percent of the parliamentary seats held by the 
governing party. Given that the mean of the sample is 79 percent, the results suggest 
that party dominance has been detrimental to growth, on average. Party dominance 
has benefitted growth in only 21 percent of the years studied, with Kelantan, Kuala 
Lumpur and Pulau Pinang being the three states that have received most of this 
benefit. The other largely political variable is the NEP dummy variable. This has a 
positive coefficient indicating that the NEP had a positive effect on regional growth.
In addition to the effects of political factors, some of the results indicate 
convergence between the states: states with lower initial per capita GDP have, on 
average, recorded faster rates of growth. This result, however, is not robust to 
specification and sample size. It appears that Malaysian states are not converging 
over time. Schooling, FDI, domestic capital and government expenditure appear to 
have no effect on growth rates. Population growth has the expected negative 
9 In preliminary analysis voter turnout is statistically insignificant while the Wald-turnout test 
indicated that the two voter turnout variables were jointly significant. Hence, we re-estimated the 
models after mean centering Gini and voter turnout and then constructing the Voter 
Turnout*Inequality variable. These are the results that are reported in Table 3. This reduced 
multicollinearity between the two voter turnout variables but leaves all other statistics (including the 
Wald-turnout statistics) unchanged. There was no need to center the party dominance variables. 
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coefficient (an increase in population growth reduces per capita growth) but this is 
not robustly statistically significant.
It appears from Table 8.1 that political variables clearly dominate economic 
variables. Malaysian regional growth appears to be driven by party dominance, voter 
turnout and the intervention period during the NEP years. Increasing voter turnout 
and reducing party dominance appear to be particularly important to increasing per 
capita incomes in Malaysia. Inequality appears to be unimportant for regional 
growth.
Robustness
It is possible that the statistical insignificance of capital could be due to 
measurement issues. It is possible that party dominance serves as an overall measure 
of policy, so that variables like government, capital and FDI become statistically 
insignificant when party dominance is included in the regressions. Hence, models
without the party dominance variables were re-estimated, but the economic variables 
(such as FDI) remain statistically insignificant.  
As part of robustness testing, this chapter also considered the effects of non-
linearities in inequality on growth and non-linearities in the effects of voter turnout 
on growth. There does not appear to be any evidence supporting such a process. This 
chapter also explored interactions between both party dominance and its square and 
inequality.10 The interaction term was not statistically significant suggesting that the 
effect of inequality on growth and the effect of party dominance on growth are not 
conditional on each other. An interaction term between voter turnout and party 
dominance was also included. This variable has a negative coefficient but it is not 
statistically significant (coefficient = -0.00027 with a t-statistic of -1.61).The school 
enrolment rate with the primary and secondary school enrolment rates were also 
included and found essentially the same results. Finally, this chapter also tested the 
Barro (2000) specification that replaces the convergence variable with a linear and a 
non-linear conditional convergence relationship consisting of the GDP per capita and 
its square. There is no evidence of nonlinear convergence.
10The logic behind this is that in the non-linear range, inequality might accelerate the adverse effects 
on growth.
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Malaysian National Data
Table 8.2 presents the results for Malaysia, using national data (time series). Column 
1 reports the results using overall inequality (Gini coefficient) and columns 2, 3 and 
4 report the results when Gini is replaced with the income share of the top 20
percent, middle 40 percent and bottom 20 percent, respectively. The different 
inequality measures are used to study the relationship of different income categories 
with growth. None of these alternate variables are statistically significant 
determinants of Malaysia’s growth. 
Table 8.2: The Persson and Tabellini model, Malaysia, (1970-2009)
Variables Gini
(1)
Top20
(2)
Mid40
(3)
Bot40
(4)
Inequality 20.902 -0.122 0.107 0.039
(0.45) (-0.24) (0.27) (0.12)
Convergence 16.333 15.112 12.345 20.398
(1.28) (0.97) (0.92) (1.51)
Education -1.961 -2.163 -1.577 -2.554
(-1.33) (-1.40) (-0.92) (-1.67)
Democracy 0.870 -1.135 -0.164 0.053
(0.26) (-0.41) (-0.10) (0.08)
Democracy* Gini -1.952
(-0.29)
Democracy*Top20 0.017
(0.36)
Democracy*Mid40 0.005
(0.10)
Democracy*Bot40 -0.020
(-0.55)
Wald
-Democracy
0.140
[0.87]
0.11
[0.90]
0.01
[0.99]
0.21
[0.81]
Constant -156.444 -125.688 -111.765 -183.125
(-1.29) (-0.79) (-0.94) (-1.46)
Observations 49 49 49 49
Adj. R2-squared
Table 8.3 reports the full model with more control variables. Again, none of 
these variables are statistically significant except for average years of schooling 
which has a negative sign. Table 8.4 presents party dominance model. Most of the 
variables are not significant and inequality does not affect growth in all models. 
Table 8.5 reports the full model with more control variables but again most of the 
variables including inequality are not significant. However, all models appear to 
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suffer from a lack of precision. This is to be expected when there are only 49 
observations.
Table 8.3: The Persson and Tabellini, full model, Malaysia, (1970-2009)
Variables Gini
(1)
Top20
(2)
Mid40
(3)
Bot40
(4)
Inequality -50.197 -0.799 0.263 0.847
(-0.14) (-0.32) (0.17) (0.52)
Convergence 49.044 35.608 23.310 38.661
(1.70) (1.10) (0.83) (1.34)
Education -5.720* -5.487* -2.563 -4.395
(-1.73) (-1.82) (-0.65) (-1.13)
Democracy -11.965 -10.659 -0.244 3.269
(-0.28) (-0.32) (-0.02) (0.69)
Democracy* Gini 22.712
(0.26)
Population -4.838 -4.532 -3.776 -3.537
(-1.02) (-0.85) (-0.92) (-0.89)
FDI 0.179 0.077 0.168 0.442
(0.32) (0.15) (0.25) (0.69)
Eco 2.215 1.827 2.114 3.073
(0.97) (0.81) (0.79) (1.01)
Trade -0.003 -0.005 -0.013 -0.034
(-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.17) (-0.41)
Govt 0.342 -0.353 -0.021 0.079
(0.36) (-0.36) (-0.02) (0.05)
Capital 0.271 0.273 0.251 0.225
(1.16) (1.33) (1.35) (1.16)
NEP 0.433 -0.346 0.392 0.897
(0.13) (-0.12) (0.12) (0.27)
Democracy*Top20 0.193
(0.32)
Democracy*Mid40 0.014
(0.04)
Democracy*Bot40 -0.268
(-0.76)
Wald
-Democracy
0.16
[0.85]
0.05
[0.95]
0.02
[0.98]
0.30
[0.75]
Constant -438.054 -275.804 -230.457 -381.089
(-1.44) (-0.80) (-0.90) (-1.35)
Observations 35 35 35 35
Adj. R2-squared
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Table 8.4: Party dominance model, Malaysia, (1970-2009) 
Table 8.5: Party dominance full model, Malaysia, (1970-2009)
Variables Gini
(1)
Top20
(2)
Mid40
(3)
Bot40
(4)
Inequality 32.390 -0.077 0.267 -0.127
(0.63) (-0.17) (0.65) (-0.25)
Convergence 49.819 50.895* 39.079 52.257*
(1.64) (1.84) (1.25) (2.04)
Education -2.580 -1.417 -0.133 -1.188
(-0.46) (-0.25) (-0.02) (-0.20)
Party Dominance -1.113
(-0.66)
-1.510
(-1.04)
-1.112
(-0.73)
-1.391
(-0.88)
Party Dominance 
Square
0.023
(1.19)
0.024
(1.23)
0.016
(0.72)
0.023
(1.18)
Population -3.864 -4.215 -3.390 -3.897
(-1.14) (-1.22) (-0.99) (-1.01)
FDI 0.563 0.578 0.510 0.594
(0.87) (0.92) (0.88) (0.94)
EcoFreedom 3.710 3.521 3.236 3.431
(1.37) (1.29) (1.19) (1.20)
Trade -0.027 -0.037 -0.033 -0.042
(-0.40) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.62)
Government 0.043 -0.526 -0.169 -0.133
(0.05) (-0.62) (-0.19) (-0.09)
Capital 0.300 0.333* 0.304 0.342*
(1.38) (1.72) (1.65) (1.79)
NEP 3.694 3.104 2.509 3.327
(0.98) (0.84) (0.68) (0.92)
Wald
-Dominance
0.85
[0.44]
0.77
[0.73]
0.32
[0.99]
0.76
[0.48]
Constant -510.958 -493.181 -401.440 -516.920*
(-1.63) (-1.65) (-1.32) (-1.95)
Observations 35 35 35 35
Adj. R2-squared
Variables Gini
(1)
Top20
(2)
Mid40
(3)
Bot40
(4)
Inequality 20.070 -0.031 0.201 -0.064
(0.65) (-0.13) (0.78) (-0.31)
Convergence 22.564 9.295 2.620 14.654
(1.48) (0.52) (0.14) (0.94)
Education -3.059 -1.957 -1.018 -2.214
(-1.44) (-1.21) (-0.55) (-1.58)
Party Dominance 0.134
(0.52)
0.108
(0.65)
0.304
(1.06)
0.144
(0.63)
Party Dominance 
Square
-0.000
(-0.09)
-0.000
(-0.01)
-0.005
(-0.65)
-0.001
(-0.23)
Wald
-Dominance
0.32
[0.73]
0.99
[0.38]
1.18
[0.32]
0.71
[0.50]
Constant -213.594
(-1.40)
-75.960
(-0.43)
-23.132
(-0.14)
-128.609
(-0.88)
Observations 49 49 49 49
Adj. R2-squared
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Southeast Asia
Tables 8.6 to 8.11 present the results for Southeast Asia, using alternate measures 
of inequality. Table 8.6 reports the results using Gini, while Tables 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9
present the results when Top20, Middle40 and Bot40 are used as measures of 
inequality. The sample size is significantly smaller when Gini is not used to measure 
inequality. Tables 8.10 and 8.11 report the results for the full set of control variables. 
These are the Southeast Asian sample equivalent of Table 8.3. The main differences 
between Table 8.8 and Tables 8.9 and 8.10 are that it includes Polity2 as the measure 
of democracy as an explanatory variable (rather than voter turnout), as well as 
exports as a share of GDP. The fixed effects models are jointly statistically 
significant in most cases, though the results are broadly similar to pooled OLS.
Table 8.6, columns 1 and 2, present the results of the Persson and Tabellini 
model using Gini as the measure of inequality, estimated by pooled OLS and fixed 
effects, respectively, using the reported data on inequality. Columns 3 and 4 use the 
data on inequality constructed using multiple imputation techniques (Honaker and 
King, 2010). Columns 5 to 8 report similar estimates for the regime duration model. 
Overall inequality measured as Gini has a positive coefficient in all specifications but 
is robustly statistically significant only in the regime duration model. Gini is not 
statistically significant in any of the full specification models (Table 8.10). 
Turning to the income shares results, Table 8.7 shows that in most cases 
inequality has a positive effect on growth. An increase in the income share of the top 
20 percent group increases the growth rate. However, the share of the top 20 percent
is no longer statistically significant when other covariates are included (Table 8.10). 
This is actually consistent with the view that top income earners can be expected to 
vote for more competitive and growth stimulating policies and the expectation that 
increases in the share of top income will also increase savings and investment that in 
turn promote growth. If the effect of the income share of the top 20 percent works 
through factors such as trade and investment, then including these effects in the 
regression should reduce the statistical significance of the inequality variable.
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Table 8.6: Basic model, Southeast Asia (1960-2009) inequality measured as Gini
Persson and Tabellini Model Regime Duration Model
Reported data Imputed data Reported data Imputed data
Variables
Pooled
OLS
(1)
Fixed
Effects
(2)
Pooled
OLS
(3)
Fixed
Effects
(4)
Pooled
OLS
(5)
Fixed
Effects
(6)
Pooled
OLS
(7)
Fixed
Effects
(8)
Gini 0.089 0.109* 0.048 0.092 0.148* 0.153* 0.134* 0.139
(1.17) (2.19) (0.79) (1.33) (2.60) (6.15) (2.12) (1.92)
Convergence -0.214 1.145 -0.111 2.073* 0.635 1.839 0.706 3.509*
(-0.17) (0.67) (-0.13) (2.37) (0.74) (1.87) (0.91 (4.70)
Education -0.188 -0.314* -0.503* -0.658* -0.714* -0.720* -0.929* -1.477*
(-0.84) (-2.49) (-2.83) (-7.84) (-2.54) (-3.94) (-4.59) (-9.95)
Democracy -0.042 -0.033 -0.145 -0.213 - - - -
(-0.43) (-0.26) (-0.50) (-0.71)
Democracy* 0.559 1.202* 0.267 0.445 - - - -
Inequality (0.74) (2.70) (0.40) (0.71)
Regime 
duration
- - - - 0.156*(1.71)
0.181*
(1.92)
0.180*
(3.05)
0.197*
(3.80)
Regime 
duration  
squared
- - - - -0.002(-1.07)
-0.003*
(-2.12)
-0.002*
(-2.03)
-0.001
(-1.12)
Wald
-democracy
0.84
[0.43]
3.66
[0.08]
0.21
[0.81]
0.29
[0.77] - - - -
Wald
-duration - - - -
3.16
[0.05]
2.31
[0.17]
9.47
[0.00]
22.81
[0.00]
R2 0.04 0.23 0.06 0.09 -
Adjusted R2 -0.01 0.14 0.04 - 0.05 - -
F-test fixed 
effects -
3.57
[0.00] - - -
2.87
[0.01] - -
Observations 111 111 251 251 111 111 251 251
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate. Imputed data used in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, using robust standard errors. Standard errors in columns 3, 4, 7 and 
8 are adjusted for data imputation. * denotes statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The 
constant and fixed effects are not reported. Wald-democracy tests the joint statistical significance of 
the democracy variables. Wald-duration tests the joint statistical significance of the regime duration 
variables. Square brackets report prob-values.
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Table 8.7: Basic model, Southeast Asia (1960-2009) inequality measured as Top20 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate. Imputed data used in columns 3, 4, 7 and 
8.Robust t-statistics in parentheses, using robust standard errors. Standard errors in columns 5 to 8 
adjusted for data imputation. * denotes statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The constant 
and fixed effects are not reported. Wald-democracy tests the joint statistical significance of the 
democracy variables. Wald-duration tests the joint statistical significance of the regime duration 
variables. Square brackets report prob-values.
Persson and Tabellini Model Regime Duration Model
Reported Data Imputed Data Reported Data Imputed Data
Variables Pooled
OLS
(1)
Fixed
Effects
(2)
Pooled
OLS
(3)
Fixed
Effects
(4)
Pooled
OLS
(5)
Fixed
Effects
(6)
Pooled
OLS
(7)
Fixed
Effects
(8)
Top 20 0.427* 0.520* 0.239* 0.248 0.518* 0.637* 0.283* 0.262*
(3.62) (1.82) (1.79) (1.81) (4.55) (1.95) (2.41) (2.09)
Convergence 6.664* 7.762 1.397 2.761 6.815* 2.142 1.755 3.514*
(3.65) (0.84) (0.83) (1.40) (2.71) (0.28) (1.10) (2.27)
Education -1.328* -1.120 -0.749* -0.670* -1.739* -1.187 -1.113* -1.581*
(-2.91) (-0.89) (-3.08) (-3.79) (-4.68) (-1.08) (-4.15) (-6.09)
Democracy -1.310 -1.975* -0.194 -0.524
(-1.43) (-1.75) (-0.36) (-1.08) - - - -
Democracy* 0.026 0.042* 0.002 0.010 - - - -
Inequality (1.22) (1.71) (0.20) (1.00)
Regime 
duration
- - - - 0.241*
(2.65)
0.204*
(9.26)
0.173*
(2.93)
0.189*
(4.27)
Regime 
duration  
squared
- - - -
-0.003*
(-2.07)
-0.000
(-0.18)
-0.002*
(-1.83)
-0.001
(-0.62)
Wald
-democracy
2.03
[0.14]
1.56
[0.22]
0.80
[0.45]
0.58
[0.62]
- - - -
Wald
-duration
- - - - 5.17
[0.01]
60.38
[0.00]
10.84
[0.00]
33.95
[0.00]
R2 0.279 0.221 - - 0.360 0.321
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.0131 0.299 0.256 - -
F-test fixed 
effects
- 2.55
[0.04]
- 3.85
[0.04]
- 1019.32
[0.00]
- 11.31
[0.41]
Observations
58 58 236 236 58 58 236 236
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
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Table 8.8: Basic model, Southeast Asia (1960-2009) inequality measured as Mid40
Persson and Tabellini Model Regime Duration Model
Reported Data Imputed Data Reported Data Imputed Data
Variables Pooled
OLS
(1)
Fixed
Effects
(2)
Pooled
OLS
(3)
Fixed
Effects
(4)
Pooled
OLS
(5)
Fixed
Effects
(6)
Pooled
OLS
(7)
Fixed
Effects
(8)
Mid 40 -0.158 -0.207 0.002 0.042 -0.146 -0.212 -0.025 0.036
(-0.63) (-0.68) (0.01) (0.26) (-0.70) (-0.62) (-0.16) (0.22)
Convergence 1.986 13.474 -0.494 1.218 1.455 9.220 -0.244 2.151
(0.70) (1.34) (-0.62) (0.82) (0.42) (1.26) (-0.33) (1.80)
Education -1.126* -2.895* -0.589* -0.670* -1.097* -2.868* -0.723* -1.319*
(-2.22) (-2.02) (-2.31) (-3.74) (-2.79) (-3.46) (-3.02) (-4.21)
Democracy -0.312 1.046 0.117 0.558 - - - -
(-0.29) (0.92) (0.30) (1.39) - - - -
Democracy* 0.013 -0.041 -0.004 -0.021
Inequality (0.33) (-0.94) (-0.30) (-1.44)
Regime duration - - - - 0.141
(1.50)
0.160
(1.72)
0.125*
(2.46)
0.173*
(3.72)
Regime duration  
squared
- - - - -0.002
(-1.21)
0.001
(0.26)
-0.001
(-1.48)
-0.001
(-0.61)
Wald
-democracy
0.11
[0.90]
0.44
[0.64]
0.05
[0.95]
1.23
[0.38]
- - - -
Wald
-duration
- - - - 1.34
[0.27]
17.49
[0.00]
8.02
[0.00]
28.54
[0.00]
R2 0.127 0.128 - - 0.167 0.234
Adjusted R2 0.043 -0.104 0.087 0.161 - -
F-test fixed 
effects
- 1.33
[0.27]
- 6.48
[0.28]
- 2134.56
[0.00]
- 19.54
[0.08]
Observations 58 58 236 236 58 58 236 236
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate. Imputed data used in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, using robust standard errors. Standard errors in columns 5 to 8 
adjusted for data imputation. * denotes statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The constant 
and fixed effects are not reported. Wald-democracy tests the joint statistical significance of the 
democracy variables. Wald-duration tests the joint statistical significance of the regime duration 
variables. Square brackets report prob-values
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Table 8.9: Basic model, Southeast Asia (1960-2009) inequality measured as Bot40 
Persson and Tabellini Model Regime Duration Model
Reported Data Imputed Data Reported Data Imputed Data
Variables Pooled
OLS
(1)
Fixed
Effects
(2)
Pooled
OLS
(3)
Fixed
Effects
(4)
Pooled
OLS
(5)
Fixed
Effects
(6)
Pooled
OLS
(7)
Fixed
Effects
(8)
Bot40 -0.205 0.151 -0.238* -0.250* -0.487* -0.451* -0.281* -0.269*
(-1.55) (0.51) (-2.01) (-2.09) (-4.13) (-2.17) (-2.35) (-2.25)
Convergence 6.588* 7.865 2.282 4.882* 7.544* -0.996 2.773 5.166*
(3.39) (0.77) (1.27) (1.96) (2.94) (-0.10) (1.53) (2.52)
Education -0.778* -1.338 -0.515* -0.586* -1.065* -0.278 -0.759* -1.324*
(-1.81) (-0.82) (-2.82) (-3.05) (-4.38) (-0.21) (-5.01) (-4.49)
Democracy 1.955 2.895* -0.208 -0.222 - - - -
(1.63) (1.98) (-0.64) (-0.78)
Democracy* -0.071* -0.102* 0.005 0.006 - - - -
Inequality (-1.73) (-1.99) (0.46) (0.53)
Regime 
Duration
- - - - 0.254*
(2.46)
0.324*
(7.65)
0.183*
(2.92)
0.206*
(4.00)
Regime 
duration  
squared
- - - - -0.004*
(-2.16)
-0.003*
(-3.36)
-0.002*
(-2.06)
-0.001
(-0.90)
Wald
-democracy
1.83
[0.17]
1.97
[0.15]
0.68
[0.51]
0.93
[0.47]
- - - -
Wald
-duration
- - - - 3.62
[0.03]
29.98
[0.00]
8.31
[0.00]
38.84
[0.00]
R2 0.252 0.155 - - 0.323 0.271 - -
Adjusted R2 0.181 -0.071 - - 0.257 0.201 -
F-test fixed 
effects
- - - - - - - -
Observations 58 58 236 236 58 58 236 236
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate. Imputed data used in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, using robust standard errors. Standard errors in columns 5 to 8 
adjusted for data imputation. * denotes statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The constant 
and fixed effects are not reported. Wald-democracy tests the joint statistical significance of the 
democracy variables. Wald-duration tests the joint statistical significance of the regime duration 
variables. Square brackets report prob-values.
Tables 8.8 and 8.11 suggest that the share of the middle class has no effect on 
growth. Stronger results emerge when inequality is measured in terms of the income 
share of the bottom 40 percent. Tables 8.9 and 8.11 show that an increase in the 
income share of the bottom 40 percent decreases growth. This is consistent with the 
view that the bottom income group will tend to vote in favour of redistribution 
policies that may be harmful to future growth. 
This study concludes from the results that for Southeast Asia as a region: (a) 
there is no evidence that overall inequality has been harmful to growth in this region; 
and (b) inequality appears to have a positive effect on growth; both the between and 
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the within Southeast Asian country variation in growth rates can be explained by the 
income shares of the top 20 percent and the bottom 40 percent.11
Table 8.10:  Growth and inequality, Southeast Asia, (1960-2009) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate. Imputed data used in columns 3 and 4. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, using robust standard errors. Standard errors in columns 3 and 4 
adjusted for data imputation. * denotes statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The constant 
and fixed effects are not reported. Wald-democracy tests the joint statistical significance of the 
democracy variables. Wald-duration tests the joint statistical significance of the regime duration 
variables. Square brackets report prob-values.
11The results are not driven by the estimator used. Some prior studies have found that different 
estimators often yield different results. For example, Forbes (2000: 884) and Li and Zou (1998) found 
that OLS generated a negative or insignificant relationship between economic growth and inequality 
while fixed effect estimation generated positive relationship. 
Inequality measured as Gini Inequality Measured as Top20
Reported Data Imputed Data Reported Data Imputed Data
Variables Pooled
OLS
(1)
Fixed
Effects
(2)
Pooled
OLS
(3)
Fixed
Effects
(4)
Pooled
OLS
(5)
Fixed
Effects
(6)
Pooled
OLS
(7)
Fixed
Effects
(8)
Inequality 0.048 0.028 0.082 0.069 0.302* 0.227 0.213 0.193
(0.84) (0.66) (1.01) (0.84) (1.83) (1.00) (1.49) (1.35)
Convergence -1.614 -6.739* 0.986 -3.012 7.008* 16.881 0.915 -2.856
(-1.07) (-3.54) (1.01) (-0.95) (1.91) (1.17) (0.66) (-1.01)
Education -1.077* -1.288* -0.915* -0.992* -1.333* -2.606* -0.895* -0.977*
(-2.92) (-2.14) (-3.75) (-3.51) (-2.85) (-2.69) (-3.72) (-3.52)
Regime    
duration
0.249*
(2.93)
0.321*
(4.41)
0.156*
(2.35)
0.191
(1.83)
0.163
(1.47)
0.074
(0.85)
0.161*
(2.57)
0.199
(1.89)
Regime 
duration  
squared
-0.003*
(-2.41)
-0.003
(-1.60)
-0.003*
(-2.22)
-0.002
(-0.87)
-0.002
(-1.17) 
0.001
(0.24) 
-0.003*
(-2.34) 
-0.002
(-0.90) 
Population -0.447
(-1.39)
-1.002*
(-10.48)
-0.364
(-1.14)
-0.923*
(-3.15)
0.621
(0.40)
0.389
(0.15)
-0.725*
(-1.74)
-1.214*
(-3.30)
FDI -0.081 0.004 0.155* 0.153* -0.228 -0.461 0.048 0.055
(-0.68) (0.11) (1.95) (2.33) (-0.73) (-1.03) (0.43) (0.52)
Exports 0.175* 0.167* 0.127* 0.120* 0.141* 0.116 0.116* 0.112*
(4.69) (2.27) (5.86) (3.74) (3.01) (1.77) (4.71) (3.44)
Government -0.164 -0.498 -0.091 -0.165 0.001 0.040 -0.120 -0.163
(-1.01) (-1.29) (-0.72) (-0.65) (0.01) (0.48) (-0.96) (-0.65)
Capital 0.029 0.099* 0.076* 0.125* 0.154* 0.229* 0.074* 0.124*
(0.76) (2.53) (2.64) (2.95) (2.51) (2.21) (2.65) (3.09)
Democracy 0.204
(1.63)
0.307*
(3.40)
0.165
(0.54)
0.248
(0.57)
0.769
(0.90)
0.216
(0.35)
0.079
(0.16)
0.465
(0.69)
Democracy*
Inequality
0.112
(0.17)
-0.472
(-0.87)
-0.203
(-0.31)
-0.256
(-0.31)
-0.016
(-0.86)
-0.004
(-0.21)
-0.001
(-0.08)
-0.008
(-0.59)
Wald
-democracy
1.34
[0.27]
14.00
[0.00]
0.67
[0.51]
0.91
[0.47]
0.41
[0.67]
0.32
[0.74]
0.18
[0.84]
0.39
[0.70]
Wald
-duration
4.30
[0.02]
10.81
[0.01]
3.26
[0.04]
6.28
[0.04]
1.10
[0.34]
3.42
[0.09]
3.47
[0.03]
5.17
[0.06]
R2 0.51 0.61 0.39 - 0.553 0.555
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.51 0.36 0.425 0.428 - -
F-test fixed 
effects
- 2.74
[0.01]
- - - - - 17.31
[0.00]
Observations 93 93 233 233 55 55 233 233
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
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Table 8.11:  Growth and inequality, Southeast Asia, (1960-2009),
inequality measured as Gini
Inequality Measured as Mid40 Inequality Measured as Bot40
Reported Data Imputed Data Reported Data Imputed Data
Variables Pooled
OLS
(1)
Fixed
Effects
(2)
Pooled
OLS
(3)
Fixed
Effects
(4)
Pooled
OLS
(5)
Fixed
Effects
(6)
Pooled
OLS
(7)
Fixed
Effects
(8)
Inequality 0.219 0.373 0.300* 0.280 -0.464* -0.488 -0.374* -0.339*
(1.23) (0.77) (1.68) (1.62) (-2.60) (-1.63) (-2.72) (-2.51)
Convergence 7.664* 17.618 1.530 -2.145 8.578* 17.011 3.268* 0.031
(1.88) (0.92) (0.96) (-0.71) (2.30) (1.38) (1.68) (0.01)
Education -0.742* -1.942 -0.376 -0.522 -0.754 -0.910 -0.523* -0.663
(-1.70) (-1.55) (-1.39) (-1.35) (-1.52) (-1.23) (-2.19) (-1.77)
Regime    
duration
0.130
(1.26)
0.148
(1.38)
0.100*
(2.09)
0.149
(1.61)
0.183
(1.67)
0.128
(1.04)
0.195*
(3.01)
0.219*
(2.46)
Regime 
duration  
squared
-0.002
(-1.30)
-0.001
(-0.31)
-0.002*
(-2.09)
-0.002
(-0.78)
-0.003*
(-1.79)
-0.001
(-0.14)
-0.003*
(-2.90)
-0.003
(-1.39)
Population 1.108 2.262 -0.170 -0.671 0.616 3.714 -0.580 -0.969*
(0.71) (0.53) (-0.37) (-1.52) (0.41) (1.48) (-1.21) (-2.10)
FDI -0.093 -0.451 0.201* 0.182* -0.200 -0.412 -0.015 -0.013
(-0.30) (-1.21) (2.19) (2.19) (-0.70) (-1.06) (-0.12) (-0.11)
Exports 0.172* 0.109 0.142* 0.131* 0.131* 0.106 0.118* 0.113*
(3.94) (1.80) (6.79) (4.08) (2.87) (1.63) (5.02) (3.49)
Government 0.069 0.113 -0.068 -0.149 -0.246 -0.092 -0.272* -0.286
(0.34) (0.47) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-1.01) (-0.43) (-1.87) (-1.14)
Capital 0.238* 0.297* 0.144* 0.181* 0.210* 0.207 0.139* 0.175*
(2.98) (2.48) (3.15) (3.81) (3.16) (1.84) (3.66) (4.34)
Democracy -1.112 -0.287 0.269 0.370 0.079 0.851 -0.122 -0.247
(-1.27) (-0.26) (0.81) (0.99) (0.08) (1.13) (-0.44) (-0.74)
Democracy*
Inequality
0.048
(1.48)
0.016
(0.40)
-0.006
(0.48)
-0.008
(-0.59)
-0.002
(-0.06)
-0.028
(-1.35)
0.006
(0.56)
0.012
(0.91)
Wald
-democracy
1.90
[0.16]
0.48
[0.64]
1.52
[0.22]
1.33
[0.36]
0.02
[0.98]
1.59
[0.27]
0.23
[0.80]
0.51
[0.64]
Wald
-duration
0.89
[0.42]
2.33
[0.17]
2.15
[0.12]
2.84
[0.17]
1.63
[0.21]
5.09
[0.04]
4.99
[0.01]
3.72
[0.12]
R2 0.571 0.569 - 0.613 0.596
Adjusted R2 0.449 0.446 - 0.502 0.481 - -
F-test fixed 
effects
- - - 15.49
[0.00]
- - - 9.50
[0.00]
Observations
55 55 233 233 55 55 233 233
Countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate. Imputed data used in columns 3 and 4. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, using robust standard errors. Standard errors in columns 3 and 4 
adjusted for data imputation. * denotes statistically significant at least at the 10% level. The constant 
and fixed effects are not reported. Wald-democracy tests the joint statistical significance of the 
democracy variables. Wald-duration tests the joint statistical significance of the regime duration 
variables. Square brackets report prob-values.
A robust finding across all tables is that democracy appears to have had no 
effect on growth in Southeast Asia; it is neither harmful nor beneficial. Doucouliagos 
and Ulubasoglu (2008) found a similar result in their meta-analysis of the effects of 
democracy on growth. The Democracy*Inequality variable should be statistically 
significant with a negative coefficient according to the Persson and Tabellini (1994) 
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model. This variable appears to have no effect on growth (except in Table 8.9 when 
Bot40 is used to measure inequality and no other control variables are included in the 
analysis). Hence, this chapter concludes that there is no evidence to support the 
Persson and Tabellini model for Southeast Asia. 
In contrast to democracy, there is fairly robust evidence on the importance of 
regime duration, particularly when Gini and Top20 are used to measure inequality. 
Regime duration has a positive effect on growth up to a threshold and thereafter it 
becomes a drag on growth. The estimated turning point is, however, rather long at 37 
years, way beyond the sample mean of 13 years. On balance, this chapter finds that 
regime duration has had a positive effect on growth. 
The results for convergence are not robust. However, in the preferred set of 
results (Table 8.10, using Gini and the larger dataset) it appears that there is 
convergence in the region and exports and capital formation both emerge as robust 
determinants of growth. The share of government and FDI appear to make no direct 
contributions to growth in the region. In many regressions, population growth has a 
negative growth. 
Does Education Have a Negative Effect on Growth?
Education consistently has a negative effect on growth.  This indicates that 
the short-term effect of education on growth has been negative. This is consistent 
with the argument that resources devoted to enrolling students reduce the growth rate 
of the economy in the short-run, though they may very well increase growth in the 
long run. 
The negative and weak relationship between education and growth is not a
new finding. It appears in many prominent studies, including the seminal paper on 
growth empirics by Mankiw et al. (1992:426). 
Although that study finds a positive relationship, the result is not robust. A 
weak and insignificant positive relationship appears in OECD samples. Islam (1994) 
replicated the Mankiw et al. (1992) study using panel data and found negative 
growth effects as well. Table 8.12 below presents the evidence from selected studies 
regarding the effect of education on economic growth.
Kyriacou (1991) is among the first paper highlighting this issue, describing 
the ‘anomaly’ evidence as a ‘puzzle’. Kyriacou relates the negative evidence with the 
high initial cost of education, which in short term causes education to have a negative 
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relationship. A negative relationship between education and growth also appears in 
Pritchet (1996 and 2001) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994:166) noted:
Human capital accumulation has long been considered an important factor in 
economic development. The results obtained in our initial set of regressions are 
therefore somewhat disappointing: When one runs the specification implied by a 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function which includes human capital as a 
factor, human capital accumulation fails to enter significantly in the determination of 
economic growth, and even enters with a negative point estimate.
Several factors have been highlighted in the literature in relation to this issue. 
Pritchett (1996) explains the negative relationship between education and growth 
within an institutional framework. Pritchett agreed that schooling may develop 
cognitive skills, but the contribution toward productivity is minimal due to ‘do the 
wrong thing’ such as working in an illegal sector, hence, it may deteriorate overall 
growth in the future. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) suggest that education or human capital do not 
influence productivity and growth directly. Education is not a factor of production as 
is commonly presumed in Cobb-Douglas production functions. In line with the 
Romer (1990) model, they argue that education influences growth by enhancing 
technological innovation. Education plays a role as a catalyst, particularly in 
attracting new capital formation and investment.  This is a long run phenomenon that 
is not captured in short term growth models.
Temple (2001) examined Pritchet (1996) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1999) 
works using the technique of least trimmed squares, which removes outliers and is 
based on a non-linear specification as suggested in Jenkins (1995). The results are 
similar. Hence, Temple (2001) concedes that ‘it is hard to reject the Pritchett 
hypothesis’.
Although the Benhabib and Spiegel (1999) and Pritchett (1996) results are 
robust, that is education negatively related with growth, Temple (2001) also warned 
of the danger of misinterpreting the results, especially in questioning the relevancy of 
education as an important growth determinant. 
Chapter 8
216 
 
Thus, caution should be exercised before claiming that ‘schooling has no effect’. The 
negative result might be subject to high standard errors and measurement problems. 
The discussion on measurement problems and standard errors in education and 
growth literature mainly focuses on the quality of schooling and the accuracy of 
schooling variables. The explanation in this chapter has a similar spirit with Pritchett 
(1996 and 2001). Southeast Asia region has a poor track record in good governance, 
which may diminish the overall effect of education on growth.
Table 8.12: Growth regression results
Author(s) Countries Period Education 
measures
Coefficient Significant level
Kyriacou (1991) Cross 
countries
1970-
1985
Average Years 
of Schooling
-0.1122 Not significant
Mankiw et.al.
(1992)
Cross 
countries
1985 Secondary 
Enrolment
0.28 Not significant
Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994)
Cross 
countries
1965-
1985
Average Years 
of Schooling
-0.059 Not significant
Islam (1995) Panel Data 1960-
1985
Secondary 
Enrolment
-0.0712 Significant at 
1% level
Pritchett (2001) Cross 
countries
1960-
1985
Growth of 
Education 
capital per 
worker
-0.049 Not significant
Barro (2000) Panel Data 1965-
1995
Average Years 
of Schooling
0.0072 Significant at 
1% level
Krueger and 
Lindahl (2001)
Cross 
countries
1960-
1985
Average Years 
of Schooling
0.178 Not significant
Essen (2006) OECD 1965-
2000
Change  in 
Average Years 
of Schooling
-0.003 Not significant
Jalilian et.al.
(2007)
Cross 
countries
1980-
2000
Initial 
Secondary 
Enrolment
-1.27 Significant at 
10% level
Miguel et.al.
(2007)
EU 1960-
2000
Tertiary 
School 
Enrolment
-0.028 Significant at 
1% level
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Robustness
This chapter explored the robustness of the results by including several 
interaction terms, none of which appear to be important in explaining growth. For 
example, democracy squared, regime duration interacted with inequality, and 
democracy interacted with regime duration were included. Replacing average years 
of schooling with either primary or secondary schooling produces the same results. A
negative relationship between education and growth might be a short run 
phenomenon because of high initial cost as postulated by Kyriacou (1991). 
Therefore, it is interesting to differentiate the effect of education into the short and 
long run. The Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran Shin and Smith 
(1997 and 1999) was used to model the short and long run relationship.12 However, 
the results of Persson and Tabellini model (Table 8.6, model 1) are very similar. The 
coefficient for education are negative in both the short-run (-62.793, prob-value of 
0.345) and the long-run (-1.050, prob-value of 0.001).13 Similar results appear when 
primary or secondary schooling is used as the measure of education. 
8.4 Endogeneity
The results reported in the tables above assume strict exogeneity between inequality, 
democracy, regime duration, and growth. If exogeneity does not hold, then the 
results capture only correlation rather than causation. If growth increases inequality, 
then OLS may overstate the effect of inequality on growth. However, inequality is 
typically measured with error which leads to attenuation bias. In addition, there is 
also the possibility of omitted variables bias which can either inflate or deflate the 
coefficient on inequality. The same issues of endogeneity also apply to democracy 
and to regime duration, with measurement error being particularly a problem for 
democracy. 
We potentially have five endogenous regressors (inequality, democracy and its 
interaction with inequality, and regime duration and its square). The recommended 
approach is to use the IV estimator. This is problematic in our situation as IV 
estimators can perform poorly in small samples and because our model is non-linear 
12The estimation was carried out using non imputed data as the xtpmg routine is not compatible with 
mi estimate format.
13 Regime duration model (Table 8.6, model 5) also produces very similar results. The coefficient for 
education are negative in both short (-127.47, prob-value of 0.138) and long run (-0.663, prob-value of 
0.214).
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in endogenous variables. Finding suitable instruments for these variables is 
notoriously difficult. Our instrumentation strategy was as follows.
For inequality we considered the natural logarithm of per capita income and its 
square to capture the Kuznets’ process (Kuznets, 1955), lagged government spending 
as a share of GDP, lagged schooling, the population share of the elderly, and regional 
dummies. As instruments for regime duration we use the inflation rate, the 
employment rate, and also a region specific recession indicator. The later measure is 
used by Brüeckner and Ciccone (2011) and is constructed by regressing the log of 
per capita income against country fixed effects, time effects and a time trend. A 
binary variable is then constructed with a value of 1 if the actual level of output was 
less than the predicted value. As instruments for democracy we use lagged schooling 
and lagged income (the Lipset hypothesis). For Southeast Asia, we also include 
foreign aid and lagged openness as instruments. For voter turnout in Malaysia, we 
use rainfall data on the day of the election (matched for each region). As instruments 
we also use lagged values of the exogenous variables, squares of the excluded 
instruments and interactions.
Instrument relevance was confirmed using Shea’s R-squared (this is useful when 
there are multiple endogenous variables) and instrument validity exogeneity was 
confirmed using Hansen J test. We also consulted the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test. 
The results suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis that the model is 
underidentified and the instruments are weak. We conclude that the instruments are 
valid.
The growth models were then estimated using IV-GMM. We then tested for the 
exogeneity of the assumed endogenous variables. The upshot of this process is that 
we can reject the assumption of endogeneity of inequality, democracy, and regime 
duration for both Malaysia and for Southeast Asia. Consequently, we give preference 
to the OLS results, as these have lower variance.
8.5 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter explores the effects of inequality, democracy and regime 
duration on growth in 8 Southeast Asian countries, the 14 Malaysian states and 
Malaysia as a whole. Both growth and inequality are particularly important to policy 
makers in this region. The results for Malaysia indicate that inequality has had no 
robust effect on regional growth. This is an interesting finding given that successive 
Malaysian governments have been very concerned to keep inequality in check, 
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especially given ethnic tensions within the country. These concerns materialised in 
the adoption of the NEP which appears to also have had a positive effect on growth 
in Malaysia. Electoral participation in the form of voter turnout appears to have a 
positive effect on regional growth in Malaysia. Ruling party dominance has a 
positive effect on growth, but this effect eventually reverses: dominant parties are 
good for growth but very dominant parties are bad for it. The results indicate that a 
shift in power away from the ruling party will increase regional incomes in Malaysia. 
For Southeast Asia there is some evidence of positive growth effects from 
inequality, though these are not robust. The strongest evidence comes from the 
income share of the bottom 40 percent; policies that redistribute incomes towards the 
lowest income earners have a detrimental effect on growth, on average. There is 
fairly robust evidence of the positive effects of regime duration on growth. This 
effect is non-linear; very long lived regimes tend to be bad for growth. Our results 
also confirm the positive effects of trade and capital. This is consistent with the East 
Asian Miracle argument that highlights the importance of a high level of savings as 
one of the development forces for countries such as Malaysia and Singapore (e.g. the 
World Bank, 1993).
The following chapter provides a summary and conclusion of the thesis. The 
chapter also discusses the policy implications and provides some suggestions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Overview
This thesis studies some of the relationships between income inequality, 
education and growth, using data for Malaysia and Southeast Asia. The analysis focuses 
mainly on Malaysia as a nation and the various Malaysian states, and is extended to 
Southeast Asia as a broader regional benchmark.
Inequality is an important issue in development studies. In Malaysia, income 
inequality has been a central policy issue, as it has triggered ethnic conflicts in the past. 
Post-independence policies targeting inequality have been a significant focus of
Malaysia’s development plans. One of the most important policies was the New 
Economic Policy, which was established to specifically address poverty and inequality.
Malaysia has been very successful at growing its economy while significantly reducing 
poverty levels and to some extent reducing inequality. Nevertheless, inequality remains 
an issue in Malaysia, particularly with regard to regional income disparities.
Education has been adopted by various Malaysian governments as one tool to 
reduce inequality; education is also seen as a potentially important factor for promoting 
economic growth. However, the effectiveness of education in both reducing inequality 
and stimulating economic growth needs to be formally assessed, as the available 
empirical evidence is mixed. This is the main undertaking of this thesis.
9.2 The Contributions of the Thesis
This thesis makes several contributions to the study of education, inequality and 
growth in Malaysia and Southeast Asia.
Comprehensive Review of the Effect of Education on Inequality
This thesis provides a comprehensive literature review of the effect of education 
on inequality. The relationship between education and inequality in the literature is 
rather inconclusive. This thesis reviews the literature on the effect of education on
inequality through the lenses of meta-regression analysis. This analysis was presented in 
Chapter 5. The relationship between education and inequality is further investigated 
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using panel data for Malaysia and Southeast Asia. Chapter 6 investigates the effect of 
education in inequality in Southeast Asia, while Chapter 7 examines the effect of 
education on inequality in Malaysian states.    
Assess the Existence of the Kuznets Curve in Malaysia and Southeast Asia
This thesis assesses the existence of the Kuznets curve in Malaysia and Southeast 
Asia. The Kuznets curve is a well-known hypothesis which has been tested extensively 
elsewhere. However, there are relatively few studies conducted for Southeast Asia and 
many of the existing studies are purely descriptive. Accordingly, this thesis attempts to 
fill this lacuna by analysing panel data in order to explore the universality of the Kuznets 
curve, using numerous alternate econometric specifications. This analysis was presented 
in Chapter 6.
Analysis of Malaysian regional income differentials
This thesis analyses the path of regional income differentials and regional 
inequality in Malaysia. This thesis makes use of state panel data for the period 1970-
2009 to explore regional inequality patterns. Several methods of regional inequality 
analysis are employed, such as beta-and sigma-convergence, and the estimation of 
Kuznets’ and Williamson curves. This thesis is also the first to assess the impact of the 
NEP on regional inequality and regional income. This analysis was presented in Chapter 
7.
Regional Specific Study of Inequality and Growth Relationship
The literature on the effects of inequality on growth has produced conflicting 
findings without a firm consensus. Inequality can have a positive, negative, or zero 
effect on growth. Numerous empirical studies have been conducted about this issue. 
These studies explore various channels through which inequality can either assist or 
harm economic growth. New evidence suggests that the growth effects of inequality may 
be region-specific, thereby highlighting the importance of specific regional empirical 
analysis. Accordingly, the thesis presents a regionally focussed study that may 
potentially reveal richer information, as the analysis can be conducted in depth. 
Although many studies have discussed the relationship between inequality and growth, 
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very few studies have focused on the effect of regime duration and democracy. This 
thesis also contributes to the literature in this emerging area by presenting an 
econometric analysis of the effects of regime duration and democracy on growth in 
Malaysia and Southeast Asia.
9.3 Major Findings
The major findings of this thesis are summarized in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1: Summary of key findings
RELATIONSHIP TESTED CHAPTER(S) FINDINGS
Prior Literature: Meta-Analysis
Education and Inequality 5 No effect. In general, education appears to 
have no effect on inequality when measured by 
the Gini coefficient.
Education and Share of Top 
Income
5 Negative. Education reduces the income share 
of the top income earners.
Education and Share of Middle 
Income
5 No significant effect.
Education and Share of Bottom 
Income
5 Positive. Education increases the income share 
of the lowest income earners.
Malaysia
Inequality Trend 2,6 Declining.
Kuznets’ Hypothesis 6 Does not support Kuznets’ hypothesis.
Education and Growth 8 Negative but not significant.
Inequality and Growth 8 Positive but not significant. Does not support 
the Persson and Tabellini (1994) model.
Party Dominance and Growth 8 No significant effect.
Growth Determinants 8 Capital.
Democracy and Growth 8 No significant effect.
Inequality, Growth and Party 
Dominance 
8 No significant effect.
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Malaysian States
Inequality Trend 7 Declining.
Kuznets/ Williamson Hypothesis 7 Does not support Kuznets/Williamson 
hypothesis.
Education and Inequality 7 Reduces inequality at initial level but increases 
it in subsequent periods.
Education and Growth 8 Negative with some significant effects.
Inequality and Growth 7 Positive but not significant. Does not support 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) model.
Inequality and Growth 8 No significant effect.
Party Dominance and Growth 8 Positive or good for growth but long lived 
regime is bad. Supports Olson (1982) 
hypothesis
Growth Determinants 8 Democracy (voter turnout), party dominance, 
NEP and convergence (not robust)
Southeast Asia
Kuznets Hypothesis 6 Does not support Kuznets hypothesis.
Education and Inequality 6 Inequality increases as education increases. 
Inequality increases initially as education 
increases but decreases in a subsequent period.
Education and Growth 8 Negative.
Inequality and Growth 8 Positive but robust and significant in regime 
duration model only. Does not support Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) model.
Regime Duration and Growth 8 Positive or good for growth but long lived 
regime is bad. Supports Olson (1982) 
hypothesis.
Growth Determinants 8 Convergence, exports and capital
Democracy and Growth 8 No significant effect.
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Education and Inequality Relationship
The meta-regression analysis presented in Chapter 5 reveals that in general 
education appears to be an effective tool in reducing the gap between the top and bottom 
income earners, consistent with some theoretical predictions.
The evidence from meta-analysis is supported by empirical results using data for 
Southeast Asia (Chapter 6). These results show that inequality increases as the number 
of years of schooling rises. However, the relationship between education and inequality 
is non-linear and our estimation suggest that inequality increases as schooling increases,
to a peak of 8 years before it starts to decline. The results using Malaysian states data 
suggest a negative relationship, though not all specifications generate statistically 
significant results. Education has a negative effect or reduces inequality initially but then 
has a positive effect. The results of meta-analysis and the evidence in Malaysia and 
Southeast Asia suggest that the effect of education on inequality is complex. The effect 
is either negative (reduces) or positive (increases) depending on the region or country 
under examination, and the level of education.
Inequality and Growth Relationship
In exploring the relationship between inequality and growth, this thesis 
commenced with testing the influential Kuznets’ hypothesis. There is no clear evidence 
of a Kuznets curve pattern in Southeast Asian countries except for Thailand. In Thailand 
a Kuznets’ curve seems to be more pronounced. For Malaysia and Indonesia, the curve 
looks more like a ‘U’ rather than Kuznets’ inverted ‘U’ curve. The evidence is very 
similar at the Malaysian regional level. The pattern of inequality in Malaysian states also 
contradicts Kuznets’ hypothesis. These findings are robust, whether pooled OLS, fixed 
effects, random effects or two-way fixed effects (state and time dummies) models are 
estimated. Therefore, this thesis concludes that there is no systematic relationship 
between inequality and growth in Malaysia and in Southeast Asia.
This thesis furthers the debate on inequality and growth by exploring the effects
of inequality on growth. The results in Malaysia and Southeast Asia provide several 
interesting findings. Malaysian governments have been very concerned to reduce 
inequality especially after serious ethnic conflict within the country. Despite huge efforts 
to counter inequality by the Malaysian government, regime duration and party 
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dominance models suggest that inequality has had no significant adverse effect on 
growth. Different inequality measures were used, including different income categories,
but inequality is not significant effect in any of the specifications. At the Malaysian 
states level, a positive relationship between inequality and growth appears but this does 
not appear to be robustly statistically significant. Interaction of inequality with 
democracy also generates similar results, implying that inequality does not reduce 
growth even within a democratic environment, contrary to the predictions of the Persson 
and Tabellini model.
Similar evidence was found for Southeast Asia. In general, inequality has a 
positive effect but the results are not robust. The results based on the different income 
shares are inconsistent and tend to contrast with the Persson and Tabellini model except 
for the income share of the bottom 40 percent. A negative relationship between the 
income share of the bottom 40 percent and economic growth is robust, suggesting that 
redistributive policies towards the lowest income earners may be harmful to growth on 
average. 
Regime Duration, Democracy and Growth
The relationship between regime duration or party dominance and economic 
growth appears to be non-linear, just as Olson (1982) hypothesized. The results for both 
Southeast Asia and the Malaysian states show a positive effect of regime duration on 
growth. Solid evidence of the positive growth effects of party dominance appears for
Malaysian states. The coefficient of party dominance is consistently positive and 
statistically significant, and its square always recorded a negative coefficient and is also 
statistically significant. Therefore, these results suggest that while strong party 
dominance or relatively long lived regimes promote growth, very strong party 
dominance and very long lived regimes are bad for economic growth. Consistent with 
recent evidence (e.g. Doucouliagos and Usubalosoglu, 2008) democracy is found to 
have had no significant effect on growth in Malaysia or Southeast Asian. However, at
the Malaysian state level, democracy appears to be important for regional growth.
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Regional Inequality Patterns
This thesis uses numerous methods to investigate regional inequality patterns in 
Malaysia. Analysis of the coefficient of variation reveals that regional inequality has 
increased significantly since the 1980s. Analysis of beta-convergence suggests evidence 
of regional income convergence. The convergence rate is estimated to be 2 percent 
annually, a rate of convergence that is found for other countries/regions. However, 
analysis of the Williamson curve shows that regional inequality has a significant 
oscillation trend without any clear pattern; regional inequality is neither converging nor 
diverging. Thus, it can be concluded that while Malaysian states have experienced some 
degree of income convergence, there is no systematic pattern in regional inequality. This 
thesis highlights several factors that might influence regional inequality patterns, such as
the historical background of Malaysian states, globalization and government policies. 
Regarding government policies, particularly the NEP, interestingly this thesis finds no 
evidence to support the notion that the NEP was successful in reducing inequality. In 
fact the results suggest that, ceteris paribus, inequality had increased during the NEP.  
Education Is Negatively Related With Growth
The importance of education to economic growth has been recognized since the
1950s. Education is often perceived as one of the most important determinants of 
growth; education is expected to increase economic growth. Nevertheless, most of the 
empirical results on the relationship between education and economic growth presented 
in this thesis are negative. The results of the growth equation presented in Chapter 8 are 
constantly negative and are statistically significant in most specifications or models. 
This finding is actually consistent with the empirical evidence in some of the recent 
literature. The findings in this thesis support the view that education is not a factor of 
production that contributes to growth in the short-run (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994: 
160). Consistent with the mainstream literature, exports and capital formation are found 
to be the most important determinants of growth in Southeast Asia. These results are 
robust regardless of specifications and inequality measures. There is some evidence of 
convergence between Southeast Asian countries but the results are not robust. Similarly, 
a weak sign of convergence also appears between Malaysian states. Economic growth 
was significantly higher during the NEP period for Malaysian states but there is no
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significant difference at the Malaysian national level between the NEP and post-NEP 
period. Poor data might contribute to the different results. At the Malaysia national level, 
capital appears to be the main growth determinant.   
9.4 Policy Implications
The findings presented in this thesis suggest some important policy implications.
Inequality Reduction is an Ongoing Effort
The results in Chapter 6 and 7 reveal that the inequality has no systematic 
pattern; neither an inverted Kuznets ‘U’ curve in Malaysia or Southeast Asian countries,
nor a Williamson curve at the states level. In fact, at the state level the results suggest a 
fluctuating trend. Hence, policy makers should keep in mind and be aware that 
inequality is a dynamic process. Inequality can increase or decrease along the course of 
development without any clear pattern. Policy makers should develop their inequality 
reduction plans and programs continuously as sustained regional disparities can affect
society, at least in the long-run.
Inequality is not Necessarily Harmful to Economic Growth
There is a popular view, particularly from some political economy scholars, that 
inequality is bad for growth as government spending on redistribution efforts is 
unproductive and detracts from growth. The results in this thesis suggest that inequality 
has not been harmful to economic growth in Malaysia and Southeast Asia. Indeed, some 
of the results suggest a positive relationship; inequality might actually be good for 
growth in this region. 
The Importance of Basic Education
The meta-analysis results in Chapter 5 reveal two important findings regarding 
the effect of education on inequality. Although education has no significant effect in 
general, education appears to have a considerable effect in reducing the gap between the 
rich and the poor. These results suggest that education is still an important measure for 
combating inequality. The effect of secondary education in reducing inequality is larger,
implying that policy makers should ensure that everyone has access to at least some 
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level of secondary education. In March 1990, The World Bank organized a World 
Conference on Education for All, at Jomtien Thailand. The conference aimed to urge 
governments to ensure that everyone has equal access to basic education. The obstacles 
to entry to the education system should be removed by increasing public spending in the 
education sector. Measures designed to improve teaching and learning facilities might 
also be beneficial. The declaration firmly urged governments ‘to mobilize strong 
national and international political commitment for education for all, develop national 
action plans and enhance significantly investment in basic education’ (UNESCO, 
2008:15).
Political Processes
Finally, the results indicate that for Malaysian states voter turnout has had a positive 
effect on growth. Hence, schemes that promote voter turnout and citizen participation in 
the democratic process appear to improve welfare, at least in Malaysia. Party dominance 
and the length of ruling party tenure also have important welfare consequences.  These, 
however, are complex issues for governments and citizens of Southeast Asia to grapple 
with. Awareness of the welfare consequences of political factors is at least a first 
necessary step to policy and institutional reform.
9.5 Limitations and Future Research
Like all research endeavours, this thesis suffers from some limitations. The 
availability and reliability of data are a major challenge for this and any other study of 
Southeast Asian countries in general, and Malaysia in particular. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the main variables in this thesis, inequality and education are not available 
every year and the available data contain many missing values. This thesis uses multiple 
imputation techniques to ‘fill in’ the missing data. The education data also face a similar 
problem. In Malaysia for instance, there are several versions of education data with 
different figures from various government agencies. Tertiary education data is not 
available at the state level. Thus, we are unable to compare the findings for Malaysian 
states with those for the national and Southeast Asian results. Lack of data, especially at 
the state level, limits empirical analysis.
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The discussion and analysis presented in this thesis assumed that the relationship 
between inequality and growth is orthogonal. This is partly justified by the results 
presented in Chapter 6 which suggest an absence of reverse causality between inequality 
and income, as well as the results presented in Chapter 8, which suggest a lack of 
endogeneity bias in the estimation. Nevertheless, the analyses relied upon single 
equation models which do not consider the real possibility that education, inequality and 
growth might very well be interrelated with each other. In the real world, these variables 
might very well be interdependent and interact simultaneously; any change in one 
variable will affect or influence other variables.
Lundberg and Squire (2003:340-341) argue that some growth and inequality 
determinants are interdependent. They suggest that policy makers should consider the 
joint determinants of growth and inequality in order to minimize the chances of 
misleading policies. They noted that:
…the search for a mechanistic relationship between inequality and income ignores the 
potential role of policy to advance both outcomes. On the other hand, when researchers 
have investigated the impact of policy on growth or inequality, they have done so by 
focusing on one outcome independently but not both…future research on growth and 
inequality should focus on their joint determinants, and especially those that are 
amenable to policy.
Therefore, future research can build upon the single equation models presented here, and 
develop structural models that capture the interdependence between these and other 
associations.
The Mincer (1974) equation is probably the pioneer in the study of education and 
inequality. Many studies of the effects of education on inequality are based on the 
Mincer approach to investigate the relationship between education and inequality. 
Nevertheless, studies based on Mincer’s approach were excluded from the meta-dataset 
as these refer to the earnings differential between individual workers, rather than 
aggregate income inequality that was of primary interest in this thesis. The meta-analysis 
study in this thesis focused on the aggregate relationship between income and education. 
Future research could focus on a meta-analysis of individual earnings differentials and 
education. 
The role of education can also be further examined. Education has long been 
cited as one of the effective tools in reducing inequality and promoting growth. In 
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growth regressions, for instance the augmented Solow model, education is assumed to 
be a factor of production. Education is expected to increase economic growth. 
Nevertheless, several recent studies reveal that education has a negative effect, or is 
negatively related with growth, contrary to popular beliefs and expectations. Thus, many 
scholars (see Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Pritchett, 2001) suggest that education may 
not be a factor of production that directly contributes to growth. Instead, education might 
affect growth indirectly. The results in this thesis (Chapter 8) are very similar to some of 
this recent evidence that suggests a negative direct relationship between education and 
economic growth. Therefore, future research could focus on investigating the reasons 
behind the negative direct effect of education on growth. Borrowing Pritchett’s (2001) 
popular question: Where has all the education gone? Does it relate to the failure of 
institutions and rent seeking activities as Pritchett postulated? These are fascinating 
research questions for future research.
Although inequality has declined in general, the evidence presented in this thesis 
shows a tendency to increasing inequality between Malaysian states. As inequality 
remains an important issue, future research may explore ways to counter the rising 
regional inequality trend. Regional disparity in the long run can have adverse effects on 
society and the economy. Future research could focus on investigating the sources of 
regional inequality differences, for example whether these differences are influenced by 
specific government policies.
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